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Foreword
The year 2004 will certainly be recorded in the history of the European Union as the year 
of its most significant enlargement. The latter did not fail to affect the organisation and 
functioning of the Court of Justice. The arrival of 10 new Judges at the Court of Justice 
and  10  new  Judges  at  the  Court  of  First  Instance,  together  with  the  increase  of 
approximately 50% in the institution’s staff, suffices alone to illustrate the challenge 
which enlargement has represented for the Court of Justice too. Meticulous preparation 
and, in particular, the remarkable devotion to duty of its staff have, however, enabled the 
Court successfully to meet the challenge, limited only by the means at its disposal.
The past year has also allowed an initial assessment of the effect of the changes to the 
functioning of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance resulting from the 
Treaty of Nice. Those changes were supplemented by a series of internal measures 
adopted by the Court of Justice in order to improve the effectiveness of its working 
methods. Finally, the creation of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal also deserves 
a mention among the events that marked 2004.
This report contains an account of the changes for the institution in the course of this 
pivotal year and, as is now traditional, a record of the main judicial activity of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance, accompanied by statistics.
V. Skouris
President of the Court of Justice6 76 7
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A  —  The Court of Justice in 2004: changes and proceedings
by Mr Vassilios Skouris, President of the Court of Justice
This part of the Annual Report gives an overview of the activity of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities in 2004. It describes, first, the way the Court developed 
during that year, with the emphasis on the institutional changes affecting the Court and 
the changes in its internal organisation and methods of work (section 1). It includes, 
second, an analysis of the statistics on the Court’s workload and the average length of 
proceedings (section 2). It presents, third, as each year, the main developments in the 
case-law, arranged by subject-matter (section 3).
1.  For the Court of Justice, the year 2004 was undoubtedly characterised principally by 
the enlargement of the European Union and the organisational changes that enlargement 
entailed for the Court (section 1.1). Also deserving of attention, however, are the transfer 
of some jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance and the creation 
of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (section 1.2), the important decisions taken 
by the Court with a view to improving the efficiency of its methods of work (section 1.3), 
and the amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice and to the 
Rules of Procedure (section 1.4).
1.1.  Enlargement of the European Union represented a great challenge for the Court, at 
both jurisdictional and administrative level. The Court had to receive 20 new judges with 
their chambers (10 Judges of the Court of Justice and 10 Judges of the Court of First 
Instance) and make ready for the introduction of 9 new official languages. In its concern 
to cope with enlargement in the best possible conditions, it had taken certain measures 
from  the  beginning  of  2002.  Those  measures  related  in  particular  to  planning  the 
installation of the new chambers, creating a nucleus of staff to be assigned to the nine 
new language units in the translation department, and organising an ad hoc working 
group with the task of identifying the needs of the various departments with an eye to the 
forthcoming accessions.
Enlargement became reality for the Court on 11 May 2004, the date of the formal sitting 
held for the swearing in of the 10 new members of the Court of Justice. On 12 May 2004, 
at the formal sitting for the swearing in of the 9 new judges of the Court of First Instance, 
the Court met for the first time as a body of 33 members. It was thus before a Court of 
Justice containing members from their own countries that the new members of the Court 
of First Instance were sworn in. For the Court of Justice as for the Court of First Instance, 
the very last stage of the enlargement process took place on 7 July 2004 when the 10th 
new member of the Court of First Instance took the oath.
At organisational level, the arrival of the new judges made it necessary to create an 
additional five-judge Chamber at the Court of Justice. There thus now exist at the Court 
three  Chambers  of  five  judges  (the  First,  Second  and  Third  Chambers)  and  three 
Chambers  of  three  judges  (the  Fourth,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Chambers).  Each  five-judge 
chamber consists of eight judges and each three-judge chamber of seven judges, who 
sit in rotation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rules of Procedure. It 
should also be noted that the three Presidents of the five-judge Chambers do not belong 
to a three-judge Chamber.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The new members’ chambers were set up and installed quickly and without incident. A 
number of training and information seminars were arranged for the staff working with the 
new judges, which made their regular integration into the judicial work of the Court of 
Justice and Court of First Instance much easier. From taking office, each of the new 
judges  was  allocated  a  number  of  cases.  Preliminary  reports  have  already  been 
presented in several of these cases, in connection with which several hearings have 
already been held, Opinions of the Advocates General submitted, or even judgments 
delivered. The installation and rapid integration of the new judges and their staff has had 
a significant impact on the statistics of the Court (see section 2).
At linguistic level, enlargement meant the addition of 9 new official languages – clearly a 
challenge for an institution with an integral multi-language system – so that the Court 
now has to be capable of functioning in 20 potential languages of the case, producing 
380 possible linguistic combinations. Nine new language divisions were set up within the 
Court’s translation department, one for each new language. Recruitment of staff to work 
in the new divisions took place particularly efficiently. On 31 December 2004 about 83% 
of the posts provided for those divisions were already filled. As to the availability of 
judgments in the new languages, the first indications are very encouraging: thus one 
might mention, as an example, that, for the judgments delivered on 16 December 2004, 
approximately 85% of the translations into the new languages were available on the date 
of the judgment.
At general administrative level, the impact of enlargement was no less significant. The 
staff of the Court increased by about 50% in 2004. Special efforts were made for the 
recruitment  of  staff,  and  a  number  of  changes  were  made  in  the  organisation  and 
functioning of the departments of the Court, listing which would go beyond the objectives 
of this part of the Annual Report.
1.2.  The year 2004 was also characterised by changes to the judicial structure of the 
European Union.
First, by Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom amending Articles 51 and 54 of the Protocol on 
the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L 132, p. 5, corrigendum at OJ 2004 L 194, 
p. 3), the Council transferred to the Court of First Instance certain jurisdiction which had 
previously been reserved to the Court of Justice. The Court of First Instance has thus 
acquired jurisdiction over direct actions for annulment and for failure to act brought by the 
Member States against:
Ø  decisions of the Council concerning State aid;
Ø  acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures 
to protect trade;
Ø  acts of the Council by which it directly exercises implementing powers;
Ø  acts of the European Central Bank, and acts of the Commission with the exception 
of those that concern enhanced cooperation under the EC Treaty.
The  cases  transferred  to  the  Court  of  First  Instance  on  this  basis  may  be  estimated 
quantitatively at approximately 5% of the cases before the Court of Justice (25 cases pending 
before the Court of Justice were transferred to the Court of First Instance in 2004).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Second, the Council made use for the first time of the possibility, introduced by the Treaty 
of Nice, of creating judicial panels to hear and determine at first instance certain classes 
of action, subject to appeal to the Court of First Instance. By Decision 2004/752/EC, 
Euratom of 2 November 2004 (OJ 2004 L 333, p. 7), it established the European Union 
Civil Service Tribunal. That Tribunal, which will have jurisdiction to hear disputes involving 
the European Union civil service, should begin to operate in the course of 2005. The 
creation of the Civil Service Tribunal is a decisive step towards improving the efficiency 
of Community administration of justice. The Court of First Instance should thereby be 
relieved of a not insubstantial volume of cases (about 25% of the cases brought each 
year) and the Court of Justice relieved of hearing appeals relating to those cases (about 
10% of the cases brought each year).
1.3.  In the first months of 2004 the Court thought long and hard about its methods of 
work, in order to make them more efficient and counteract the expanding average length 
of proceedings. The result was the adoption of a series of measures which were put into 
practice progressively from May 2004.
Among the most important of those measures is, first, the putting in place of a more 
rigorous system for managing the Court’s judicial work. That system is ensured with the 
aid of computer tools developed specially for the purpose. In addition, to speed up the 
written procedure in direct actions and appeals, the Court has decided to adopt a much 
stricter approach to granting extensions of time-limits for submitting pleadings.
Moreover, the Reports for the Hearing drawn up by the Judge-Rapporteur are now 
drafted in a shorter and more summary form and contain only the essential elements of 
the case. Where the procedure in a case, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, 
does not require an oral hearing, a report of the Judge-Rapporteur is no longer produced. 
In accordance with the wording of Article 20 of the Statute of the Court, such a report is 
compulsory only where a hearing takes place.
Finally, the Court has re-examined its practice of publishing judgments in the European 
Court Reports. Two factors were identified at the centre of the problem. First, it was 
found that the volume of the Reports, which exceeded 12 000 pages in 2002 and 13 000 
pages  in  2003,  is  liable  seriously  to  compromise  the  accessibility  of  the  case-law. 
Second, all judgments published in the Reports necessarily have to be translated into all 
the official languages of the Union, which represents a substantial workload for the 
Court’s translation department. Given that not all the judgments it delivers are equally 
significant from the point of view of the development of Community law, the Court, after 
careful consideration, decided to adopt a policy of selective publication of its decisions in 
the European Court Reports.
In an initial stage, as regards direct actions and appeals, judgments will no longer be 
published in the Reports if they come from a Chamber of three judges, or from a Chamber 
of five judges if, pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 20 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice, the case is decided without an Opinion of the Advocate General. It will, however, 
be open to the formation giving judgment to decide to publish such a decision in whole 
or in part in exceptional circumstances. It must be noted that texts of the decisions not 
published in the Reports will still be accessible to the public in electronic form in the 
language or languages available.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The Court decided not to extend this new practice to references for a preliminary ruling, 
in view of their importance for the interpretation and uniform application of Community 
law in all the Member States.
The reduction in the workload of the Court’s translation department following the adoption 
of the selective publication policy was already clearly noticeable in 2004. The total saving 
as a result of selective publication amounted in 2004 to approximately 20 000 pages.
1.4.  The Court’s reflections on the course of proceedings and methods of work also 
prompted it to suggest certain amendments to its Rules of Procedure, again with the 
intention  of  shortening  the  length  of  proceedings. Those  proposals,  which  relate  to 
various aspects of the procedure before the Court, are still being discussed in the Council 
and have not yet been approved by that institution.
One decision amending the Rules of Procedure was, however, adopted in 2004. As a 
result of the accession of the new Member States, and in view of the fact that the Council 
had  amended  the  provision  of  the  Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  Court  of  Justice 
concerning the number of judges in the Grand Chamber, the Court consequently adjusted 
the provisions of the Rules of Procedure relating to the composition of that formation of 
the Court. The Grand Chamber thus now consists of 13 judges.
2.  The cumulative effect of the measures taken to improve the efficiency of the methods 
of work of the Court, the implementation of the changes made by the Treaty of Nice to 
the working of the Court, and the arrival of 10 new judges following enlargement is 
clearly visible in the Court’s judicial statistics for 2004. The number of cases brought to a 
close increased by approximately 30%, that of cases pending fell by about 14%, and 
there was a considerable improvement in the duration of proceedings before the Court.
In particular, the Court brought 603 cases to a close in 2004 (net figure, taking account 
of joined cases). Of those cases, 375 were dealt with by judgments and 226 gave rise to 
orders. Those figures show a considerable increase over the previous year (455 cases 
brought to a close). The Court had 531 new cases brought before it (561 in 2003, gross 
figures). There were 840 cases (gross figure) pending at the end of 2004, compared with 
974 at the end of 2003.
The upward trend in the length of proceedings observed during previous years changed 
in 2004. As regards references for preliminary rulings, the length was approximately 23 
months, whereas it was approximately 25 months in 2003. As regards direct actions, it 
fell from 25 months in 2003 to 20 months in 2004. The average time taken to deal with 
appeals was 21 months (compared with 28 months in 2003).
As in the preceding year, the Court made use in 2004 of the various instruments at its 
disposal to expedite the treatment of certain cases (priority treatment, the accelerated or 
expedited procedure, the simplified procedure, and the possibility of giving judgment 
without an Opinion of the Advocate General). For the third time, the Court made use of 
the expedited or accelerated procedure provided for in Articles 62a and 104a of the 
Rules of Procedure, but this time in a direct action (judgment of 13 July 2004 in Case 
C-27/04 P Commission v Council, not yet published in the ECR, see section 3.11). As 
this instrument makes it possible to omit certain stages in the procedure, it was possible Proceedings  Court of Justice
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to give judgment less than six months from the case being brought. Use of the expedited 
or accelerated procedure was requested in 12 other cases, but the exceptional conditions 
of urgency required by the Rules of Procedure were not satisfied. Following a new 
practice, requests for the use of the expedited or accelerated procedure are granted or 
dismissed by reasoned order of the President of the Court.
The Court also regularly used the simplified procedure provided for in Article 104(3) of 
the Rules of Procedure for answering certain questions referred to it for preliminary 
rulings. It made 22 orders on the basis of that provision.
In addition, the Court made frequent use of the possibility provided by Article 20 of the 
Statute of giving judgment without an Opinion of the Advocate General where the case 
does not raise any new point of law. It is noteworthy that about 30% of the judgments 
delivered in 2004 were delivered without an Opinion.
As regards the distribution of cases between the formations of the Court, it may be noted 
that the full Court (full Court, Grand Chamber, former plenary formations) dealt with 
nearly 12%, Chambers of five judges 54% and Chambers of three judges 34% of the 
cases brought to a close in 2004. There is a tendency for cases heard by Chambers of 
five judges to increase in number (50% of cases brought to a close in 2002). Five-judge 
Chambers are thus becoming the usual formation for hearing the cases brought before 
the Court. The substantial increase in the number of cases heard by Chambers of three 
judges should also be pointed out (20% of cases brought to a close in 2003).
For further information on the statistics for the 2004 judicial year, the reader is referred to 
Chapter IV of this Report.
3.  It is, however, the judicial activity of the Court that I wish more particularly to dwell on 
in this Annual Report. This section presents the main developments in the case-law, 
arranged by subject-matter as follows:
law of the institutions (section 3.1); European citizenship (section 3.2); free movement of 
goods (section 3.3); freedom of movement for workers (section 3.4); freedom to provide 
services (section 3.5); free movement of capital (section 3.6); competition rules (section 
3.7); trade mark law (section 3.8); harmonisation of laws (section 3.9); social law (section 
3.10); economic and monetary policy (section 3.11).
This selection covers only 34 of the 603 judgments and orders handed down by the Court 
in 2004. They are, however, presented more fully than in previous editions of the Annual 
Report of the Court. While the selection naturally includes judgments of major importance in 
cases where an Opinion was written by the Advocate General, for purely practical reasons 
connected with the length of this Report those Opinions, which are nevertheless essential 
for understanding the issues at stake in a case, are not addressed here. The full texts of all 
the judgments, opinions and orders of the Court published in the European Court Reports, 
as well as the Opinions of the Advocates General, are available in all the official languages 
of the Communities on the Court’s internet site (www.curia.eu.int) and the Europa site 
(www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex). In order to avoid any confusion and to assist the reader, this 
Report refers, unless otherwise stated, to the numbering of the articles of the Treaty on 
European Union and the EC Treaty established by the Treaty of Amsterdam.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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3.1.  Among cases with constitutional or institutional import, four are worthy of mention, 
one concerning the conclusion by the Community of international agreements with non-
member countries, the other three the application of and compliance with Community 
law by the authorities of the Member States. In Case C-233/02 France v Commission 
[2004] ECR I-2759 the Court dismissed the action brought by France for annulment of 
the act by which the Commission had concluded an agreement with the United States on 
guidelines intended to improve regulatory cooperation between the two parties and to 
promote transparency towards third parties in connection with the adoption of technical 
rules  concerning  goods  covered  by  the  WTO/TBT  Agreement  (the  World  Trade 
Organisation’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade).
The French Government’s main argument was that the Commission had itself concluded, in 
the form of guidelines, a binding international agreement, whereas the conclusion of such an 
act is normally within the exclusive competence of the Council by virtue of Article 300 EC.
The Commission submitted, on the other hand, that the guidelines had no binding force, 
and that that on its own was enough to confer competence on it to adopt them.
The  Court’s  answer  was  a  qualified  one.  It  rejected  the  argument  of  the  French 
Government without altogether agreeing with the Commission. The fact that a measure 
such as the guidelines at issue in the case is not binding is not sufficient to confer on the 
Commission the competence to adopt it. The Court said that ‘determining the conditions 
under which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division of powers and the 
institutional balance established by the Treaty in the field of the common commercial 
policy be duly taken into account, since in this case the measure seeks to reduce the risk 
of conflict related to the existence of technical barriers to trade in goods’ (paragraph 40).
The lack of binding force is not therefore the exclusive criterion of competence, allowing 
the Commission to adopt measures such as the guidelines. Account must also be taken 
of the division of powers and the institutional balance established by the Treaty in the 
field in question. The Court then stated that the intention of the parties must be ‘the 
decisive  criterion  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  or  not  the  Guidelines  are 
binding’ (paragraph 42). Carrying out an analysis of the wording, the Court reached the 
conclusion that in this case the guidelines clearly have no binding force, and are therefore 
logically not concerned by Article 300 EC.
It was thus from an analysis in concreto, that is to say, of the measure seen in its context, 
that the Court was able to determine the institution with competence to conclude the 
agreement at issue.
In Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837 the College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven (Administrative Court for Trade and Industry, Netherlands) asked the Court, 
in the context of a dispute concerning the tariff classification of poultrymeat and the 
determination of the amount of export refunds for the exporter, whether Community law, 
in  particular  the  principle  of  Community  solidarity  in  Article  10  EC,  requires  an 
administrative body to reopen a decision which has become final in order to ensure the 
full operation of Community law, as it is to be interpreted in the light of a subsequent 
preliminary ruling.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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From December 1986 to December 1987 Kühne & Heitz NV, a company established in 
the Netherlands, exported quantities of poultrymeat parts to non-member countries and 
made various declarations to the Netherlands customs authorities with a view to obtaining 
export refunds for consignments of poultrymeat. Those goods were declared under a 
particular subheading of the Common Customs Tariff. On the basis of those declarations, 
the  Productschap  voor  Pluimvee-  en  Eieren  granted  export  refunds  under  that 
subheading and paid the exporting company the relevant amounts.
After carrying out checks as to the nature of the goods exported, the Productschap 
reclassified  them  under  a  different  tariff  subheading,  following  which  it  ordered  the 
exporting company to repay a certain sum. The company’s complaint against the demand 
for reimbursement was rejected, and it appealed against that rejection to the College van 
Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven. The latter dismissed the appeal in 1991 without finding it 
necessary to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, on the ground that the 
goods  in  question  were  not  covered  by  the  term  ‘legs’  within  the  meaning  of  the 
subheading stated in the exporter’s declaration.
Relying on a later judgment of the Court of Justice rejecting the view taken by the 
Netherlands courts (Case C-151/93 Voogd Vleesimport- en export [1994] ECR I-4915), 
the exporter sought payment of the refunds it had been refused, and the court in which it 
brought proceedings against the administrative authorities’ fresh refusal of its request 
referred a question in the above terms to the Court of Justice.
The Court began by recalling that, in view of the obligation on all the authorities of the 
Member States to ensure observance of Community law, and also of the retroactive 
effect inherent in interpretative judgments, a rule of Community law which has been 
interpreted on the occasion of a reference for a preliminary ruling must be applied by 
all State bodies within the sphere of their competence, even to legal relationships 
which  arose  or  were  formed  before  the  Court  gave  its  ruling  on  the  request  for 
interpretation.
With regard to compliance with that obligation notwithstanding the fact that the national 
administrative decision has become final before the application for that decision to be 
reviewed in the light of a preliminary ruling by the Court, account must be taken, said the 
Court, of the demands of the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general 
principles of Community law. In the present case, the Court was able to find a way of 
reconciling  those  two  requirements  by  noting,  first,  that  Netherlands  law  gives 
administrative bodies the power to reopen a final administrative decision, second, that 
the decision became final only as a result of a judgment of a national court against whose 
decisions  there  is  no  judicial  remedy,  third,  that  that  judgment  was  based  on  an 
interpretation of Community law which, in the light of a subsequent judgment of the 
Court, was incorrect and which was adopted without a question being referred to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling in accordance with the conditions provided for in the third 
paragraph of Article 234 EC, and, finally, that the person concerned complained to the 
administrative body immediately after becoming aware of that judgment of the Court.
Having  summarised  the  facts  of  the  case  in  that  way,  the  Court  held  that,  in  such 
circumstances,  the  administrative  body  concerned  hearing  such  a  request  is,  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  cooperation  arising  from  Article  10  EC,  under  an Proceedings  Court of Justice
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obligation to review the final administrative decision in order to take account of the 
interpretation of the relevant provision given in the meantime by the Court.
In Case C-239/03 Commission v France (judgment of 7 October 2004, not yet published 
in the ECR) France was accused of failing to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent, 
abate and combat heavy and prolonged pollution of the Étang de Berre’ (paragraph 18).
The serious damage to the aquatic environment of the Étang de Berre, caused principally 
by hydroelectric discharges from a power station, induced the Commission to bring an 
action before the Court alleging infringement of the Barcelona Convention of 16 February 
1976 and the Athens Protocol of 17 May 1980 for the protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea against pollution.
The Court had first to decide on its own jurisdiction. Following on from its decision in Case 
12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, it observed that ‘mixed agreements concluded by the 
Community, its Member States and non-member countries have the same status in the 
Community legal order as purely Community agreements in so far as the provisions fall 
within the scope of Community competence. In ensuring compliance with commitments 
arising from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions, the Member States 
fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, which has 
assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement’ (paragraphs 25 and 
26). Applying that reasoning to the present case, the Court observed that those mixed 
agreements  concern  a  field  in  large  measure  covered  by  Community  law,  namely 
protection  of  the  environment.  Their  implementation  therefore  has  a  Community 
dimension. The fact that there is no specific Community legislation on the subject-matter 
of the action is not material. On the basis of that reasoning, the Court declared that it had 
jurisdiction to rule on the application of those international agreements.
The Court then addressed the substance of the case. After analysing the wording of the 
agreements in question, it observed that ‘it is therefore a particularly rigorous obligation 
that is owed by the Contracting Parties’, namely an obligation to ‘strictly limit’ pollution 
from land-based sources in the area by ‘appropriate measures’ (paragraph 50). The 
existence of other sources of pollution, such as industrialisation of the marsh’s shores 
and the rapid increase in the population of the nearby communes, was not capable of 
calling into question the existence of land-based pollution attributable to the operation of 
the power station. The Court then had to examine the appropriateness of the actions of 
the French public authorities from the point of view of their Community obligation to 
reduce pollution from land-based sources.
In this context, the Court found that the quantities of fresh water and alluvia discharged 
by the hydroelectric power station were indeed excessive, despite the measures taken 
by the public authorities to reduce them. Moreover, the harmful effect of such discharges 
is well known, and that circumstance in itself attested the inadequacy of the measures 
taken by the public authorities. The Court therefore considered, following that detailed 
analysis, that the actions of the public authorities were not appropriate, and consequently 
held that France had failed to fulfil its obligations.
Case C-60/02 X [2004] ECR I-651 raised the question of the imposition by national 
courts of penalties for breach of Community law. In November 2000 Rolex, a company Proceedings  Court of Justice
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which holds various trade marks for watches, applied in Austria for a judicial investigation 
to be opened against persons unknown, following the discovery of a consignment of 
counterfeit watches which persons unknown had attempted to transport from Italy to 
Poland, thus infringing its trade mark rights. Rolex asked for the goods to be seized 
and destroyed following that investigation. In July 2001 Tommy Hilfiger, Gucci and 
Gap likewise requested the opening of judicial investigations concerning imitation 
goods from China intended to be transported to Slovakia. The Austrian court was 
faced with the following problem: the opening of a judicial investigation under the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the conduct complained of is an 
offence. However, the court said, under the national law on the protection of trade 
marks only the import and export of counterfeit goods, and not their mere transit 
across the national territory, constitute offences. The court therefore put a question to 
the Court of Justice on the compatibility of that law with Regulation No 3295/94, 1 
which in its view covers also mere transit.
The Court first confirmed that view: the regulation applies also to goods in transit from 
one non-member country to another which are temporarily detained in a Member State 
by the customs authorities of that State. It further stated that the interpretation of the 
scope of the regulation does not depend on the type of national proceedings (civil, 
criminal or administrative) in which that interpretation is relied on. The Court then noted 
that there was no unanimity as to the interpretation to be given to the Austrian law on 
trade marks. The Austrian Government and the claimant companies contested the view 
taken by the national court; in their opinion, mere transit is indeed an offence under 
Austrian law. That, said the Court, concerned the interpretation of national law, which is 
a matter for the national court, not the Court of Justice. If the national court were to find 
that the relevant provisions of national law do not in fact penalise mere transit contrary to 
the regulation, it would have to interpret its national law within the limits set by Community 
law, in order to achieve the result intended by the Community rule, and in this case apply 
to the transit of counterfeit goods across the national territory the civil law remedies 
applicable under national law to the other offences, provided that they were effective and 
proportionate and constituted an effective deterrent. The Court noted, however, that a 
particular problem arises where the principle of compatible interpretation is applied to 
criminal matters. That principle finds its limits in the general principles of law. In particular, 
since  Regulation  No  3295/94  empowers  Member  States  to  adopt  penalties  for  the 
conduct it prohibits, the Court’s case-law on directives must be extended to it, according 
to which directives cannot, of themselves and independently of a national law adopted 
by a Member State for their implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating 
the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of their provisions. The 
Court reached the conclusion that, if the national court were to consider that Austrian law 
does not prohibit the mere transit of counterfeit goods, the principle of non-retroactivity 
of penalties, which is a general principle of Community law, would prohibit the imposition 
of criminal penalties for such conduct, despite the fact that national law was contrary to 
Community law.
1  Council Regulation (EC) No 3295/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down measures concerning the 
entry into the Community and the export and re-export from the Community of goods infringing 
certain intellectual property rights (OJ 1994 L 341, p. 8), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
241/1999 of 25 January 1999 (OJ 1999 L 27, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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3.2.  European citizenship and its implications were involved in two cases.
In Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763 the Korkein oikeus (Supreme Court, Finland) 
referred a question on the interpretation of Article 18 EC for a preliminary ruling. That 
question arose in proceedings between Mr Pusa, a Finnish national in receipt of an 
invalidity pension in Finland, and Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö concerning 
calculation of the amount in which that company should be authorised to carry out an 
attachment on the pension Mr Pusa received in Finland, for the purpose of recovering a 
debt owed by him. The Finnish law on enforcement provides that part of remuneration is 
excluded from attachment, that part being calculated from the amount which remains 
after compulsory deduction at source of income tax in Finland. The problem in this case 
lay in the fact that the person concerned, who was resident in Spain, was subject to 
income  tax  there  and  thus,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  a  double  taxation 
agreement, not subject to any deduction at source in Finland. The part of his pension 
subject to attachment was therefore calculated on the basis of the – necessarily higher 
– gross amount of the pension, which would not have been the case if he had continued 
to reside in Finland.
The  Finnish  Supreme  Court  asked  the  Court  of  Justice  essentially  whether  such  a 
situation  is  compatible  in  particular  with  the  freedom  of  movement  and  residence 
guaranteed to citizens of the European Union by the EC Treaty.
Recalling that Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States and that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member States 
the same treatment in law as that accorded to the nationals of those Member States who 
find themselves in the same situation, the Court considered, first, that if the Finnish law 
on enforcement if the law on enforcement must be interpreted to mean that it does not in 
any way allow the tax paid by the person concerned in Spain to be taken into account, 
that difference of treatment will certainly and inevitably result in his being placed at a 
disadvantage by virtue of exercising his right to move and reside freely in the Member 
States, as guaranteed under Article 18 EC. The Court stated, second, that to preclude all 
consideration of the tax payable in the Member State of residence, when such tax has 
become payable and to that extent affects the actual means available to the debtor, 
cannot be justified in the light of the legitimate objectives pursued by such a law of 
preserving the creditor’s right to recover the debt due to him and preserving the debtor’s 
right to a minimum subsistence income.
Consequently, in answer to the question referred to it by the Finnish Supreme Court, the 
Court held that ‘Community law in principle precludes legislation of a Member State 
under which the attachable part of a pension paid at regular intervals in that State to a 
debtor is calculated by deducting from that pension the income tax prepayment levied in 
that State, while the tax which the holder of such a pension must pay on it subsequently 
in the Member State where he resides is not taken into account at all for the purposes of 
calculating the attachable portion of that pension’ (paragraph 48). However, the Court 
considered that ‘on the other hand, Community law does not preclude such national 
legislation if it provides for tax to be taken into account, where taking the tax into account 
is made subject to the condition that the debtor prove that he has in fact paid or is 
required to pay within a given period a specified amount as income tax in the Member 
State where he resides’. The Court said that that is only the case ‘to the extent that, first, Proceedings  Court of Justice
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the right of the debtor concerned to have tax taken into account is clear from that 
legislation;  secondly,  the  detailed  rules  for  taking  tax  into  account  are  such  as  to 
guarantee  to  the  interested  party  the  right  to  obtain  an  annual  adjustment  of  the 
attachable portion of his pension to the same extent as if such a tax had been deducted 
at source in the Member State which enacted that legislation; and, thirdly, those detailed 
rules do not have the effect of making it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise that 
right’ (paragraph 48).
In Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen (judgment of 19 October 2004, not yet published in the 
ECR) Mr and Mrs Chen, Chinese nationals and parents of a first child born in China, 
wished to have a second child but came up against the birth control policy – the ‘one 
child policy’ – of the People’s Republic of China. They therefore decided that Mrs Chen 
would give birth abroad. Their second child was thus born in September 2000 in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland. The choice of the place of birth was no accident: Irish law allows any 
person born in the island of Ireland, even outside the political boundaries of Ireland 
(Éire), to acquire Irish nationality. The child therefore acquired that nationality. Because, 
however, she did not meet the requirements laid down by the relevant United Kingdom 
legislation, she did not acquire United Kingdom nationality. After the birth, Mrs Chen 
moved to Cardiff, Wales, with her child, and applied there for a long-term residence 
permit for herself and her child, which was refused. The appellate authority referred a 
question to the Court on the lawfulness of that refusal, pointing out that the mother and 
child  provide  for  their  needs,  they  do  not  rely  on  public  funds,  there  is  no  realistic 
possibility of their becoming so reliant, and they are insured against ill health.
The circumstance that the facts of the case concerned a young child gave the Court an 
occasion to state a preliminary point. It said that the capacity to be the holder of rights 
guaranteed by the EC Treaty and by secondary law on the free movement of persons 
does not require that the person concerned has attained the age prescribed for the 
acquisition of legal capacity to exercise those rights personally. Moreover, the enjoyment 
of those rights cannot be made conditional on the attainment of a minimum age.
As regards the child’s right of residence, the Court recalled that Article 18 EC has direct 
effect. Purely as a national of a Member State, and therefore a citizen of the Union, she 
can rely on the right of residence laid down by that provision. Regard must be had, 
however, to the limitations and conditions to which that right is subject, in particular Article 
1(1)  of  Directive  90/364, 2  which  allows  Member  States  to  require  that  the  persons 
concerned have sickness insurance and sufficient resources. The Court found that that 
was so in the present case. It further stated that the fact that the sufficient resources of the 
child were provided by her mother and she had none herself was immaterial: a requirement 
as the origin of the resources cannot be added to the requirement of sufficient resources. 
Finally, as regards the fact that Mrs Chen went to Ireland with the sole aim of giving her 
child the nationality of a Member State, in order then to secure a right of residence in the 
United Kingdom for herself and her child, the Court recalled that it is for each Member 
State to define the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. A Member State 
may not restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by 
imposing an additional condition for the recognition of that nationality with a view to the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty.
2  Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence (OJ 1990 L 180, p. 26).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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As regards the mother’s right of residence, the Court observed that Directive 90/364 
recognises a right of residence for ‘dependent’ relatives in the ascending line of the 
holder of the right of residence, which assumes that material support for the family 
member is provided by the holder of the right of residence. In the present case, said the 
Court, the position was exactly the opposite. Mrs Chen could not thus be regarded as a 
‘dependent’ relative of her child in the ascending line. On the other hand, where a child 
is granted a right of residence by Article 18 EC and Directive 90/364, the parent who is 
the carer of the child cannot be refused the right to reside with the child in the host 
Member State, as otherwise the child’s right of residence would be deprived of any 
useful effect.
3.3.  In the field of the free movement of goods, the Court had to decide inter alia on 
national rules concerning the composition of foodstuffs and food supplements and on 
national rules on the packaging of drinks.
In Case C-95/01 Greenham and Abel [2004] ECR I-1333 the Tribunal de grande instance 
de  Paris  (Regional  Court,  Paris,  France),  which  was  hearing  criminal  proceedings 
against the joint directors of a company distributing foodstuffs, asked the Court pursuant 
to Article 234 EC whether a Member State may prohibit the marketing on its territory 
without prior authorisation of foodstuffs lawfully manufactured and marketed in another 
Member State, on the ground that they contain nutrients whose addition is not authorised 
for human consumption by the national rules and vitamins in quantities exceeding the 
recommended daily intake or the safety limits laid down at national level.
After noting that national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings constitute 
a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, the Court stated that they 
could nevertheless be justified, under certain conditions, under Article 30 EC. First, such 
rules  must  make  provision  for  a  procedure  enabling  economic  operators  to  have  a 
nutrient included on the national list of authorised substances. The procedure must be 
one which is readily accessible and can be completed within a reasonable time, and is 
open, if necessary, to challenge before the courts. Second, an application to have a 
nutrient included on the national list of authorised substances may be refused by the 
competent  national  authorities  only  if  the  substance  poses  a  genuine  risk  to  public 
health. Such a risk must be assessed, stated the Court, on the basis of the most reliable 
scientific data available and the most recent results of international research. Finally, 
since such rules derogate from the principle of the free movement of goods within the 
Community,  they  must  be  confined  to  what  is  actually  necessary  to  ensure  the 
safeguarding of public health and must be proportionate to the aim thus pursued.
In a judgment of the same date in Case C-24/00 Commission v France [2004] ECR 
I-1277, it was precisely because France had failed either to provide for a procedure 
for  including  nutrients  on  the  list  of  authorised  substances  which  was  accessible, 
transparent, and could be completed within a reasonable time or to justify refusals on 
the basis of a detailed assessment of the genuine risk to public health that the Court 
held that that State had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 28 EC.
In  Case  C-387/99  Commission  v  Germany  [2004]  ECR  I-3751  and  Case  C-150/00 
Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-3887, it was because it had been alerted by a 
number of complaints against the administrative practice in Germany and Austria of Proceedings  Court of Justice
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automatically classifying as medicinal products preparations based on certain vitamins 
and/or minerals lawfully marketed as food supplements in the Member State from which 
they  are  imported,  where  those  substances  are  present  in  amounts  exceeding  the 
recommended daily intake (Case C-150/00) or exceed it by three times (Case C-387/99), 
that the Commission brought two actions before the Court of Justice against those 
Member States for infringement of the principle of the free movement of goods laid down 
in Article 28 EC.
In support of those actions, the Commission argued essentially that the classification of 
each vitamin or mineral as a medicinal product must be carried out case by case, having 
regard  to  the  pharmacological  properties  which  it  was  recognised  as  having  in  the 
present state of scientific knowledge. The harmfulness of vitamins and minerals varied. 
It argued that a single general and abstract approach for all those substances thus went 
beyond what was necessary for achieving the objective of the protection of health laid 
down in Article 30 EC, so that that approach was not proportionate. The barrier to the 
free movement of goods resulting from the contested practices could not therefore be 
justified, even though it pursued a legitimate aim.
The Court, upholding the Commission’s argument, held that, to determine whether 
vitamin  preparations  or  preparations  containing  minerals  should  be  classified  as 
medicinal products within the meaning of Directive 65/65 on proprietary medicinal 
products, the national authorities, acting under the control of the court, must work on 
a case-by-case basis, having regard to the characteristics of those preparations, in 
particular their composition, their pharmacological properties, the manner in which 
they are used, the extent of their distribution, their familiarity to consumers and the 
risks which their use may entail. Classification as a medicinal product of a vitamin 
preparation  or  a  preparation  containing  minerals  which  is  based  solely  on  the 
recommended  daily  amount  of  the  nutrient  it  contains  does  not  fully  satisfy  the 
requirement for a classification on the basis of the pharmacological properties of 
each preparation. Even though it is true that the concentration of vitamins or minerals 
above which a preparation is classified as a medicinal product varies according to 
the vitamin or mineral in question, it does not necessarily follow that all preparations 
containing more than once – or three times – the recommended daily intake of one 
of those substances come within the definition of a medicinal product for the purposes 
of Directive 65/65. 3
In those circumstances, the Court then said, it was clear that the contested practices 
create a barrier to trade, since such preparations lawfully marketed or produced in other 
Member States as food supplements cannot be marketed in Germany or Austria until 
they have been subject to the marketing authorisation procedure for medicinal products. 
That barrier cannot be justified on the basis of Article 30 EC. While that provision allows 
Member States a certain discretion relating to the protection of public health, the means 
used must be proportionate to the objective pursued, which it must not be possible to 
attain by measures less restrictive of intra-Community trade. In this respect, stated the 
Court, the systematic nature of the contested practices does not make it possible to 
3  Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products (OJ, English Special 
Edition 1965-1966, p. 20).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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identify and assess a real risk to public health, which requires a detailed assessment on 
a case-by-case basis of the effects which the addition of the vitamins and minerals in 
question could entail. A preparation which would not pose a real risk to public health thus 
also requires a marketing authorisation as a medicinal product. In the light of those 
considerations,  the  Court  held  that  Germany  and  Austria  had  failed  to  fulfil  their 
obligations under Article 28 EC.
In  two  separate  cases,  Case  C-463/01  Commission  v  Germany  (judgment  of  14 
December 2004, not yet published in the ECR) and Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getränke 
and S. Spitz (judgment of 14 December 2004, not yet published in the ECR), the Court 
was  called  on  to  rule  on  the  permissibility  with  respect  to  the  Community  rules  of 
measures  adopted  in  Germany  to  cope  with  the  environmental  problem  created  by 
drinks packaging. In that Member State, producers and distributors of drinks in non-
reusable packaging are subject in principle to the obligation to charge a deposit and take 
back  packaging.  They  may,  however,  comply  with  this  by  participating  in  a  global 
collection system. That option is withdrawn if, for two years in a row, the percentage of 
drinks marketed in reusable packaging in Germany falls below a certain threshold.
Case  C-463/01  concerned  an  action  for  failure  to  fulfil  obligations  brought  by  the 
Commission against Germany. According to the guardian of the treaties, the above rules 
constitute a barrier to trade. Producers of mineral water, who all have to bottle at source 
under a Community directive, are subject to a particular burden if they are established in 
other Member States.
The judgment giving a preliminary ruling in Case C-309/02 concerned the same basic 
problem. The Austrian undertakings Radlberger and Spitz export soft drinks to Germany 
and  belong  to  a  global  system  of  waste  collection,  ‘Der  Grüne  Punkt’.  Those  two 
undertakings brought proceedings in the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Administrative 
Court, Stuttgart), arguing that the German rules on quotas for reusable packaging and 
the related obligations were contrary to Directive 94/62 4 and the provisions of the Treaty 
on the free movement of goods. The German court decided to stay the proceedings and 
make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
According to the Court, since Directive 94/62 does not carry out a complete harmonisation 
of national systems for the reuse of packaging, the German legislation must be capable 
of assessment in the light of the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to the free movement 
of goods.
Although  applying  without  distinction,  the  national  legislation  does  not  affect  the 
marketing of drinks produced in Germany and that of drinks from other Member States 
in the same manner. The changeover from a global system of waste collection to a 
deposit and return system results generally in additional costs for all producers. However, 
producers established outside Germany use considerably more non-reusable packaging 
than German producers. Those measures are therefore such as to hinder the marketing 
of water from other Member States.
4  Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 December 1994 on packaging 
and packaging waste (OJ 1994 L 365, p. 10).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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As regards justification relating to protection of the environment, the Court acknowledged 
that the introduction of a deposit and return system contributes to improving the recovery 
of packaging waste and to the reduction of waste in the natural environment. Moreover, 
the probability of a change of system to a deposit obligation contributes to reducing 
waste by encouraging undertakings to make use of reusable packaging. The national 
legislation is thus necessary for attaining the objectives pursued.
However, the legislation, which makes the establishment of a deposit and return system 
dependent on a reuse rate, must still be proportionate. That is the case, said the Court, 
only if there is a reasonable transitional period to adapt, which thus ensures that every 
producer or distributor concerned can actually participate in an operational system.
In Case C-309/02 the Court held that it was for the national court to assess whether that 
requirement was satisfied.
In Case C-463/01, in the case of mineral water which must be bottled at source, the 
Court held that the national legislation did not comply with the principle of proportionality, 
since the transition period allowed by the authorities was only six months.
3.4.  In the area of freedom of movement for workers, four cases submitted to the 
Court by way of preliminary reference merit special mention. The first, Case C-138/02 
Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, was a reference in a dispute before a tribunal in the United 
Kingdom. In that Member State, the grant of a ‘jobseeker’s allowance’ to persons 
seeking employment is subject to a condition of habitual residence or to the condition 
that the person is a worker for the purposes of Regulation No 1612/68 5 or a person 
with a right to reside in the United Kingdom pursuant to Directive 68/360. Brian Francis 
Collins was born in the United States and has dual American and Irish nationality. 
Having spent one semester in the United Kingdom in 1978 as part of his university 
studies and having worked for 10 months in 1980 and 1981 on a part-time and casual 
basis in bars and the sales sector, he returned to the United Kingdom in 1998 for the 
purpose  of  seeking  employment.  He  applied  for  a  jobseeker’s  allowance  but  was 
refused on the grounds that he was not habitually resident in the United Kingdom and 
was not a worker for the purposes of Regulation No 1612/68 or entitled to reside in that 
State pursuant to Directive 68/360. 6 Three questions were referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling in this connection, the first two of which concerned respectively the 
regulation and the directive, while the third, phrased in an open manner, asked whether 
there might be some provision or principle of Community law capable of assisting the 
applicant in his claim.
On  the  question  whether  Mr  Collins  was  a  worker  within  the  terms  of  Regulation 
No 1612/68, the Court took the view that, as 17 years had elapsed since he had last been 
engaged in an occupational activity in the United Kingdom, Mr Collins did not have a 
sufficiently close connection with the employment market in that Member State. The 
5  Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1968(II), p. 475).
6  Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families (OJ, English Special 
Edition 1968(II), p. 485).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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situation of Mr Collins, the Court ruled, was comparable to that of any person seeking his 
first employment. The Court pointed out in this regard that a distinction had to be drawn 
between persons looking for work in the host Member State without having previously 
worked  there  and  those  who  have  already  entered  the  employment  market  in  that 
Member State. While the former benefit from the principle of equal treatment only as 
regards access to employment, the latter may, on the basis of Article 7(2) of Regulation 
No 1612/68, claim the same social and tax advantages as national workers. The Court 
took the view that Mr Collins was not a worker in the sense in which that term covers 
persons who have already entered the employment market. However, as Regulation No 
1612/68 does not use the concept of ‘worker’ in a uniform manner, the Court stated that 
it was for the national tribunal to determine whether it was in fact to that meaning that the 
United Kingdom legislation was referring.
With regard to Directive 68/360, the Court first pointed out that the Treaty itself confers a 
right of residence, which may be limited in time, on nationals of Member States who are 
seeking employment in other Member States. The right to reside in a Member State 
which Directive 68/360 confers is reserved for nationals who are already employed in 
that Member State. Mr Collins was not in that position and he could therefore not rely on 
that directive.
The Court concluded by examining the United Kingdom legislation in the light of the 
fundamental  principle  of  equal  treatment.  Nationals  of  one  Member  State  who  are 
seeking employment in another Member State come in that regard, the Court held, within 
the scope of application of Article 48 of the EC Treaty and are thus entitled to benefit from 
the right to equal treatment set out in Article 48(2). However, does that right to equal 
treatment extend to benefits of a financial nature such as the jobseeker’s allowance? In 
principle the answer must be in the negative in the light of the case-law previously cited 
of the Court, which states that equality of treatment in regard to social and financial 
benefits applies only to persons who have already entered the employment market, 
while others specifically benefit from it only as regards access to employment. The Court 
considered, however, that, in view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and 
the interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the 
Union, it was no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 48(2) of the EC 
Treaty, which is an expression of equal treatment, a benefit of a financial nature intended 
to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State. In the present 
case, the residence condition imposed by the United Kingdom legislation was likely to be 
more easily satisfied by United Kingdom nationals. It could be justified only if it was 
based on objective considerations that were independent of the nationality of the persons 
concerned and proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national law. It was, the Court 
pointed out, legitimate for the national legislature to wish to ensure that there was a 
genuine link between an applicant for the allowance and the employment market, in 
particular by establishing that the person concerned was, for a reasonable period, in fact 
genuinely seeking work. However, if it is to be proportionate, a period of residence 
required for that purpose may not exceed what is necessary in order to enable the 
national  authorities  to  be  satisfied  that  the  person  concerned  is  genuinely  seeking 
work.
The  second  case,  Case  C-456/02  Trojani  (judgment  of  7  September  2004,  not  yet 
published  in  the  ECR),  involved  a  destitute  French  national  who  had  been  given Proceedings  Court of Justice
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accommodation in a Salvation Army hostel in Brussels where, in return for his board and 
lodging and a small amount of pocket money, he performed a variety of jobs for about 30 
hours per week as part of a personal socio-occupational reintegration programme. The 
question which arose was whether he could claim a right of residence as a worker, a self-
employed worker or a person providing or receiving services within the terms of Articles 
39 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC respectively. If not, could he benefit from that right by direct 
application of Article 18 EC in his capacity merely as a citizen of the Union?
It was in fact in respect of the right of residence that the Tribunal du travail de Bruxelles 
(Labour Court, Brussels) questioned the Court, even though the case had been brought 
before it following the refusal by the Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) to 
grant Mr Trojani the minimum subsistence allowance (‘minimex’).
On  the  issue  of  the  right  of  residence  as  a  worker,  the  Court  first  pointed  out  the 
Community scope of the concept of ‘worker’. The essential feature of an employment 
relationship is that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under 
the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration. Neither the 
sui generis nature of the employment relationship under national law, nor the level of 
productivity of the person concerned, the origin of the funds from which the remuneration 
is paid or the limited amount of that remuneration can have any consequence in that 
regard.  The  Court  found  that,  in  this  case,  the  constituent  elements  of  any  paid 
employment relationship, that is to say, the relationship of subordination and payment of 
remuneration, were present: the benefits in kind and in cash which the Salvation Army 
provided for Mr Trojani constituted the consideration for the services which he performed 
for and under the direction of the hostel. However, it remained to be determined whether 
those services were real and genuine or whether, on the contrary, they were on such a 
small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, with the result that the 
person concerned could not be classified as a worker. In that connection the Court left it 
to the national court to determine whether those services were real and genuine. It did, 
however, provide some guidelines: the national court had, in particular, to ascertain 
whether the services performed were capable of being treated as forming part of the 
normal labour market, regard being had to the status and practices of the hostel, the 
content of the social reintegration programme, and the nature and details of performance 
of the services.
The  Court  also  rejected  the  argument  that  the  provisions  governing  the  right  of 
establishment might be applicable inasmuch as it had been established in the case that 
the activities performed were in the nature of employment. The Court likewise ruled out 
the applicability of the provisions on the freedom to provide services, which exclude any 
activity carried out on a permanent basis or, at least, without a foreseeable limit to its 
duration.
With regard to the right of residence of citizens of the Union under Article 18 EC, the Court 
pointed out that this provision is directly effective but stated immediately that the right to 
rely on it is not unconditional: it may be subject to limitations and conditions, including 
Article 1 of Directive 90/364, 7 which allows Member States to refuse a right of residence 
to citizens of the Union who do not have sufficient resources. Those limitations and 
7  Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence (OJ 1990 L 180, p. 26).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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conditions must, however, be applied in compliance with Community law and, in particular, 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In the present case, the Court found 
that it was the lack of resources which led Mr Trojani to seek the minimex, a fact which 
justified application of Directive 90/364 and ruled out reliance on Article 18 EC.
The Court did, however, note that Mr Trojani had a residence permit. It accordingly 
pointed out, on its own initiative, that, with regard to a social assistance benefit such as 
the minimex, Mr Trojani could invoke Article 12 EC in order to secure treatment equal to 
that accorded to Belgian nationals.
The third case, Case C-386/02 Baldinger (judgment of 16 September 2004, not yet 
published in the ECR), concerned application of the Austrian Law on Compensation for 
Prisoners of War, adopted in 2000, which provides for the grant of a monthly financial 
benefit to former prisoners of war but which is also subject to the condition that the 
recipient is an Austrian national. The question referred to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling asked whether such legislation was compatible with the provisions governing the 
free movement of workers. In this case, the allowance in question had been refused to a 
former Austrian national who had been a prisoner of war in the USSR from 1945 to 1947, 
but who had acquired Swedish nationality in 1967, at the same time forfeiting his Austrian 
nationality.
The Court successively examined the legislation in question in the light of Regulation No 
1408/71, 8 Regulation No 1612/68 9 and Article 39(2) EC.
With regard to Regulation No 1408/71, the Court stated that an allowance of this kind 
was excluded from its scope as it was covered by Article 4(4), which provides that the 
regulation does not apply to ‘benefit schemes for victims of war or its consequences’. 
The Court found that the allowance in question was provided to former prisoners of war 
who proved that they had undergone a long period of captivity, in testimony of national 
gratitude for the hardships which they had endured and was thus paid as a quid pro quo 
for the service which they had rendered to their country.
The  Court  reasoned  along  identical  lines  in  regard  to  Regulation  No  1612/68:  an 
allowance of the kind in issue in the case was excluded from the scope of that regulation 
as it also did not come within the category of advantages granted to national workers 
principally because of their status as workers or national residents and, as a result, did 
not fulfil the essential characteristics of the ‘social advantages’ referred to in Article 7(2) 
of Regulation No 1612/68.
The Court finally reached the same conclusion with regard to Article 39(2) EC, which 
covers  conditions  of  employment,  remuneration  and  other  working  conditions.  That 
provision, the Court ruled, could not cover compensatory allowances linked to service 
8  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes 
to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the 
Community, as amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996 
(OJ 1997 L 28, p. 1).
9  Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1968(II), p. 475).Proceedings  Court of Justice
26
Court of Justice  Proceedings
27
rendered in wartime by citizens to their own country and the essential aim of which was 
to provide those citizens with a benefit because of the hardships which they had endured 
for that country.
The  fourth  case,  Case  C-400/02  Merida  (judgment  of  16  September  2004,  not  yet 
published in the ECR), was a reference in a dispute brought before a German court. In 
Germany, the collective agreement applicable to civilians employed by foreign armed 
forces stationed in Germany provides, inter alia, for the payment by the German State of 
‘interim assistance’ to those workers in the case where their contract of employment has 
been terminated. Mr Merida, a French resident who worked until 1999 for the French 
forces stationed in Baden-Baden, received that allowance with effect from that time. 
However, the method by which it was calculated induced him to bring an action against 
the German State. That allowance was calculated on the basis of remuneration from 
which, however, German wage tax had been notionally deducted, even where, as in Mr 
Merida’s case, the remuneration was subject to tax in the country of residence, in casu 
France, under a double taxation agreement between the two countries. The German 
Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) asked the Court whether the method of 
calculation in question was compatible with Article 39 EC.
Apart from Article 39 EC, the Court, in order to reply to the question submitted, referred 
to the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1612/68. 10 After 
pointing  out  that,  unless  it  was  objectively  justified  and  proportionate  to  its  aim,  a 
provision of national law was indirectly discriminatory if it was intrinsically liable to affect 
migrant workers more than national workers and if there was a consequent risk that it 
would place the former at a particular disadvantage, the Court went on to hold that, in the 
case before it, the notional deduction of German wage tax in order to determine the basis 
of assessment of the interim allowance placed frontier workers such as Mr Merida at a 
disadvantage. While application of that method of assessment ensured that German 
residents would, for the first year following the end of their contract of employment, 
receive an income equivalent to that of an active worker, that was not the case with 
regard to French residents, whose allowance, in the same way as their remuneration, 
was subject to tax in France.
With  a  view,  however,  to  justifying  the  manner  in  which  the  disputed  method  of 
assessment  was  applied  to  frontier  workers,  the  German  Government  put  forward 
grounds  of  simplified  administration  and  limitation  of  financial  charges.  The  Court 
unequivocally dismissed those objections, which could not in any event justify non-
compliance with the obligations under the EC Treaty.
3.5.  The freedom to provide services was in issue in Case C-36/02 Omega (judgment of 
14 October 2004, not yet published in the ECR). Omega, a company established under 
German law, operated an installation in Bonn (Germany) for the practice of a sport – 
‘laser sport’ – inspired by the film Star Wars and using modern laser technology. That 
installation featured machine-gun-type laser targeting devices and sensory tags installed 
either in the firing corridors or on the jackets worn by players. As it took the view that 
games for entertainment featuring simulated killing were contrary to human dignity and 
10  Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1968(II), p. 475).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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thus constituted a danger to public order, the police authorities issued a prohibition order 
against the company enjoining it to cease operating equipment intended for firing on 
human targets. Following dismissal of its administrative complaint and appeals brought 
against that administrative measure of the police authorities, Omega brought an appeal 
on a point of law (‘Revision’) before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative 
Court).
In support of its appeal Omega submitted, inter alia, that the contested order infringed the 
freedom to provide services under Article 49 EC as the installation in question had to use 
equipment and technology supplied by a British company. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
acknowledged in this regard that, while the commercial exploitation of a ‘killing game’ did 
indeed, as the lower court had ruled, constitute an affront to human dignity contrary to the 
Grundgesetz (German Basic Law), its prohibition did, none the less, infringe the freedom 
to provide services guaranteed under Article 49 EC. It accordingly decided to ask the 
Court, by way of a reference under Article 234 EC, whether, inter alia, the prohibition of a 
commercial activity that was at variance with the fundamental values enshrined in the 
national constitution was compatible with Article 49 EC.
The  Court  held  in  this  regard  that,  by  prohibiting  Omega  from  operating  its  game 
installation in accordance with the model developed by a British company and lawfully 
marketed by that company in the United Kingdom, in particular under the franchising 
system, the contested order affected the freedom to provide services which Article 49 EC 
guarantees both to providers and to the persons receiving those services established in 
another Member State. However, it continued, as both the Community and its Member 
States are required to respect fundamental rights, the protection of those rights was a 
legitimate interest which could, in principle, justify a derogation from the obligations 
imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty such as the freedom to provide services. Measures which restricted the freedom 
to provide services could, however, be justified on public policy grounds only if they were 
necessary for the protection of the interests which they were intended to guarantee and 
only in so far as those objectives could not be attained by less restrictive measures. 
None the less, it stressed, the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted 
could not be excluded merely because one Member State had chosen a system of 
protection  different  from  that  adopted  by  another  State.  In  other  words,  therefore, 
Germany  could  prohibit  that  which  the  United  Kingdom  authorised  if  it  could  be 
established  that  the  measure  imposing  the  prohibition  was  both  necessary  and 
proportionate, which, as the Court observed, was indeed the situation in the case under 
examination. In the first place, the prohibition of the commercial exploitation of games 
involving the simulation of acts of violence against persons, in particular the representation 
of acts of homicide, corresponded to the level of protection of human dignity which the 
national constitution sought to guarantee within the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Second, by prohibiting only the variant of the laser game the object of which 
was to fire on human targets, the contested order did not go beyond what was necessary 
in order to attain the objective pursued. For those reasons, the Court concluded, that 
order could not be regarded as a measure unjustifiably undermining the freedom to 
provide services.
3.6.  In the area of the free movement of capital‚ mention should be made of Case 
C-319/02 Manninen (judgment of 7 September 2004, not yet published in the ECR), Proceedings  Court of Justice
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which  concerned  the  Finnish  legislation  on  the  taxation  of  dividends.  Under  that 
legislation a person holding shares in a domestic company receives, in addition to the 
dividend, a tax credit in proportion to the corporation tax paid by the undertaking. The tax 
credit is offset against tax on the dividend, so that in practice the shareholder has no 
further tax to pay on his dividend. By contrast, the right to benefit from a tax credit is 
excluded in the case where the company is established in another Member State.
Such a system, the end result of which is that dividends are no longer taxed in the hands 
of the shareholder, left the Court in no doubt that it involved a restriction on the free 
movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56 EC inasmuch as it applied solely in 
favour of dividends paid by companies established in Finland, even though, as the Court 
pointed out, direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States. That 
system disadvantaged persons receiving dividends from companies established in other 
Member States by deterring them from investing in such companies and thereby had a 
restrictive effect as regards those companies in that it constituted an obstacle to their 
raising capital in Finland. As regards possible justification for that restriction, the Court 
rejected the argument based on Article 58(1)(a) EC, which authorises different treatment 
of taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to the place where their capital 
is invested. That derogation, the Court pointed out, had to be interpreted strictly and was 
itself limited by Article 58(3) EC, which is directed at arbitrary discrimination and disguised 
restrictions. In order for a difference in treatment to be capable of being classified as 
unequal treatment which is permitted under Article 58(1) EC rather than as arbitrary 
discrimination which is prohibited by Article 58(3) EC, that difference in treatment must 
also concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by overriding 
reasons in the general interest, such as the need to safeguard the cohesion of the tax 
system. In addition, it must comply with the principle of proportionality.
The Court began by discounting the argument that the situations were not comparable. 
In view of the purpose of the Finnish tax legislation, namely to prevent double taxation 
– corporation tax and income tax – of the profits distributed by the company in which the 
investment is made, shareholders who are fully taxable in Finland find themselves in a 
comparable situation, whether they receive dividends from a national company or from a 
company  established  in  another  Member  State  inasmuch  as,  in  the  two  cases,  the 
dividends are, apart from the tax credit, liable to be subjected to double taxation.
In support of the legislation in issue, the governments which submitted observations – in 
casu the Finnish Government and the French and United Kingdom Governments – also 
pleaded  the  need  to  ensure  the  cohesion  of  the  national  tax  system.  Since  it  was 
accepted in principle by the Court in its judgments in Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] 
ECR I-249 and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305 as a potential 
justification for restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, that 
notion has been invoked on numerous occasions but hitherto without success. The 
judgment in Manninen provided the Court with a fresh opportunity to point out that, for an 
argument based on such justification to succeed, a direct link had to be established 
between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular 
tax deduction. Such an argument also had to be examined in the light of the objective 
pursued by the tax legislation in question. In this case, the legislation was designed to 
prevent double taxation; while there was indeed a link between the tax advantage (tax 
credit) and the offsetting tax deduction (corporation tax paid by the company established Proceedings  Court of Justice
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in Finland), that legislation was not necessary in order to preserve the cohesion of the 
tax system. Granting to a shareholder in a company established in another Member 
State a tax credit calculated by reference to the corporation tax paid by that company in 
that Member State would, the Court held, constitute a less restrictive measure while at 
the same time not threatening the cohesion of the tax system.
It was in those circumstances appropriate, the Court went on, to take account, in the 
calculation of the tax credit to be granted to a shareholder who had received dividends 
from a company established in another Member State, of the tax actually paid by that 
company in that other Member State. Possible difficulties in determining the tax actually 
paid could not, in that regard, justify an obstacle to the free movement of capital such as 
that which arose from the Finnish legislation.
3.7.  With regard to the rules on competition‚ nine cases, including four joined cases, 
merit consideration.
In Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355-01 AOK Bundesverband and 
Others [2004] ECR I-2493 , several questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 EC, 82 
EC and 86 EC were referred to the Court for preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf  (Higher  Regional  Court,  Düsseldorf)  and  the  Bundesgerichtshof  (Federal 
Court of Justice) in disputes between associations of sickness and health insurance funds 
and  pharmaceutical  companies  concerning  the  fixed  maximum  amounts  payable  by 
sickness funds towards the cost of medicinal products and treatment materials which had 
been established by the German legislature with a view to addressing the deficit in the 
statutory health insurance scheme.
The  Oberlandesgericht  Düsseldorf  and  the  Bundesgerichtshof  essentially  asked  the 
Court whether the competition rules laid down by the EC Treaty precluded groups of 
sickness funds, such as the fund associations, from determining fixed maximum amounts 
corresponding to the upper limit of the price of medicinal products whose cost is borne 
by sickness funds. The Bundesgerichtshof also asked whether, if that question was to be 
answered in the affirmative, there was a right against those groups to an injunction 
remedying the situation and to compensation for the loss suffered by reason of the 
introduction of the fixed maximum amounts.
The Court adopted the solution set out in its ‘Poucet and Pistre’ case-law, to the effect 
that the concept of an undertaking, within the context of Community competition law, 
does not cover bodies entrusted with the management of statutory health insurance and 
old-age insurance schemes which pursue an exclusively social objective and do not 
engage in economic activity. The Court took the view in Poucet and Pistre that this was 
the position with regard to sickness funds, which, even though the legislature had given 
them  a  degree  of  latitude  in  setting  contribution  rates  in  order  to  promote  sound 
management, were compelled by law to offer to their members essentially identical 
obligatory benefits which do not depend on the amount of the contributions. The Court 
accordingly ruled in the present cases that ‘in determining the fixed maximum amounts, 
the fund associations merely perform a task for management of the German social 
security system which is imposed upon them by legislation and they do not act as 
undertakings engaging in economic activity’ (paragraph 64). Articles 81 EC and 82 EC 
were therefore not applicable to such measures.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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In Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039, the questions put to the Court in a 
preliminary reference by the Landgericht (Regional Court) Frankfurt am Main (Germany) 
concerned the interpretation of Article 82 EC in the context of a dispute between two 
companies specialising in market studies in the pharmaceutical products and health care 
sectors centring on the claim by one of them that it was entitled to use a brick structure 
developed by the other for the provision of data on regional sales of pharmaceutical 
products in Germany.
As it took the view that one company could not exercise its right to obtain an injunction 
prohibiting all unlawful use of its work if it acted in an abusive manner, within the meaning 
of Article 82 EC, by refusing to grant a licence to another company on reasonable terms, 
the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main accordingly referred to the Court three questions on 
the interpretation of that Treaty provision.
The Court first took the view that ‘for the purposes of examining whether the refusal by 
an undertaking in a dominant position to grant a licence for a brick structure protected by 
an intellectual property right which it owns is abusive, the degree of participation by users 
in the development of that structure and the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the 
part of potential users in order to purchase studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical 
products presented on the basis of an alternative structure are factors which must be 
taken  into  consideration  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  protected  structure  is 
indispensable to the marketing of studies of that kind’ (paragraph 30). Applying its ‘Magill’ 
case-law, the Court also took the view that ‘the refusal by an undertaking which holds a 
dominant position and owns an intellectual property right in a brick structure indispensable 
to the presentation of regional sales data on pharmaceutical products in a Member State 
to grant a licence to use that structure to another undertaking which also wishes to 
provide  such  data  in  the  same  Member  State,  constitutes  an  abuse  of  a  dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 82 EC where the following conditions are fulfilled: 
– the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the 
supply of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the 
intellectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand; – the 
refusal is not justified by objective considerations; – the refusal is such as to reserve to 
the owner of the intellectual property right the market for the supply of data on sales of 
pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned by eliminating all competition 
on that market’ (paragraph 52).
The  other  four  cases  which  deserve  mention  in  regard  to  the  rules  on  competition 
concern State aid.
In Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, the Court delivered its ruling 
on  an  application  brought  by  the  Italian  Republic  seeking  partial  annulment  of 
Commission Decision 98/182/EC of 30 July 1997, which had found that aid granted 
between  1981  and  1995  by  the  Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  Region  to  road  haulage 
companies  in  that  region  was  in  part  incompatible  with  the  common  market  and 
ordered its partial recovery. The Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region successively adopted 
two laws, which were essentially identical, one replacing the other, concerning action 
to promote and develop transport of concern to the Region and the carriage of goods 
by  road  for  hire  or  reward. Those  laws  provided  for  three  measures  in  favour  of 
undertakings operating in that sector and established in the Region: these consisted Proceedings  Court of Justice
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of financing of interest on loans contracted for the purpose of developing infrastructure 
and purchasing equipment, financing for the cost of leasing vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers, together with the installations for the maintenance and repair of vehicles 
and for the handling of goods, and, finally, financing, for groups and other forms of 
association, of up to 50% of investment to be used for the construction or purchase of 
installations and equipment.
In its appraisal of the disputed aid in the light of Article 87(1) EC, the Commission 
decision drew a distinction between aid granted to undertakings which were engaged in 
international  transport,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  aid  to  undertakings 
exclusively engaged in transport operations at local, regional or national level. In the 
latter case, the decision drew a further distinction according to whether the aid had been 
granted before or after 1 July 1990, the date on which Regulation No 4059/89, which 
opened up that second market to Community competition, entered into force. However, 
as the contested decision had in the interim been partially annulled by the Court of First 
Instance following application by a number of the recipient companies (judgment of 
15 June 2000 in Joined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to 
T-607/97,  T-1/98,  T-3/98  to  T-6/98  and  T-23/98  Alzetta  and  Others  v  Commission 
[2000] ECR II-2319), and the application for annulment in the present case to some 
extent no longer served any purpose, in view of the fact that the Commission had 
accepted the interpretation of the Court of First Instance regarding the aid granted after 
1 July 1990 to undertakings engaged exclusively in local, regional or national transport, 
the Court was ultimately required to assess that decision only to the extent to which it 
declared illegal the contested aid granted to undertakings engaged in international road 
transport operations.
The Italian Republic raised several pleas in law or arguments designed to minimise the 
significance of the aid thus granted, whether with regard to the paucity of its amount or 
to the mainly local nature of the operations engaged in by most of the recipients of the 
aid. From this it inferred that the aid had minimal impact on intra-Community trade and 
competition, with a view to establishing that the aid did not come under the prohibition 
laid down in Article 87(1) EC. The Court rejected all of those submissions, reaffirming a 
number of principles derived from its case-law. Whereas the Italian Republic argued that 
the Commission had not demonstrated the existence of a real, concrete risk of distortion 
of competition, the Court thus pointed out that, where aid has been granted by a Member 
State without having been notified to the Commission beforehand at the planning stage, 
the decision finding that aid to be incompatible with the common market did not have to 
demonstrate the real effect which the aid might have on competition or trade between 
Member States. The Court also reaffirmed that the fact that the aid was relatively small 
in amount or that the recipient undertaking was relatively small in size did not as such 
exclude the possibility that intra-Community trade might be affected. Along the same 
lines, the Court also recalled that the condition for the application of Article 87(1) EC, 
namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, did not 
depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the 
scale of the field of activity concerned. The Court further ruled once more that the fact 
that a Member State sought to approximate, by unilateral measures, the conditions of 
competition in a particular sector of the economy to those prevailing in other Member 
States could not deprive the measures in question of their character as State aid. That 
said, even if in certain cases the very circumstances in which State aid had been granted Proceedings  Court of Justice
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were sufficient to show that the aid was capable of affecting trade between Member 
States and of distorting or threatening to distort competition, the Commission had at the 
very least to set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision. The 
Court pointed out further that, during the examination of the impact of aid on competition 
and intra-Community trade, the Commission had to weigh the beneficial effects of the aid 
against its adverse effects on trading conditions and on the maintenance of undistorted 
competition, with judicial review of the manner in which that discretion was exercised 
being confined to establishing whether the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the 
duty to give reasons had been complied with and to verifying the accuracy of the facts 
relied on and that there was no error of law, manifest error of assessment in regard to the 
facts or misuse of powers. The Italian Republic further argued that, as the aid in dispute 
had an insignificant effect on the position of the recipient undertakings, recovery of that 
aid would infringe the principle of proportionality. The Court once again ruled that the 
recovery  of  State  aid  unlawfully  granted  could  not  in  principle  be  regarded  as 
disproportionate to the objectives of the Treaty in regard to State aid or as a failure by the 
Commission to act within the bounds of its discretion inasmuch as such a measure does 
no more than to restore the previous situation. In reply to a final argument by the Italian 
Republic, the Court concluded by reaffirming that, while a recipient of unlawful aid could 
rely on exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the 
aid to be lawful and thus decline to refund that aid, a Member State whose authorities 
had granted aid contrary to the procedural rules laid down in Article 88 EC could not 
plead that legitimate expectation in order to circumvent its obligation to take the steps 
necessary to implement a Commission decision instructing it to recover the aid. The 
Court thus dismissed that part of the action brought by the Italian Republic which still 
served a purpose.
A second case, Case C-298/00 P Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-4087, also arose from 
the dispute concerning State aid granted by the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region to road 
haulage companies between 1981 and 1995. More precisely, the case derived from an 
appeal brought by the Italian Republic, which, having intervened in the proceedings at 
first instance in support of the form of order sought by the applicants, challenged the 
abovementioned  judgment  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  in  Alzetta  and  Others  v 
Commission,  by  which  that  Court  partially  dismissed  the  applications  brought  by  a 
number of recipient undertakings for annulment in part of Commission Decision 98/182/
EC  of  30  July  1997. The  Commission  itself  also  lodged  a  cross-appeal  in  which  it 
submitted that the application brought by those undertakings before the Court of First 
Instance was inadmissible on the ground that, even though recovery of the aid was 
called  for  in  the  decision,  that  decision  was  addressed  to  the  Italian  Republic  and 
concerned a statutory scheme of State aid: it was for those reasons not of individual 
concern to the recipient undertakings and the Court of First Instance ought for that 
reason to have examined the issue of admissibility of its own motion.
The Court first dismissed the cross-appeal brought by the Commission, ruling that an 
undertaking which, as in the case of the applicants at first instance, is not only concerned 
by the decision in question as an undertaking operating in the sector in issue and a 
potential beneficiary of the disputed aid scheme, but also by virtue of being an actual 
recipient of individual aid granted under that scheme, the recovery of which has been 
ordered by the Commission, is in a different position from that of applicants for whom a 
Commission decision is in the nature of a measure of general application.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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On the substance, the Court had in particular to rule on the question of the degree to 
which the disputed aid was liable to affect intra-Community trade and competition. It also 
had to determine whether the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and 
proportionality precluded recovery of the aid.
With regard to the first matter, the Court pointed out that ‘in the course of the Commission’s 
assessment of new aid which, pursuant to Article [88(3) EC], is to be notified to it before 
being put into effect, the Commission is required to establish, not whether such aid has 
a real impact on trade between Member States, but whether that aid could affect that 
trade’, stressing that ‘if the Commission had to demonstrate in its decision the real effect 
of aid already granted, such a requirement would have the effect of favouring Member 
States which grant aid in breach of the obligation to notify laid down in Article [88(3) EC], 
to the detriment of those which do notify aid at the planning stage’ (paragraph 49). The 
Court also ruled once again that ‘the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small 
size of the undertaking which receives it do not as such exclude the possibility that intra-
Community trade might be affected’ and that ‘aid of a relatively small amount is liable to 
affect competition and trade between Member States where there is strong competition 
in the sector in which the undertakings which receive it operate’ (paragraph 54). The 
Court concluded by confirming its position that ‘the fact that a Member State seeks to 
approximate, by unilateral measures, conditions of competition in a particular sector of 
the economy to those prevailing in other Member States cannot deprive the measures in 
question of their character as aid’ (paragraph 61).
Dealing with the second branch of the appeal, the Court pointed out that, as the abolition 
of unlawful aid by means of recovery was the logical consequence of its illegality, ‘the 
recovery of State aid unlawfully granted, for the purpose of restoring the previously 
existing situation, cannot in principle be regarded as disproportionate to the objectives of 
the Treaty in regard to State aids’ (paragraph 75). The Court also refused to apply in this 
case the solution which it had adopted in its judgment in Case 223/85 RSV v Commission 
[1987] ECR 4617, paragraph 17, under which ‘a delay by the Commission in deciding 
that an aid is illegal and must be abolished and recovered by a Member State could in 
certain circumstances establish a legitimate expectation on the part of the recipients of 
that aid so as to prevent the Commission from requiring that Member State to order the 
refund of the aid’ (paragraph 90). The Court took the view that the circumstances which 
had justified such a solution in that case did not obtain in the present case. In the same 
way as the cross-appeal brought by the Commission, the Court therefore also dismissed 
the appeal brought by the Italian Republic.
In Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] ECR I-3925, the Court ruled on an 
application  by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  for  the  annulment  of  Commission 
Decision  2000/567/EC  of 11 April  2000  on the State aid  granted  to an undertaking 
established under the former German Democratic Republic which was at the time a 
market leader in the manufacture of customised circuits and which, following several 
restructuring stages, became System Microelectronic Innovation GmbH (‘SMI’), in which 
the majority shareholding of 51% was held by the Land of Brandenburg, the remaining 
share capital having been acquired by an American company, Synergy Semiconductor 
Corporation (‘Synergy’). SMI had already received financial support from the Land of 
Brandenburg,  the  Treuhandanstalt  (the  German  public-law  body  responsible  for 
restructuring the undertakings of the former German Democratic Republic) and the body Proceedings  Court of Justice
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which succeeded the Treuhandanstalt in the form of grants for investments or removal 
activities  or  in  the  form  of  loans.  Following  difficulties  encountered  in  its  activities, 
however, SMI was forced to file for bankruptcy, which resulted in its name being changed 
to ‘SMI iG’, as a company in liquidation, and in the appointment of an administrator, who, 
in order to ensure continuation of SMI’s activities and to save the jobs of 105 employees, 
established a hive-off vehicle, the company ‘SiMI’, the services relating to consultancy, 
marketing, development and design of microelectronic products and services having 
already  been  transferred  to  SiMI’s  wholly-owned  subsidiary  ‘MD  &  D’. The  Land  of 
Brandenburg and the body which succeeded the Treuhandanstalt granted their financial 
support to the hive-off vehicle before SiMI and MD & D found a buyer and MD & D 
ultimately purchased the share capital of SiMI.
As it took the view in the contested decision that the grants and loans thus made to SMI 
and the hive-off company respectively were incompatible with the common market, the 
Commission ordered the Federal Republic of Germany to take all necessary measures 
to  recover  the  disputed  aid  from  its  beneficiaries,  that  is  to  say,  according  to  the 
Commission, the companies SMI, SiMI and MD & D, as well as any other firm to which 
their assets had been or might be transferred in order to evade the consequences of the 
Commission’s decision.
Although  the  German  Government  argued  that  the  grants  made  to  SMI  by  the 
Treuhandanstalt, in the same way as those from the body which succeeded it, were 
covered by the derogating framework governing the activities of the Treuhandanstalt with 
a view to restructuring the undertakings of the former German Democratic Republic and 
ensuring their transition from a planned economy to a market economy, inasmuch as 
they had been made in the context of what it regarded as the privatisation of SMI, the 
Court took the view that ‘the term “privatisation” must be construed narrowly in the 
context of the Treuhandanstalt aid schemes’ (paragraph 24) and that, although ‘it cannot 
therefore be ruled out that the acquisition of a minority interest in a public undertaking, 
combined with a transfer of the effective control of that undertaking, may be regarded as 
a “privatisation” for the purposes of the Treuhandanstalt aid schemes’ (paragraph 25), 
that  was  not  the  position  in  the  present  case  as  the Treuhandanstalt  had  in  many 
respects retained control over SMI after Synergy had acquired its shares. The Court also 
adopted the same solution, on the same grounds, in regard to the loans which the Land 
of Brandenburg had made to SMI.
The German Government also submitted in the alternative that the derogation provided 
for in Article 87(2)(c) EC, under which aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the 
Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany is compatible with the 
common market insofar as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by that division, was applicable in this case. The Court also 
rejected that plea on the ground that the German Government had failed to adduce any 
evidence to show that the disputed aid was required in order to compensate for an 
economic disadvantage caused by the division of Germany. The Court pointed out in this 
regard that ‘although, following the reunification of Germany, Article 87(2)(c) EC falls to 
be applied to the new Länder, such application can only be on the same conditions as 
those  applicable  in  the  old  Länder  during  the  period  preceding  the  date  of  that 
reunification’. In that regard, as the phrase ‘division of Germany’ referred historically to 
the establishment in 1948 of the dividing line between the two occupied zones, the Proceedings  Court of Justice
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‘economic  disadvantages  caused  by  that  division’  could  mean  only  the  economic 
disadvantages  caused  in  certain  areas  of  Germany  by  the  isolation  which  the 
establishment of that physical frontier entailed, such as the breaking of communication 
links or the loss of markets as a result of the rupture of commercial relations between the 
two parts of German territory. By contrast, the idea that Article 87(2)(c) EC permitted full 
compensation for the undeniable lack of economic development suffered by the new 
Länder disregarded both the nature of that provision as a derogation and its context and 
aims. The economic disadvantages suffered by the new Länder as a whole were not 
directly caused by the geographical division of Germany within the meaning of Article 
87(2)(c)  EC  and  ‘the  differences  in  development  between  the  original  and  the  new 
Länder are explained by causes other than the geographical rift caused by the division 
of Germany and in particular by the different politico-economic systems set up in each 
part of Germany’ (paragraphs 49 to 53).
In conclusion, the German Government challenged the recovery order contained in the 
contested decision, on the basis, inter alia, of an unlawful extension of the status of aid 
beneficiary. It was on this latter point that the contested decision was annulled by the 
Court. The Court took the view that, by ordering MD & D, as the company acquiring SiMI, 
to repay the State aid granted to the latter, the Commission had failed to have regard to 
the principles governing the recovery of State aid. The Court pointed out in this connection 
that ‘where an undertaking that has benefited from unlawful State aid is bought at the 
market price, that is to say at the highest price which a private investor acting under 
normal competitive conditions was ready to pay for that company in the situation it was 
in, in particular after having enjoyed State aid, the aid element was assessed at the 
market  price  and  included  in  the  purchase  price.  In  such  circumstances,  the  buyer 
cannot be regarded as having benefited from an advantage in relation to other market 
operators’ (paragraph 80). The Court also annulled the contested decision on the ground 
that it ordered the hive-off company to repay the aid granted to the company the activity 
of which it was intended to continue. The Court ruled that, although ‘it is certainly possible 
that, in the event that hive-off companies are created in order to continue some of the 
activities of the undertaking that received the aid, where that undertaking has gone 
bankrupt,  those  companies  may  also,  if  necessary,  be  required  to  repay  the  aid  in 
question, where it is established that they actually continue to benefit from the competitive 
advantage linked with the receipt of the aid. This could be the case, inter alia, where 
those hive-off companies acquire the assets of the company in liquidation without paying 
the market price in return or where it is established that the creation of such companies 
evades the obligation to repay that aid’, the mere fact that the plant of the beneficiary 
undertaking was leased for a certain period by such a company did not necessarily mean 
that the latter enjoyed the competitive advantage linked with the aid granted to the lessor 
almost three years before the creation of the lessee (paragraphs 86, 88 and 89). As the 
obligation imposed on MD & D to repay the aid granted to SMI, as well as its extension 
to ‘any other firm to which SMI’s, SiMI’s or MD & D’s assets have been or will be 
transferred in order to evade the consequences of this decision’, had also been annulled 
by the Court, SMI and SiMI alone remained under an obligation to repay the aid which 
had been granted to them respectively.
In Case C-345/02 Pearle and Others (judgment of 15 July 2004, not yet published in the 
ECR),  which  was  a  preliminary  reference  from  the  Hoge  Raad  der  Nederlanden 
(Supreme  Court  of  the  Netherlands),  the  questions  for  resolution  concerned  the Proceedings  Court of Justice
36
Court of Justice  Proceedings
37
interpretation of Articles 87(1) EC and 88(3) EC and had arisen in proceedings concerning 
the lawfulness of charges imposed on its members by a trade association governed by 
public law, the Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten (Central Industry Board for Skilled Trades) 
(‘the HBA’), which represented traders in optical equipment. The measure in question 
consisted of a ‘compulsory earmarked levy’ to finance a collective advertising campaign 
for opticians’ businesses.
By its first three questions the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden in substance asked whether 
the funding of advertising campaigns by the HBA for the benefit of opticians’ businesses 
could be regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC and whether, if 
necessary taking into account the de minimis rule, the HBA’s bye-laws imposing levies 
on its members in order to fund those campaigns ought – as components of an aid 
scheme – to have been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) EC. 
The Hoge Raad was thus seeking clarification as to whether the compulsory earmarked 
levies imposed on the appellants in the main proceedings were, because they were 
directly linked to what might be unnotified aid, also vitiated by unlawfulness, with the 
result that they had in principle to be reimbursed. By its fourth and fifth questions, the 
Hoge Raad also asked whether, in circumstances such as those of the dispute in the 
main proceedings, it was contrary to Community law for the courts with jurisdiction to 
apply  the  rule  of  Netherlands  case-law  on  formal  legal  force  which  prevented  their 
remaining able to examine the lawfulness of the HBA’s decisions imposing charges on 
the appellants in the main proceedings where the bye-laws on which those decisions 
were based were introduced in contravention of Article 88(3) EC.
After establishing that, even if the HBA was a public body, it did not, in the circumstances 
of  the  case,  appear  that  the  advertising  campaign  was  funded  by  resources  made 
available to the national authorities; on the contrary, the judgment making the reference 
made it clear that the monies used by the HBA for the purpose of funding the advertising 
campaign in question were collected from its members who benefited from the campaign 
by  means  of  compulsory  levies  earmarked  for  the  organisation  of  that  advertising 
campaign, the initiative for which, moreover, came from a private association of opticians, 
the Court ruled that ‘on a proper construction of Articles [87(1) EC and 88(3) EC], bye-
laws adopted by a trade association governed by public law for the purpose of funding 
an advertising campaign organised for the benefit of its members and decided on by 
them, through resources levied from those members and compulsorily earmarked for the 
funding of that campaign, do not constitute an integral part of an aid measure within the 
meaning of those provisions and it was not necessary for prior notification of them to be 
given to the Commission since it has been established that that funding was carried out 
by means of resources which that trade association, governed by public law, never had 
the power to dispose of freely’ (paragraph 41). It was for that reason no longer necessary 
to reply to the last two questions.
3.8.  In the area of trade marks, Case C-363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland [2004] ECR 
I-1619 merits attention. On 2 April 1997, the company Koninklijke KPN Nederland lodged 
with the Benelux Trade Mark Office (‘the BTMO’) an application for registration of the 
word ‘Postkantoor’ (‘Post Office’ in Dutch) as a trade mark in respect of paper, card and 
articles manufactured from those materials, in addition to a variety of services. The 
BTMO refused registration on the ground that the sign was exclusively descriptive of the 
goods and services relating to a post office. The Gerechtshof te ‘s Gravenhage (Regional Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Court of Appeal, The Hague), before which KPN brought an action challenging the 
decision of the BTMO, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling a series of questions 
on the interpretation of the First Directive on Trade Marks. 11
It was necessary, among other things, to determine whether the fact that a trade mark 
had been registered in a Member State in respect of certain goods or services had any 
bearing on the examination in another Member State of an application for registration of 
a similar mark in respect of similar goods or services. The Court answered that question 
in the negative: that fact could not have any bearing. The competent authority had to 
examine the characteristics peculiar to the mark with specific reference to the goods and 
services concerned. The Gerechtshof also asked the Court whether the prohibition of 
descriptive signs under Article 3(1)(c) of the directive extended to signs or indications 
designating the characteristics of the goods or services concerned in the case where 
there were more usual indications for designating the same characteristics. The Court 
pointed out that, in prohibiting descriptive signs, the aforementioned provision pursued 
an aim which was in the public interest, namely that such signs or indications may be 
freely used by all, by preventing them from being reserved to one undertaking alone by 
being registered as trade marks. In those circumstances, if the competent authority 
reaches the conclusion that the sign currently represents, in the mind of the relevant 
class of persons, a description of the characteristics of the goods or services concerned 
or if it is reasonable to assume that that might be the case in the future, it must refuse to 
register the mark. It is in that regard irrelevant whether there are other, more usual, signs 
or indications. In issue is also the fact that, under the Benelux trade mark law, the right 
to a trade mark expressed in one of the national or regional languages of the Benelux 
territory extends automatically to its translation in those other languages. The Court took 
the view that this was in effect equivalent to the registration of several different trade 
marks. The competent authority must therefore, in such a case, ascertain whether the 
sign in each of those translations may be descriptive. The Court was also required to rule 
on the relationship between distinctive and descriptive characteristics. The Gerechtshof 
posed the question as to whether, if a trade mark is descriptive in regard to certain goods 
or services but is not descriptive in regard to other goods or services, it had to be 
regarded as necessarily having a distinctive character in relation to those other goods or 
services. This provided the Court with an opportunity to point out that each of the grounds 
for refusal listed in that provision is independent of the others and calls for a separate 
examination, although there is a clear overlap between the scope of the respective 
provisions. Consequently, the fact that a mark does not fall within one of those grounds 
does not mean that it cannot fall within another. In addition, the question whether a mark 
has a distinctive character must be assessed by reference to the goods or services 
described in the application for registration; where registration of a mark is sought in 
respect of various goods or services, it is necessary to check that, in regard to each of 
those goods or services, none of the grounds for refusal of registration applies, which 
may lead to different conclusions depending on the goods or services under consideration. 
The Court accordingly found that it is not open to the competent authority to conclude 
that a mark is not devoid of any distinctive character in relation to certain goods or 
services purely on the ground that it is descriptive of the characteristics of other goods or 
services, even where registration is sought in respect of those goods or services as a 
11  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member 
States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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whole. With regard to the fact that the word ‘Postkantoor’ is composed of elements, 
each of which is descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services in respect of 
which registration was sought, the Court pointed out that, in order for a trade mark to 
be regarded as descriptive, it is not sufficient that each of its components may be found 
to be descriptive: the word itself must be found to be so. Although, as a general rule, a 
mere combination of elements, each of which is descriptive, itself remains descriptive, 
that may, however, not be the case where that combination creates an impression 
which is sufficiently far removed from that produced by the simple combination of those 
descriptive elements, if the word is more than the sum of its parts by reason of the 
unusual nature of the combination in regard to the goods or services in question, or if 
the word has become part of everyday language and has acquired its own meaning, 
with the result that it is now independent of its components (provided that, in that case, 
the word is not itself descriptive). It should be noted that, on a reference from the 
Benelux-Gerechtshof (Benelux Court of Justice) in a dispute arising from the refusal by 
the BTMO to register the sign ‘BIOMILD’ for foodstuffs on the ground of its descriptive 
nature,  the  Court  provided  a  similar  answer  in  Case  C-265/00  Campina  Melkunie 
[2004] ECR I-1699.
3.9.  The cases to which attention is to be drawn from among the plentiful case-law 
concerning Community measures to harmonise the laws of the Member States are the 
three Fixtures Marketing cases (judgments of 9 November 2004 in Cases C-46/02, 
C-338/02 and C-444/02, not yet published in the ECR) and The British Horseracing 
Board and Others (judgment of 9 November 2004 in Case C-203/02, not yet published 
in the ECR), which related to what is called the sui generis right under Directive 96/9 12 
and the scope of the legal protection afforded by it in the field of sports betting. A number 
of questions on the interpretation of provisions of that directive were submitted to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling, in the course of proceedings which had arisen from the use 
by certain betting companies, in Sweden, Greece, Finland and the United Kingdom, of 
information that was published but the exploitation, or organisation, of which had been 
entrusted to other bodies, the applicants in the main proceedings. In three cases the 
disputed use consisted in the reproduction on pools coupons of data relating to the 
fixture  lists  of  the  English  and  Scottish  football  leagues.  These  data  are  stored 
electronically  and  published  inter  alia  in  printed  booklets  but  the  handling  of  the 
exploitation of the data had been entrusted, by means of licences, to the applicant in the 
main proceedings. In the fourth case, the dispute concerned the publication on two 
internet horserace-betting sites of information derived from newspapers and from raw 
data supplied by certain companies which had been authorised to do so by the applicant. 
The latter has the task of managing the horse racing industry in the United Kingdom and 
in this context compiles and maintains the database whose protection it claimed.
The applicants in the main proceedings took the view that undertakings which use their 
data in this way for the purpose of taking bets infringe the right conferred on them by their 
national law, as amended as a result of implementation of the directive on the legal 
protection of databases. As implementing measures, the relevant national provisions 
had to be interpreted in light of the directive.
12  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases (OJ 1996 L 77, p. 20).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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In those proceedings which had been brought before them, the Vantaan Käräjäoikeus 
(Vantaa District Court, Finland), the Court of Appeal (England and Wales), the Högsta 
Domstolen (Supreme Court, Sweden) and the Monomeles Protodikio Athinon (Court of 
First Instance, Athens, Greece) referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling a 
number of questions on the subject-matter and scope of the protection established by 
the directive, in particular of Article 7(1) of the directive granting the maker of a database 
which  shows  that  there  has  been  qualitatively  and/or  quantitatively  a  substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents the right to 
prevent extraction and/or reutilisation of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.
Asked by the four national courts as to what is covered by the condition of ‘substantial 
investment’ under that provision, the Court held that ‘the expression “investment in ... 
the obtaining ... of the contents” of a database as defined in Article 7(1) of the directive 
must be understood to refer to the resources used to seek out existing independent 
materials and collect them in the database’ and that ‘it does not cover the resources 
used for the creation of materials which make up the contents of a database’ (Cases 
C-46/02, C-338/02, C-444/02 and C-203/02, paragraph 1 of the operative part). The 
Court  thus  held  that  ‘in  the  context  of  drawing  up  a  fixture  list  for  the  purpose  of 
organising football league fixtures, therefore, it does not cover the resources used to 
establish the dates, times and the team pairings for the various matches in the league’. 
The obtaining of the data which make up those football fixture lists does not require any 
particular effort on the part of the professional leagues, being indivisibly linked to the 
creation of those data, and the resources used for verification or presentation of a 
fixture list also do not entail substantial investment independent of the investment in the 
creation of its constituent data (Cases C-46/02, C-338/02 and C-444/02). The Court 
also  made  it  clear  in  the  case  concerning  horserace  betting  that  ‘the  expression 
“investment in … the … verification … of the contents” of a database in Article 7(1) of 
the directive must be understood to refer to the resources used, with a view to ensuring 
the reliability of the information contained in that database, to monitor the accuracy 
of the materials collected when the database was created and during its operation’ 
and that ‘the resources used for verification during the stage of creation of materials 
which are subsequently collected in a database do not fall within that definition’ (Case 
C-203/02, paragraph 42). The Court thus held there that ‘the resources used to draw up 
a list of horses in a race and to carry out checks in that connection do not constitute 
investment in the obtaining and verification of the contents of the database in which that 
list appears’ (Case C-203/02, paragraph 42).
3.10.  In the field of social policy, two judgments are worthy of specific mention. In the 
first of these cases (judgment of 30 March 2004 in Case C-147/02 Alabaster, [2004] ECR 
I-3101), the Court was asked by the Court of Appeal about the taking into account of a 
pay rise when calculating statutory maternity pay.
In the case in point, Mrs Alabaster, an employee in the United Kingdom, commenced 
maternity leave in January 1996. Shortly before it began, she received a pay increase 
backdated so as to have effect from December 1995. However, that increase could not 
be reflected in the calculation of her statutory maternity pay since the applicable national 
legislation has regard to an earlier period, corresponding to the months of September 
and October, for calculating normal earnings.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The Court found first of all that Directive 92/85 13 did not provide a useful reply to the 
questions asked by the national court. However, after considering all the Community 
legislation it succeeded in establishing the general principles applicable to the case. The 
Court’s reasoning is essentially founded on Article 141 EC and on Directive 75/117. 14
The benefit paid to a pregnant woman during her maternity leave is to be treated like pay. 
She cannot of course claim full pay since she is in a special position compared with 
workers actually at work. That is a standard application of the principle of equal treatment. 
Nevertheless,  since  the  benefit  paid  is  equivalent  to  pay  (see  to  this  effect  Case 
C-342/93 Gillespie and Others [1996] ECR I-475), the principle of non-discrimination 
results in her being entitled to the increase since, had she not been pregnant, she would 
have received a pay rise. That requirement is not limited to cases where the pay rise is 
backdated to the period covered by the reference pay. This is an application of the 
principle of equal pay for men and women.
The Court refused, however, to express a view on the precise manner in which that 
principle was to be implemented since this fell outside its jurisdiction in proceedings for 
a preliminary ruling.
It also refused to take a view on the standpoint to be adopted in the event of a decrease 
in pay since that question appeared hypothetical in the case in point. This question 
therefore remains open.
In  the  second  judgment,  namely  the  judgment  of  5  October  2004  in  Joined  Cases 
C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others, not yet published in the ECR, which develops 
the judgment in Case C-151/02 Jaeger [2003] ECR I-8389 concerning time spent by 
doctors on call, the Court held that the maximum weekly working time for rescue workers 
in an emergency medical rescue service cannot exceed 48 hours.
In Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Mr Pfeiffer and the other claimants were, or had 
been, employed as emergency workers by the German Red Cross, a private-law body 
which operates a land-based rescue service using ambulances and emergency medical 
vehicles. In their various contracts of employment with their employer, it was agreed that 
a collective agreement was to apply, by virtue of which their average weekly working time 
was, when account was taken of their obligation to spend an average of at least three 
hours per day ‘on duty’, extended from 38.5 hours to 49 hours. During those periods of 
duty time, the emergency workers concerned had to make themselves available to their 
employer at the place of employment and remain continuously attentive in order to be 
able to act immediately should the need arise.
The workers concerned brought an action before the Arbeitsgericht Lörrach (Labour 
Court, Lörrach) for a declaration that their average weekly working time could not exceed 
13  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1).
14  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women (OJ 1975 L 45, 
p. 19).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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the 48-hour limit laid down by Directive 93/104 15 and for payment for the hours they 
worked in excess of that weekly limit. The German court requested guidance from the 
Court of Justice in this regard. The questions referred by it for a preliminary ruling relate 
to the interpretation of certain provisions of Directives 89/391 16 and 93/104.
The Court began by stating that the activity of emergency workers carried out in the 
framework of an emergency medical service falls within the scope of Directives 89/391 
and 93/104. None of the exceptions provided for is relevant in this instance. Their activity 
does not involve services essential for the protection of public health, safety and order in 
cases, such as a catastrophe, the gravity and scale of which are exceptional and which, 
by their nature, do not lend themselves to planning as regards working time; nor does 
their activity involve road transport services, its main aim being to provide initial medical 
treatment to the sick or injured. That being so, the Court held that an extension of the 
48-hour maximum weekly period of working time can be valid only if consent has first 
been expressly and freely given by each worker individually and that it is therefore not 
sufficient that the relevant worker’s employment contract refers to a collective agreement 
permitting such an extension.
Applying its decision in Jaeger, the Court, treating emergency workers’ periods of duty 
time in the same way as time spent by doctors on call, then held that such periods must 
be taken into account in their totality in the calculation of maximum daily and weekly 
working time. It stated that the 48-hour upper limit on average weekly working time, 
including overtime, constitutes a rule of Community social law of particular importance 
from which every worker must benefit, since it is a minimum requirement necessary to 
ensure protection of his safety and health. Therefore, national legislation the effect of 
which, as regards periods of duty time completed by emergency workers, is to permit, 
including by means of a collective agreement or works agreement based on such an 
agreement, the 48-hour maximum period of weekly working time to be exceeded is 
incompatible with the requirements of Directive 93/104.
Finally the Court found, in standard fashion, that Directive 93/104 fulfils, so far as the 
maximum period of weekly working time is concerned, the conditions necessary for it to 
have direct effect since, as regards its content, it is unconditional and sufficiently precise. 
While it is true that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and 
cannot  therefore  be  relied  upon  as  such  against  an  individual,  the  Court  recalled, 
however, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with Community 
law and held that, when hearing a case between individuals, a national court is required, 
when applying the provisions of domestic law adopted for the purpose of transposing 
obligations laid down by a directive, to consider the whole body of rules of national law 
and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the 
directive in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the 
directive. Applied to the present instance, that principle had to lead the national court to 
do whatever lay within its jurisdiction to ensure that the maximum period of weekly 
working time set at 48 hours was not exceeded.
15  Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time (OJ 1993 L 307, p. 18).
16  Council  Directive  89/391/EEC  of  12  June  1989  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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3.11.  Finally, the Court also had to act in the field of economic and monetary policy. In 
its judgment of 13 July 2004 in Case C-27/04 Commission v Council, not yet published 
in the ECR, it was called on to address implementation of the Stability Pact. It will be 
recalled  that,  in  June  1997  in  Amsterdam,  the  European  Council,  with  a  view  to 
completing Economic and Monetary Union, adopted a resolution on the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the objective of which is to prevent excessive deficits from arising and to 
ensure sound management of public finances in the euro zone. It was in this context that, 
in  2003,  an  excessive  deficit  procedure  was  initiated  against  France  and  against 
Germany.
On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council found that an excessive deficit 
existed in both those States. It therefore adopted two recommendations asking them to 
reduce their deficits and setting a deadline for the adoption of corrective measures (on 
the  basis  of  Article  104(7)  EC).  After  those  periods  had  expired,  the  Commission 
recommended to the Council that it adopt decisions establishing that neither France nor 
Germany  had  taken  adequate  measures  to  reduce  their  deficit  in  response  to  the 
Council’s recommendations. The Commission thus requested the Council to give the two 
Member States concerned notice to take measures to reduce their deficit (Article 104(9) 
EC).  However,  on  25  November  2003  the  Council,  unable  to  achieve  the  majority 
required for taking that decision, merely adopted conclusions in which it decided to hold 
the excessive deficit procedures in abeyance and declared itself ready to take a decision 
under Article  104(9)  EC  should  it  appear  that  the  relevant  Member  State  was  not 
complying with the commitments entered into by it. Faced with what it considered to be 
a  breach  of  the  Treaty  rules,  in  January  2004  the  Commission  brought  an  action 
challenging both the Council’s failure to adopt a decision and its conclusions.
So far as concerns, first, the Council’s inability to adopt the decision recommended by 
the Commission, the Court declared this part of the action inadmissible. It held that 
failure by the Council to adopt acts provided for in Article 104(8) and (9) EC that are 
recommended by the Commission cannot be regarded as giving rise to acts open to 
challenge for the purposes of Article 230 EC. Where the Commission recommends to the 
Council that it adopt decisions under Article 104(8) and (9) EC and the required majority 
is  not  achieved  within  the  Council,  no  decision  is  taken  for  the  purpose  of  those 
provisions. The Court added as an incidental point that ‘… if the Council does not adopt 
formal instruments recommended by the Commission pursuant to Article 104(8) and (9) 
EC, the latter can have recourse to the legal remedy provided for by Article 232 EC, in 
compliance with the conditions prescribed therein’ (paragraph 35).
On the other hand, the action was declared admissible in so far as it was directed against 
the Council’s conclusions. They were indeed intended to have legal effects, at the very 
least inasmuch as they held the ongoing excessive deficit procedures in abeyance and 
in reality modified the recommendations previously adopted by the Council under Article 
104(7) EC. The Court stated that the Council had rendered any decision to be taken 
under Article 104(9) EC conditional on an assessment which would no longer have the 
content  of  the  recommendations  adopted  under  Article  104(7)  EC  as  its  frame  of 
reference, but the unilateral commitments of the Member State concerned.
The Court then held that the Council had not complied with procedural rules. Since the 
decision contained in the conclusions involved modification of the recommendations Proceedings  Court of Justice
44
Court of Justice  Proceedings
45
adopted by the Council under Article 104(7) EC, it constituted a breach of Article 104(7) 
and (13) EC, that is to say a breach of the Commission’s right of initiative and of the 
voting rules. The Court stated that ‘… it follows from the wording and the broad logic of 
the system established by the Treaty that the Council cannot break free from the rules 
laid down by Article 104 EC and those which it set for itself in Regulation No 1467/97. 
Thus, it cannot have recourse to an alternative procedure, for example in order to adopt 
a measure which would not be the very decision envisaged at a given stage or which 
would  be  adopted  in  conditions  different  from  those  required  by  the  applicable 
provisions.’
In Case C-19/03 Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg (judgment of 14 September 2004, not 
yet published in the ECR), the Landgericht München (Regional Court, Munich) submitted 
a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Regulation No 1103/97 17 to 
the Court of Justice in proceedings between a Germany association responsible for the 
taking of legal action with regard to breach of consumer protection laws (the Verbraucher-
Zentrale) and O2, an undertaking which operates a mobile telephone network.
The case involved determining whether the method applied by O2 for converting into 
euros amounts hitherto expressed in deutschmarks was compatible with that regulation. 
O2 converted the price per minute of its various tariffs by rounding them to the nearest 
cent, and in fact rounded the relevant tariff up to the nearest cent.
Article 5 of Regulation No 1103/97 states that ‘monetary amounts to be paid or accounted 
for when a rounding takes place after a conversion into the euro unit … shall be rounded 
up or down to the nearest cent’.
The Court had to decide first whether a tariff, such as the per-minute price at which O2 
invoiced its customers’ telephone calls, is a monetary amount to be paid or accounted for 
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 5 of Regulation No 1103/97 or whether 
it is only the final sum for which the consumer is actually invoiced which may constitute 
such an amount.
Since Community law does not define those concepts, the Court had recourse to the 
teleological  method  of  interpretation  and  thus  concerned  itself  with  the  aims  of  the 
measure in question. Two general principles of law are identifiable in Regulation No 
1103/97: the need to protect citizens’ legal certainty at the time of transition to the euro 
and the correlative requirement that the continuity of contracts and other legal instruments 
should  not  be  affected,  these  principles  sharing  a  general  objective  pursued  when 
introducing the new single currency, namely that the transition to the euro should be 
neutral for citizens and undertakings. As the 12th recital in the preamble to the regulation 
suggests, that objective requires that ‘a high degree of accuracy in conversion operations’ 
be achieved.
Having  regard  to  those  objectives,  the  Court  interpreted  Regulation  No  1103/97 
restrictively and ruled that ‘a tariff, such as the per-minute price at issue in the main 
proceedings, does not constitute a monetary amount to be paid or accounted for within 
17  Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction 
of the euro (OJ 1997 L 162, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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the meaning of the first sentence of Article 5 of … Regulation … No 1103/97 … and thus 
is not to be rounded in every case to the nearest cent. …’ (paragraph 1 of the operative 
part).
Second, the question then arose as to whether Regulation No 1103/97, in particular the 
first sentence of Article 5, must be taken to preclude the rounding to the nearest cent of 
amounts other than those which must be paid or accounted for. While the Court held that 
it is not fundamentally precluded, this is, however, only ‘… provided that that rounding 
practice is consistent with the principle of continuity of contracts … and with the objective 
… that the transition to the euro should be neutral; in other words, provided that the 
rounding  practice  does  not  affect  contractual  obligations  entered  into  by  economic 
agents, including consumers, and that it does not have a real impact on the price actually 
to be paid’ (paragraph 2 of the operative part).
In the case in point, the Court stated that the conversion in question is ‘liable to have a 
real impact on the price actually borne by consumers’ (paragraph 54). It did not take this 
interpretation beyond that point, leaving it to the national court to ascertain whether there 
had been a ‘real impact on prices’.46
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B  —  Composition of the Court of Justice
(Order of precedence as at 14 October 2004)
First row, from left to right:
C. Gulmann, Judge; A. Borg Barthet, President of Chamber; R. Silva de Lapuerta, President of Chamber; 
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Timmermans, President of Chamber; L.A. Geelhoed, First Advocate General; K. Lenaerts, President of 
Chamber; F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General.
Second row, from left to right:
A.  Tizzano,  Advocate  General;  N. Colneric,  Judge;  D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,  Advocate  General; J.-
P. Puissochet,  Judge;  A.M. La Pergola,  Judge;  P. Léger,  Advocate  General;  R. Schintgen,  Judge, 
S. von Bahr, Judge; J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judge.
Third row, from left to right:
G. Arestis,  Judge;  P.  Ku ˉris,  Judge;  K.  Schiemann,  Judge;  J.  Kokott, Advocate  General;  C. Stix-Hackl, 
Advocate General; L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General; J. Makarczyk, Judge; E. Juhász, Judge.
Fourth row, from left to right:
A. Ó Caoimh, Judge; U. Lõhmus, Judge; J. Malenovský, Judge; M. Ilešic ˇ, Judge; J. Kluc ˇka, Judge; E. Levits, 
Judge; R. Grass, Registrar.48
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1.  Members of the Court of Justice
(in order of their entry into office)
Vassilios Skouris
Born 1948; graduated in law from the Free University, Berlin (1970); 
awarded doctorate in constitutional and administrative law at Hamburg 
University (1973); Assistant Professor at Hamburg University (1972-
77); Professor of Public Law at Bielefeld University (1978); Professor 
of Public Law at the University of Thessaloniki (1982); Minister of 
Internal Affairs (1989 and 1996); Member of the Administrative Board 
of  the  University  of  Crete  (1983-87);  Director  of  the  Centre  for 
International and European Economic Law, Thessaloniki (from 1997); 
President  of  the  Greek  Association  for  European  Law  (1992-94); 
Member  of  the  Greek  National  Research  Committee  (1993-95); 
Member of the Higher Selection Board for Greek Civil Servants (1994-
96); Member of the Academic Council of the Academy of European 
Law, Trier (from 1995); Member of the Administrative Board of the 
Greek National Judges’ College (1995-96); Member of the Scientific 
Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-99); President of 
the Greek Economic and Social Council in 1998; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 8 June 1999; President of the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2003.
Francis Geoffrey Jacobs
Born 1939; Barrister; Queen’s Counsel; Official in the Secretariat of 
the  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights;  Legal  Secretary  to 
Advocate General J.-P. Warner; Professor of European Law, University 
of London; Director, Centre of European Law, King’s College London; 
Author of several works on European law; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 1988.Members  Court of Justice
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Claus Christian Gulmann
Born 1942; Official at the Ministry of Justice; Legal Secretary to Judge 
Max Sørensen; Professor of Public International Law and Dean of the 
Law  School  of  the  University  of  Copenhagen;  in  private  practice; 
Chairman and member of arbitral tribunals; Member of Administrative 
Appeal Tribunal; Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  from  7 
October 1991 to 6 October 1994; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 1994.
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward
Born 1934; Advocate (Scotland); Queen’s Counsel (Scotland); Clerk, 
and subsequently Treasurer, of the Faculty of Advocates; President of 
the  Consultative  Committee  of  the  Bars  and  Law  Societies  of  the 
European Community; Salvesen Professor of European Institutions 
and Director of the Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh; Special 
Adviser to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities; Honorary Bencher, Gray’s Inn, London; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance from 25 September 1989 to 9 March 1992; 
Judge at the Court of Justice from 10 March 1992 to 7 January 2004.
Antonio Mario La Pergola
Born  1931;  Professor  of  Constitutional  Law  and  General  and 
Comparative Public Law at the Universities of Padua, Bologna and 
Rome;  Member  of  the  High  Council  of  the  Judiciary  (1976-78); 
Member of the Constitutional Court and President of the Constitutional 
Court (1986-87); Minister for Community Policy (1987-89); elected to 
the European Parliament (1989-94); Judge at the Court of Justice 
from 7 October 1994 to 31 December 1994; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice from 1 January 1995 to 14 December 1999; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 15 December 1999.Members  Court of Justice
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Jean-Pierre Puissochet
Born 1936; State Counsellor (France); Director, subsequently Director-
General,  of  the  Legal  Service  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities  (1968-73);  Director-General  of  the  Agence  nationale 
pour l’emploi (1973-75); Director of General Administration, Ministry of 
Industry (1977-79); Director of Legal Affairs at the OECD (1979-85); 
Director of the Institut international d’administration publique (1985-
87); Jurisconsult, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (1987-94); Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 1994.
Philippe Léger
Born 1938; A member of the judiciary serving at the Ministry of Justice 
(1966-70);  Head  of,  and  subsequently  Technical  Adviser  at,  the 
Private Office of the Minister for Living Standards in 1976; Technical 
Adviser at the Private Office of the Minister for Justice (1976-78); 
Deputy Director of Criminal Affairs and Reprieves at the Ministry of 
Justice (1978-83); Senior Member of the Court of Appeal, Paris (1983-
86); Deputy Director of the Private Office of the Minister for Justice 
(1986); President of the Regional Court at Bobigny (1986-93); Head of 
the Private Office of the Minister for Justice, and Advocate General at 
the Court of Appeal, Paris (1993-94); Associate Professor at René 
Descartes University (Paris V) (1988-93); Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 1994.
Peter Jann
Born 1935; Doctor of Law of the University of Vienna (1957); appointed 
Judge and assigned to the Federal Ministry of Justice (1961); Judge 
in  press  matters  at  the  Straf-Bezirksgericht,  Vienna  (1963-66); 
spokesman  of  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice  (1966-70)  and 
subsequently appointed to the international affairs department of that 
Ministry; Adviser  to  the  Justice  Committee  and  spokesman  at  the 
Parliament  (1973-78);  appointed  as  Member  of  the  Constitutional 
Court (1978); permanent Judge-Rapporteur at that court until the end 
of 1994; Judge at the Court of Justice since 19 January 1995.Members  Court of Justice
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Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
Born 1949; Judge at the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (General 
Council of the Judiciary); Professor; Head of the Private Office of the 
President of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial; ad hoc Judge to 
the European Court of Human Rights; Judge at the Tribunal Supremo 
(Supreme Court) from 1996; Advocate General at the Court of Justice 
since 19 January 1995.
Romain Schintgen
Born 1939; General Administrator at the Ministry of Labour; President 
of the Economic and Social Council; Director of the Société nationale 
de  crédit  et  d’investissement  and  of  the  Société  européenne  des 
satellites; Government Representative on the European Social Fund 
Committee, the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for 
Workers and the Administrative Board of the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions; Judge at the Court 
of First Instance from 25 September 1989 to 11 July 1996; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 12 July 1996.
Fidelma O’Kelly Macken
Born 1945; Called to the Bar of Ireland (1972); Legal Advisor, Patent 
and Trade  Mark Agents  (1973-79);  Barrister  (1979-95)  and  Senior 
Counsel (1995-98) of the Bar of Ireland; member of the Bar of England 
and Wales; Judge of the High Court in Ireland (1998); Lecturer in 
Legal  Systems  and  Methods  and  ‘Averil  Deverell’  Lecturer  in 
Commercial Law, Trinity College, Dublin; Bencher of the Honourable 
Society of King’s Inns; Judge at the Court of Justice from 6 October 
1999 to 13 October 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Ninon Colneric
Born  1948;  studied  in Tübingen,  Munich  and  Geneva;  following  a 
period of academic research in London, awarded a doctorate in law by 
the  university  of  Munich;  Judge  at  the  Arbeitsgericht  Oldenburg; 
authorised, by the University of Bremen, to teach labour law, sociology 
of law and social law; Professor ad interim at the faculty of law of 
the  universities  of  Frankfurt  and  Bremen;  President  of  the 
Landesarbeitsgericht  Schleswig-Holstein  (1989);  collaboration,  as 
expert, on the European Expertise Service (EU) project for the reform 
of the labour law of Kirghizstan (1994-95); Honorary Professor at the 
University of Bremen in labour law, specifically in European labour 
law; Judge at the Court of Justice since 15 July 2000.
Stig von Bahr
Born 1939; has worked with the Parliamentary Ombudsman and in the 
Swedish Cabinet Office and ministries inter alia as assistant under-
secretary  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance;  appointed  Judge  in  the 
Kammarrätten (Administrative Court of Appeal), Gothenburg, in 1981 
and Justice of the Regeringsrätten (Supreme Administrative Court) in 
1985; has collaborated on a large number of official reports, mainly on 
the  subject  of  tax  legislation  and  accounting;  has  been  inter  alia 
Chairman of the Committee on Inflation-Adjusted Taxation of Income, 
Chairman of the Accounting Committee and Special Rapporteur for 
the Committee on Rules for Taxation of Private Company Owners; has 
also been Chairman of the Accounting Standards Board and Member 
of the Board of the National Courts Administration and the Board of 
the Financial Supervisory Authority; has published a large number of 
articles, mainly on the subject of tax legislation; Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2000.Members  Court of Justice
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Antonio Tizzano
Born 1940; various teaching assignments at Italian universities; Legal 
Counsel  to  Italy’s  Permanent  Representation  to  the  European 
Communities (1984-92); Member of the Bar at the Court of Cassation 
and  other  higher  courts;  Member  of  the  Italian  delegation  in 
international  negotiations  and  at  intergovernmental  conferences 
including those on the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty; 
various  editorial  positions;  Member  of  the  Independant  Group  of 
Experts  appointed  to  examine  the  finances  of  the  European 
Commission  (1999);  Professor  of  European  Law,  Director  of  the 
Institute  of  International  and  European  Law  (University  of  Rome); 
Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.
José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues
Born 1940; various offices within the judiciary (1964-77); Government 
assignments  to  carry  out  and  coordinate  studies  on  reform  of  the 
judicial system; Government Agent to the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (1980-84); 
Expert on the Human Rights Steering Committee of the Council of 
Europe (1980-85); Member of the Review Commission of the Criminal 
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure; Attorney General (1984-
2000); Member of the Supervisory Committee of the European Union 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1999-2000); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 7 October 2000.
Christiaan Willem Anton Timmermans
Born 1941; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (1966-69); official of the European Commission (1969-
77); Doctor of Laws (University of Leiden); Professor of European Law 
at the University of Groningen (1977-89); Deputy Justice at Arnhem 
Court of Appeal; various editorial positions; Deputy Director-General 
at  the  Legal  Service  of  the  European  Commission  (1989-2000); 
Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.Members  Court of Justice
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Leendert A. Geelhoed
Born 1942; Research Assistant, University of Utrecht (1970-71); Legal 
Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities (1971-
74);  Senior Adviser,  Ministry  of  Justice  (1975-82);  Member  of  the 
Advisory Council on Government Policy (1983-90); various teaching 
assignments; Secretary-General, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1990-
97);  Secretary-General,  Ministry  of  General  Affairs  (1997-2000); 
Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.
Christine Stix-Hackl
Born  1957;  Doctor  of  Laws  (University  of  Vienna),  postgraduate 
studies in European Law at the College of Europe, Bruges; member of 
the Austrian  Diplomatic  Service  (from  1982);  expert  on  European 
Union matters in the office of the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1985-88); Legal Service of the European Commission 
(1989); Head of the ‘Legal Service – EU’ in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  (1992-2000,  Minister  Plenipotentiary);  participated  in  the 
negotiations on the European Economic Area and on the accession of 
the Republic of Austria to the European Union; Agent of the Republic 
of Austria at the Court of Justice of the European Communities from 
1995; Austrian Consul-General in Zurich (2000); teaching assignments 
and publications; Advocate-General at the Court of Justice since 7 
October 2000.Members  Court of Justice
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Allan Rosas
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws (1977) of the University of Turku (Finland); 
Professor of Law at the University of Turku (1978-81) and at the Åbo 
Akademi  University  (Turku/Åbo)  (1981-96);  Director  of  the  latter’s 
Institute  for  Human  Rights  (1985-95);  various  international  and 
national  academic  positions  of  responsibility  and  memberships  of 
learned  societies;  coordinated  several  international  and  national 
research projects and programmes, including in the fields of EU law, 
international law, humanitarian and human rights law, constitutional 
law and comparative public administration; represented the Finnish 
Government  as  member  of,  or  adviser  to,  Finnish  delegations  at 
various international conferences and meetings; expert functions in 
relation to Finnish legal life, including in governmental law commissions 
and  committees  of  the  Finnish  Parliament,  as  well  as  the  UN, 
UNESCO,  OSCE  (CSCE)  and  the  Council  of  Europe;  from  1995 
Principal  Legal  Adviser  at  the  Legal  Service  of  the  European 
Commission, in charge of external relations; from March 2001, Deputy 
Director-General of the European Commission Legal Service; Judge 
at the Court of Justice since 17 January 2002.
Rosario Silva de Lapuerta
Born  1954;  Bachelor  of  Laws  (Universidad  Complutense,  Madrid); 
Abogado del Estado in Malaga; Abogado del Estado at the Legal 
Service of the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communication and, 
subsequently, at the Legal Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Head Abogado del Estado of the State Legal Service for Cases before 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities  and  Deputy 
Director-General of the Community and International Legal Assistance 
Department (Ministry of Justice); Member of the Commission think 
tank  on  the  future  of  the  Community  judicial  system;  Head  of  the 
Spanish  delegation  in  the  ‘Friends  of  the  Presidency’  Group  with 
regard to the reform of the Community judicial system in the Treaty of 
Nice and of the Council ad hoc working party on the Court of Justice; 
Professor of Community law at the Diplomatic School, Madrid; Co-
director of the journal Noticias de la Unión Europea; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Koen Lenaerts
Born 1954; lic.iuris, Ph.D. in Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); 
Master of Laws, Master in Public Administration (Harvard University); 
Lecturer  (1979-83),  subsequently  Professor  of  European  Law, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (since 1983); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice (1984-85); Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges 
(1984-89); Member of the Brussels Bar (1986-89); Visiting Professor 
at the Harvard Law School (1989); Judge at the Court of First Instance 
of the European Communities from 25 September 1989 to 6 October 
2003; Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.
Juliane Kokott
Born 1957; Law studies (Universities of Bonn and Geneva); LL.M. 
(American University/Washington DC); Doctor of Laws (Heidelberg 
University, 1985; Harvard University,1990); visiting professor at the 
University of California, Berkeley (1991); Professor of German and 
foreign  public  law,  international  law  and  European  law  at  the 
Universities of Augsburg (1992), Heidelberg (1993) and Düsseldorf 
(1994);  deputy  judge  for  the  Federal  Government  at  the  Court  of 
Conciliation  and  Arbitration  of  the  Organisation  for  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE);  Deputy  Chair  of  the  Federal 
Government’s Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 1996); 
Professor  of  International  Law,  International  Business  Law  and 
European Law at the University of St Gallen (1999); Director of the 
Institute for European and International Business Law at the University 
of St Gallen (2000); Deputy Director of the Master of Business Law 
programme at the University of St Gallen (2001); Advocate General at 
the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro
Born  1967;  degree  in  law  (University  of  Lisbon,  1990);  assistant 
lecturer  (European  University  Institute,  1991);  Doctor  of  Laws 
(European  University  Institute,  Florence,  1996);  visiting  professor 
(College  of  Europe,  Natolin;  Ortega  y  Gasset  Institute,  Madrid; 
Catholic University, Portugal; Institute of European Studies, Macao); 
Professor  (Universidade  Nova,  Lisbon,  1997);  Fulbright  Visiting 
Research  Fellow  (Harvard  University,  1998);  co-director  of  the 
Academy  of  International  Trade  Law;  co-editor  (Hart  Series  on 
European Law and Integration, European Law Journal) and member 
of the editorial board of several law journals; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.
Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann
Born 1937; Law degrees at Cambridge University; Barrister 1964-80. 
Queen’s Counsel 1980-86. Justice of the High Court of England and 
Wales  1986-95;  Lord  Justice  of Appeal  1995-2003;  Bencher  from 
1985 and Treasurer in 2003 of the Honourable Society of the Inner 
Temple; Judge at the Court of Justice since 8 January 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Jerzy Makarczyk
Born 1938; Doctor of Laws (1966); Professor of Public International 
Law (1974); Senior Visiting Fellow at the University of Oxford (1985); 
Professor  at  the  International  Christian  University,  Tokyo  (1988); 
author  of  several  works  on  public  international  law,  European 
Community law and human rights law; member of several learned 
societies in the field of international law, European law and human 
rights law; Negotiator for the Polish Government for the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Poland; Under-Secretary of State, then Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  (1989-92);  Chairman  of  the  Polish 
delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations; Judge at 
the European Court of Human Rights (1992-2002); President of the 
Institut de droit international (2003); Advisor to the President of the 
Republic of Poland on foreign policy and human rights (2002-04); 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Pranas Ku ˉris
Born  1938;  graduated  in  law  from  the  University  of  Vilnius  (1961); 
Doctorate in legal science, University of Moscow (1965); Doctor in legal 
science (Dr. hab), University of Moscow (1973); Research Assistant at 
the Institut des hautes études internationales (Director: Professor C. 
Rousseau), University of Paris (1967-68); Member of the Lithuanian 
Academy  of  Sciences  (1996);  Doctor  honoris  causa  of  the  Law 
University  of  Lithuania  (2001);  various  teaching  and  administrative 
duties  at  the  University  of  Vilnius  (1961-90);  Lecturer,  Assistant 
Professor, Professor of Public International Law, Dean of the Faculty of 
Law; several governmental posts in the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service 
and  Lithuanian  Ministry  of  Justice;  Minister  for  Justice  (1990-91), 
Member of the State Council (1991), Ambassador of the Republic of 
Lithuania  to  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  (1992-94); 
Judge at the (old) European Court of Human Rights (June 1994 to 
November  1998);  Judge  at  the  Supreme  Court  of  Lithuania  and 
subsequently  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  (December  1994  to 
October 1998); Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (from 
November  1998);  participated  in  several  international  conferences; 
member of the delegation of the Republic of Lithuania for negotiations 
with  the  USSR  (1990-92);  author  of  numerous  publications 
(approximately 200); Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Endre Juhász
Born 1944; graduated in law from the University of Szeged, Hungary 
(1967); Hungarian Bar Entrance Examinations (1970); post-graduate 
studies in comparative law, University of Strasbourg, France (1969, 
1970, 1971, 1972); Official in the Legal Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade (1966-74), Director for Legislative Matters (1973-74); 
First  Commercial  Secretary  at  the  Hungarian  Embassy,  Brussels, 
responsible for European Community issues (1974-79); Director at 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade (1979-83); First Commercial Secretary, 
then Commercial Counsellor to the Hungarian Embassy in Washington 
DC, USA (1983-89); Director-General of the Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry  of  International  Economic  Relations  (1989-91);  Chief 
negotiator for the Association Agreement between Hungary and the 
European  Communities  and  their  Member  States  (1990-91); 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of International Economic Relations, 
Head of the Office of European Affairs (1992); State Secretary at the 
Ministry  of  International  Economic  Relations  (1993-94);  State 
Secretary,  President  of  the  Office  of  European Affairs,  Ministry  of 
Industry  and  Trade  (1994);  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary, Chief of Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the 
European Union (January 1995 to May 2003); Chief negotiator for the 
accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union (July 
1998 to April 2003); Minister without portfolio for the coordination of 
matters of European integration (from May 2003); Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 11 May 2004.
George Arestis
Born 1945; graduated in law from the University of Athens (1968); 
M.A. in Comparative Politics and Government, University of Kent at 
Canterbury  (1970);  practice  as  a  lawyer  in  Cyprus  (1972-82); 
appointed  District  Court  Judge  (1982);  Promoted  to  the  post  of 
President of the District Court (1995); Administrative President of the 
District Court of Nicosia (1997-2003); Judge at the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus (2003); Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Anthony Borg Barthet U.O.M.
Born 1947; Doctorate in Law at the Royal University of Malta in 1973; 
entered the Maltese Civil Service as Notary to the Government in 
1975;  Counsel  for  the  Republic  in  1978,  Senior  Counsel  for  the 
Republic in 1979, Assistant Attorney General in 1988 and appointed 
Attorney General by the President of Malta in 1989; part-time lecturer 
in civil law at the University of Malta (1985-89); Member of the Council 
of the University of Malta (1998-2004); Member of the Commission for 
the Administration of Justice (1994-2004); Member of the Board of 
Governors of the Malta Arbitration Centre (1998-2004); Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Marko Ilešic ˇ
Born  1947;  Doctor  of  Law  (University  of  Ljubljana);  specialism  in 
comparative law (Universities of Strasbourg and Coimbra); Member of 
the Bar; Judge at the Labour Court, Ljubljana (1975-86); President of 
the Sports Tribunal (1978-86); Arbitrator at the Arbitration Court of the 
Triglav  Insurance  Company  (1990-98);  Chairman  of  the  Stock 
Exchange Appellate  Chamber  (from  1995); Arbitrator  at  the  Stock 
Exchange Arbitration Court (from 1998); Arbitrator at the Chamber of 
Commerce  of  Yugoslavia  (until  1991)  and  Slovenia  (from  1991); 
Arbitrator at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris; Judge 
at the Board of Appeals of UEFA (from 1988) and FIFA (from 2000); 
President of the Union of Slovenian Lawyers’ Associations; Member of 
the  International  Law  Association,  of  the  International  Maritime 
Committee and of several other international legal societies; Professor 
of Civil Law, Commercial Law and Private International Law; Dean of 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Ljubljana; author of numerous 
legal publications; Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Jir ˇí Malenovský
Born  1950;  Doctor  of  Law  from  the  Charles  University  in  Prague 
(1975); Senior faculty member (1974-90), Vice-Dean (1989-91) and 
Head of the Department of International and European Law (1990-92) 
at Masaryk University in Brno; Judge at the Constitutional Court of 
Czechoslovakia (1992); Envoy to the Council of Europe (1993-98); 
President of the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of 
Europe (1995); Senior Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998-
2000); President of the Czech and Slovak branch of the International 
Law  Association  (1999-2001);  Judge  at  the  Constitutional  Court 
(2000-04); Member of the Legislative Council (1998-2000); Member of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague (2000); Professor of 
Public International Law at Masaryk University, Brno (2001); Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Ján Kluc ˇka
Born 1951; Doctor of Law from the University of Bratislava (1974); 
Professor of International Law at Kosice University (since 1975); Judge 
at the Constitutional Court (1993); Member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague (1994); Member of the Venice Commission 
(1994); Chairman of the Slovakian Association of International Law 
(2002); Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Uno Lõhmus
Born 1952; Doctor of Law in 1986; Member of the Bar (1977-98); 
Visiting Professor of Criminal Law at Tartu University; Judge at the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (1994-98);  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme Court of Estonia (1998-2004); Member of the Committee for 
Legal Expertise of the Constitution; consultant to the working group 
drafting  the  Criminal  Code;  member  of  the  working  group  for  the 
drafting of the Criminal Procedure Code; author of several works on 
human rights and constitutional law; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 11 May 2004.Members  Court of Justice
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Egils Levits
Born 1955; graduated in law and in political science from the University 
of Hamburg; research assistant at the Faculty of Law, University of 
Kiel; Advisor to Latvian Parliament on questions of international law, 
constitutional  law  and  legislative  reform;  Latvian  Ambassador  to 
Germany  and  Switzerland  (1992-93),  Austria,  Switzerland  and 
Hungary  (1994-95);  Vice  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Justice, 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (1993-94); Conciliator at the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration within OSCE (from 1997); Member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (from 2001); elected as Judge to the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1995, re-elected in 1998 and 
2001;  numerous  publications  in  the  spheres  of  constitutional  and 
administrative law, law reform and European Community law; Judge 
at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Aindrias Ó Caoimh
Born  1950;  Bachelor  in  Civil  Law  (National  University  of  Ireland, 
University  College  Dublin,  1971);  Barrister  (King’s  Inns,  1972); 
Diploma in European Law (University College Dublin, 1977); Barrister 
(Bar  of  Ireland,  1972-99);  Lecturer  in  European  Law  (King’s  Inns, 
Dublin); Senior Counsel (1994-99); Representative of the Government 
of  Ireland  on  many  occasions  before  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Communities; Judge at the High Court (from 1999); Bencher 
of the Honourable Society of King’s Inns (since 1999); Vice-President 
of the Irish Society of European Law; member of the International Law 
Association (Irish Branch); Son of Judge Andreas O’Keeffe (Aindrias 
Ó Caoimh) member of the Court of Justice 1974-85; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 13 October 2004.
Roger Grass
Born 1948; Graduate of the Institut d’études politiques, Paris, and 
awarded  higher  degree  in  public  law;  Deputy  Procureur  de  la 
République attached to the Tribunal de grande instance, Versailles; 
Principal Administrator at the Court of Justice; Secretary-General in 
the office of the Procureur Général attached to the Court of Appeal, 
Paris; Private Office of the Minister for Justice; Legal Secretary to the 
President of the Court of Justice; Registrar at the Court of Justice 
since 10 February 1994.64
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2.  Changes in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2004
In 2004 the composition of the Court of Justice changed as follows:
On 7 January, Mr David Alexander Ogilvy Edward, Judge, left the Court of Justice. He 
was replaced as Judge by Mr Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann.
On 11 May, following the accession of ten new States to the European Union, ten new 
Judges entered into office: Mr Jerzy Makarczyk, a Polish national, Mr Pranas Ku ˉris, a 
Lithuanian  national,  Mr  Endre  Juhász,  a  Hungarian  national,  Mr  George Arestis,  a 
Cypriot national, Mr Anthony Borg Barthet, a Maltese national, Mr Marko Ilešic ˇ, a Slovene 
national, Mr Jir ˇí Malenovský, a Czech national, Mr Ján Kluc ˇka, a Slovak national, Mr Uno 
Lõhmus, an Estonian national, and Mr Egils Levits, a Latvian national.
On 13 October, Ms Fidelma O’Kelly Macken, Judge, left the Court of Justice. She was 
replaced as Judge by Mr Aindrias Ó Caoimh.66
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3.  Order of precedence
from 1 to 7 January 2004
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
C. Gulmann, President of the Fifth Chamber
A. Tizzano, First Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, President of the Fourth Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
D.A.O. Edward, Judge
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
J.-P. Puissochet, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General




S. von Bahr, Judge
L.A. Geelhoed, Advocate General
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
R. Silva de Lapuerta, Judge
K. Lenaerts, Judge
J. Kokott, Advocate General
L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General
R. Grass, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of Justice
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from 8 January to 12 May 20041
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
C. Gulmann, President of the Fifth Chamber
A. Tizzano, First Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, President of the Fourth Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
J.-P. Puissochet, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General




S. von Bahr, Judge
L.A. Geelhoed, Advocate General
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
R. Silva de Lapuerta, Judge
K. Lenaerts, Judge
J. Kokott, Advocate General
L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General
K. Schiemann, Judge
R. Grass, Registrar
1  On 11 May 2004 ten new Judges entered into office. The new order of precedence existed from 
13 May only.Order of precedence  Court of Justice
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from 13 May 6 October 2004
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber
C. Gulmann, President of the Fifth Chamber
J.-P. Puissochet, President of the Sixth Chamber
A. Tizzano, First Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, President of the Fourth Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General




S. von Bahr, Judge
L.A. Geelhoed, Advocate General
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
R. Silva de Lapuerta, Judge
K. Lenaerts, Judge
J. Kokott, Advocate General
L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General
K. Schiemann, Judge
J. Makarczyk, Judge
P. Ku ˉris, Judge
E. Juhász, Judge
G. Arestis, Judge
A. Borg Barthet, Judge
M. Ilešic ˇ, Judge
J. Malenovský, Judge
J. Kluc ˇka, Judge
U. Lõhmus, Judge
E. Levits, Judge
R. Grass, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of Justice
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from 7 to 13 October 2004
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber
L.A. Geelhoed, First Advocate General
R. Silva de Lapuerta, President of the Fifth Chamber
K. Lenaerts, President of the Fourth Chamber
A. Borg Barthet, President of the Sixth Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
C. Gulmann, Judge
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
J.-P. Puissochet, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General




S. von Bahr, Judge
A. Tizzano, Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judge
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
J. Kokott, Advocate General
L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General
K. Schiemann, Judge
J. Makarczyk, Judge
P. Ku ˉris, Judge
E. Juhász, Judge
G. Arestis, Judge
M. Ilešic ˇ, Judge
J. Malenovský, Judge
J. Kluc ˇka, Judge
U. Lõhmus, Judge
E. Levits, Judge
R. Grass, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of Justice
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from 14 October to 31 December 2004
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber
L.A. Geelhoed, First Advocate General
R. Silva de Lapuerta, President of the Fifth Chamber
K. Lenaerts, President of the Fourth Chamber
A. Borg Barthet, President of the Sixth Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
C. Gulmann, Judge
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
J.-P. Puissochet, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General
D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General
R. Schintgen, Judge
N. Colneric, Judge
S. von Bahr, Judge
A. Tizzano, Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judge
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
J. Kokott, Advocate General
L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General
K. Schiemann, Judge
J. Makarczyk, Judge
P. Ku ˉris, Judge
E. Juhász, Judge
G. Arestis, Judge
M. Ilešic ˇ, Judge
J. Malenovský, Judge
J. Kluc ˇka, Judge
U. Lõhmus, Judge
E. Levits, Judge
A. Ó Caoimh, Judge
R. Grass, Registrar72
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4.  Former Members of the Court of Justice
Massimo Pilotti, Judge (1952-1958), President from 1952 to 1958
Petrus Josephus Servatius Serrarens, Judge (1952-1958)
Otto Riese, Judge (1952-1963)
Louis Delvaux, Judge (1952-1967)
Jacques Rueff, Judge (1952-1959 and 1960-1962)
Charles Léon Hammes, Judge (1952-1967), President from 1964 to 1967
Adrianus Van Kleffens, Judge (1952-1958)
Maurice Lagrange, Advocate General (1952-1964)
Karl Roemer, Advocate General (1953-1973)
Rino Rossi, Judge (1958-1964)
Andreas Matthias Donner, Judge (1958-1979), President from 1958 to 1964
Nicola Catalano, Judge (1958-1962)
Alberto Trabucchi, Judge (1962-1972), then Advocate General (1973-1976)
Robert Lecourt, Judge (1962-1976), President from 1967 to 1976
Walter Strauss, Judge (1963-1970)
Riccardo Monaco, Judge (1964-1976)
Joseph Gand, Advocate General (1964-1970)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars, Judge (1967-1984), President from 1980 to 1984
Pierre Pescatore, Judge (1967-1985)
Hans Kutscher, Judge (1970-1980), President from 1976 to 1980
Alain Louis Dutheillet de Lamothe, Advocate General (1970-1972)
Henri Mayras, Advocate General (1972-1981)
Cearbhall O’Dalaigh, Judge (1973-1974)
Max Sørensen, Judge (1973-1979)
Alexander J. Mackenzie Stuart, Judge (1973-1988), President from 1984 to 1988
Jean-Pierre Warner, Advocate General (1973-1981)
Gerhard Reischl, Advocate General (1973-1981)
Aindrias O’Keeffe, Judge (1975-1985)
Francesco Capotorti, Judge (1976), then Advocate General (1976-1982)
Giacinto Bosco, Judge (1976-1988)
Adolphe Touffait, Judge (1976-1982)
Thymen Koopmans, Judge (1979-1990)
Ole Due, Judge (1979-1994), President from 1988 to 1994
Ulrich Everling, Judge (1980-1988)
Alexandros Chloros, Judge (1981-1982)
Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General (1981-1988), then Judge (1988-1992)
Simone Rozès, Advocate General (1981-1984)
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Advocate General (1981-1986)
Fernand Grévisse, Judge (1981-1982 and 1988-1994)
Kai Bahlmann, Judge (1982-1988)
G. Federico Mancini, Advocate General (1982-1988), then Judge (1988-1999)
Yves Galmot, Judge (1982-1988)
Constantinos Kakouris, Judge (1983-1997)
Carl Otto Lenz, Advocate General (1984-1997)
Marco Darmon, Advocate General (1984-1994)Former Members  Court of Justice
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René Joliet, Judge (1984-1995)
Thomas Francis O‘Higgins, Judge (1985-1991)
Fernand Schockweiler, Judge (1985-1996)
Jean Mischo, Advocate General (1986-1991 and 1997-2003)
José Carlos De Carvalho Moithinho de Almeida, Judge (1986-2000)
José Luis Da Cruz Vilaça, Advocate General (1986-1988)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Judge (1986-2003), President from 1994 to 2003
Manuel Diez de Velasco, Judge (1988-1994)
Manfred Zuleeg, Judge (1988-1994)
Walter Van Gerven, Advocate General (1988-1994)
Giuseppe Tesauro, Advocate General (1988-1998)
Paul Joan George Kapteyn, Judge (1990-2000)
John L. Murray, Judge (1991-1999)
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward, Judge (1992-2004)
Georges Cosmas, Advocate General (1994-2000)
Günter Hirsch, Judge (1994-2000)
Michael Bendik Elmer, Advocate General (1994-1997)
Hans Ragnemalm, Judge (1995-2000)
Leif Sevón, Judge (1995-2002)
Nial Fennelly, Advocate General (1995-2000)
Melchior Wathelet, Judge (1995-2003)
Krateros Ioannou, Judge (1997-1999)
Siegbert Alber, Advocate General (1997-2003)
Antonio Saggio, Advocate General (1998-2000)
Fidelma O’Kelly Macken, Judge (1999-2004)
– Presidents
Massimo Pilotti (1952-1958)
Andreas Matthias Donner (1958-1964)
Charles Léon Hammes (1964-1967)
Robert Lecourt (1967-1976)
Hans Kutscher (1976-1980)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars (1980-1984)
Alexander John Mackenzie Stuart (1984-1988)
Ole Due (1988-1994)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias (1994-2003)
– Registrars
Albert Van Houtte (1953-1982)
Paul Heim (1982-1988)
Jean-Guy Giraud (1988-1994)Former Members  Court of Justice
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A  —  Proceedings of the Court of First Instance in 2004
By Mr Bo Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
The  Court  of  First  Instance  of  the  European  Communities  experienced  significant 
changes  in  2004  which  will  leave  their  mark  on  the  European  judicial  institution’s 
history.
First of all, the accession to the European Union of 10 new States enabled the Court of First 
Instance to welcome 10 new Judges: Mrs E. Cremona, Mr O. Czúcz, Ms I. Wiszniewska-
Bialecka, Ms I. Pelikánová, Mr D. Šváby, Mr V. Vadapalas, Ms K. Jürimäe, Ms I. Labucka 
and Mr S.S. Papasavvas took the oath on 12 May 2004, while Ms V. Trstenjak entered into 
the same commitment on 7 July 2004.
For the second time in the Court of First Instance’s history, the number of Judges, initially 
set at 12, was increased. The Court is now composed of 25 Judges, one from each 
Member State.
The term of office of a number of members of the Court of First Instance, some of whom 
had just been appointed, came to an end on 31 August 2004. By decision of 14 July 2004, 
the representatives of the governments of the Member States of the European Union 
renewed the term of office of the following members for the period from 1 September 2004 
to 31 August 2010: Mr B. Vesterdorf, Ms V. Tiili, Mr J. Azizi, Mr M. Jaeger, Mr A.W.H. Meij, 
Mr M. Vilaras, Ms M.E. Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro, Mr F. Dehousse, Mr O. Czúcz, Ms I. 
Wiszniewska-Bialecka, Mr D. Šváby, Ms K. Jürimäe and Mr S.S. Papasavvas.
In light of the enlargement of the European Union, the Rules of Procedure of the Court 
of First Instance were amended to increase the number of Judges comprising the Grand 
Chamber from 11 to 13 (OJ 2004 L 127, p. 108). The provisions relating to the language 
of a case were also amended: since 1 May 2004 actions may be brought in 21 languages 
– the 20 official languages and Irish (OJ 2004 L 132, p. 3).
The organisation and operation of the Court of First Instance were adapted to respond to 
the needs resulting from the increased number of Judges. Initially, for the period from 1 
May to 31 August 2004, the new Judges joined the five existing Chambers of three 
Judges. Each of the Chambers of three Judges was therefore supplemented by two 
Judges, and formed in that way the Chamber in its extended composition. Subsequently, 
the  Court  decided  to  retain  for  the  2004/05  judicial  year  the  structure  entailing  five 
Chambers composed of five Judges. It follows that, during this judicial year, each of the 
five Chambers sits with three Judges in two distinct and predetermined trial formations 
that are presided over by the President of the Chamber.
Four of the five Chambers composed of five Judges are presided over by Presidents who 
were elected by their fellow Judges in September 2004 for a period of three years, 
namely Mr Jaeger, Mr Pirrung, Mr Vilaras and Mr Legal. This election of Presidents of 
Chambers  which  on  10  September  2004  took  place  for  the  first  time,  pursuant  to 
Article 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, is a consequence of 
the entry into force on 1 February 2003 of the new Protocol on the Statute of the Court 
of Justice (Article 50).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The other Chamber of five Judges is presided over by the President of the Court, who on 
8 September 2004 was elected for three years (that is to say until 31 August 2007). Since 
the President of the Court does not sit in a Chamber composed of three Judges, the 
Chamber is presided over by one of the Chamber’s other Judges, Mr Cooke, when it sits 
with three Judges.
Also, implementation of the reforms made possible by the Treaty of Nice has begun. The 
EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Nice which entered into force on 1 February 
2003, provides in Article 225 that the Court of First Instance is to have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine at first instance all direct actions with the exception of those assigned to 
a judicial panel and those reserved in the Statute for the Court of Justice.
The Council has (i) amended the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice and (ii) 
adopted provisions for the establishment of a ‘judicial panel’.
First, on 26 April 2004 the Council adopted Decision 2004/407/EC, Euratom amending 
Articles 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (OJ 2004 L 132, 
p. 5; corrigendum at OJ 2004 L 194, p. 3). As a result of the new division of direct actions 
between the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, which came into effect on 1 
June 2004, actions for annulment and for failure to act brought by a Member State 
against an act of, or failure to act by, the Commission 1 fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court of First Instance. The same is true of actions brought by the Member States 
against:
–  decisions of the Council concerning State aid;
–  acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to 
protect trade;
–  acts of the Council by which it exercises implementing powers;
–  acts of the European Central Bank.
On account of this new division of jurisdiction for direct actions, cases initially brought 
before the Court of Justice but in which the written procedure had not yet been brought 
to a close were transferred to the Court of First Instance; these cases related mostly to 
State aid and to the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
Second, on 2 November 2004 the Council adopted Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom 
establishing  the  European  Union  Civil  Service  Tribunal  (OJ 2004  L 333,  p. 7).  This 
reform, likewise made possible by the Treaty of Nice (Articles 220 EC and 225a EC; 
Articles 136 EA and 140b EA; see also Declaration No 16 annexed to the Treaty of Nice), 
was keenly desired by the Court of First Instance because of the special nature of this 
field of litigation and the workload which is anticipated as a result of application of the 
provisions of the new Staff Regulations. This new specialised tribunal, consisting of 
seven judges, will be called on to hear disputes involving the European Union civil 
1  With the exception of acts of the Commission that concern enhanced cooperation under the EC 
Treaty.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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service,  in  respect  of  which  jurisdiction  is  currently  exercised  by  the  Court  of  First 
Instance. Its decisions will be open to an appeal, limited to points of law, before the Court 
of First Instance and, exceptionally, subject to review by the Court of Justice in the 
circumstances prescribed by the Protocol on the Statute. It should begin to operate in the 
course of 2005.
Finally, the statistics relating to 2004 call for some comments. The number of cases 
brought continued to increase – a constant feature for a number of years – rising to 536 
(compared with 466 in 2003). This increase is partly due to the fact that since 1 June 2004 
the Court of First Instance has had jurisdiction to decide direct actions brought by the 
Member States (see the explanation above). On this basis 48 additional cases were 
received, namely 21 cases whose referral was ordered by the Court of Justice and 27 
new cases lodged by Member States. Community trade-mark litigation continues to grow 
in absolute terms (110 cases were brought, 10 more than in 2003) and accounts in 
relative terms for 21% of the total number of cases brought. Staff cases still form the 
most significant category of cases in terms of numbers, as they have since 2000: 146 
new cases were lodged (that is to say 27% of the total number of cases brought).
The number of cases decided, which comes to 361, is close to that of 2003 (339). Of 
these cases, 76% were decided by Chambers composed of three Judges, 18% by 
Chambers composed of five Judges and 4% by the Court sitting as a single Judge. It can 
be seen that the increase in the number of Judges has not yet enabled the number of 
cases decided each year to be increased significantly.
The number of cases pending crossed the critical threshold of 1 000 cases, there being 
1 174 such cases as at 31 December 2004. This number of cases corresponds, as things 
stand, to more than three years of the Court’s work.
The average duration of proceedings increased slightly compared with the preceding 
three years: in 2004 the average duration was 22.6 months for cases other than those 
falling within the special areas constituted by intellectual property cases and staff cases.
A very small number of cases have been dealt with under the expedited procedure: 13 
such applications were made in the course of the year and two of the cases were 
accorded expedited treatment.
Developments in the case-law are set out in the following account, covering in turn 
proceedings  concerning  the  legality  of  measures  (I),  actions  for  damages  (II)  and 
applications for interim relief (III).
I.  Proceedings concerning the legality of measures
Consideration of the substance of an action presupposes that the action is admissible. 
Cases which broached the question of the admissibility of actions for annulment (B) will 
therefore be covered before the essential aspects of substantive law (C to H). The latter are Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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grouped according to subject matter. Not every field falling within the jurisdiction of the Court 
of First Instance is included in the following account, which is therefore not exhaustive. 2
Some issues of a procedural nature will be set out under a specific heading (A), since the 
clarification of the law provided by certain decisions is worthy of emphasis.
A.  Procedural aspects
1.  Default proceedings
The delivery of judgments by default is extremely rare. In order for such a judgment to be 
delivered, a defendant on whom an application initiating proceedings has been duly 
served must fail to lodge a defence to the application in the proper form within the time 
prescribed and the applicant must apply to the Court of First Instance for judgment by 
default.
It was in accordance with those provisions that the Court of First Instance, following the 
Commission’s  failure  to  lodge  a  defence  within  the  prescribed  period,  delivered 
judgments by default in favour of five banks which had been fined for their participation 
in an agreement relating to commission charged on exchange transactions in respect of 
euro-zone banknotes. By its judgments of 14 October 2004 in Case T-56/02 Bayerische 
Hypo- und Vereinsbank v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, Case T-44/02 
Dresdner Bank v Commission, not published in the ECR, Case T-54/02 Vereins- und 
Westbank  v  Commission,  not  published  in  the  ECR,  Case  T-60/02  Deutsche 
Verkehrsbank v Commission, not published in the ECR, and Case T-61/02 Commerzbank 
v Commission, not published in the ECR, the Court annulled the Commission decision 3 
after finding that the applicants’ submissions appeared to be well founded. The Court 
held that the matters put forward by the applicants in their applications enabled it to 
conclude that the existence of the agreement was not sufficiently proven, as regards 
both the fixing of the prices for currency exchange services in the euro-zone currencies 
and also the ways of charging those prices. The aggregate amount of the fines imposed 
2  In particular, this account does not deal with decisions in customs cases since they very largely 
involve the application to particular cases of solutions that are already well established (inter alia 
judgments of 12 February 2004 in Case T-282/01 Aslantrans v Commission, of 21 September 2004 
in  Case  T-104/02  Société  française  de  transports  Gondrand  Frères  v  Commission,  and  of 
14 December 2004  in  Case  T-332/02  Nordspedizionieri  di  Danielis  Livio  &  C.  and  Others  v 
Commission, none yet published in the ECR). Nor, for identical reasons, does this account include 
judgments  concerning  the  annulment  of  decisions  reducing  or  cancelling  Community  financial 
assistance, whether granted under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (judgment of 
14 September 2004 in Case T-290/02 Ascontex v Commission, not yet published in the ECR) or 
under  the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGGF),  Guidance  Section 
(judgment of 28 January 2004 in Case T-180/01 Euroagri v Commission, not yet published in the 
ECR; under appeal, Case C-153/04 P).
3  Commission Decision 2003/25/EC of 11 December 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (Case COMP/E – 1/37.919 (ex 37.391) – Bank charges for exchanging euro-zone 
currencies – Germany) (OJ 2003 L 15, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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on the five banks by the Commission in the annulled decision amounted to more than 
EUR 100 000 000.
The Commission has applied for the setting aside of those judgments, as the relevant 
provisions allow.
2.  Raising of an absolute bar to proceedings by the Court of its own motion
An absolute bar to proceedings may, and even must, be considered by the Community 
judicature of its own motion. Such a bar may therefore be pleaded by the parties at any 
stage in the proceedings, whether it relates to the admissibility of the action or to the 
legality of the contested measure.
The Court of First Instance has thus considered of its own motion absolute bars to 
proceedings, which include bars relating to the time-limit for bringing an action (judgment 
of 28 January 2004 in Joined Cases T-142/01 and T-283/01 OPTUC v Commission, not 
yet published in the ECR), to whether the contested measure is of a challengeable nature 
(orders of 29 April 2004 in Case T-308/02 SGL Carbon v Commission and of 13 July 2004 
in Case T-29/03 Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía v Commission, neither yet published 
in the ECR), to the interest of the applicant in obtaining the annulment of the contested 
measure (judgment of 28 September 2004 in Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR) and to standing to bring proceedings (judgments of 7 July 2004 in 
Joined Cases T-107/01 and T-175/01 Sacilor-Lormines v Commission and of 1 December 
2004 in Case T-27/02 Kronofrance v Commission, neither yet published in the ECR).
It has also considered, in so far as it constitutes an absolute bar to proceedings, the bar 
arising from infringement of essential procedural requirements, which encompasses the 
lack of a statement of reasons for the contested measure or an inadequate statement of 
reasons  (judgment  of  8  July  2004  in  Case  T-44/00  Mannesmannröhren-Werke  v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, paragraphs 126 and 210; under appeal, 
Case C-411/04 P). On the other hand, the Court held that a breach of the rights of the 
defence, which by its nature is subjective, does not fall within the scope of an infringement 
of essential procedural requirements and, therefore, is not be raised by the Court of its 
own motion (judgment of 8 July 2004 in Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and 
T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, 
paragraph 425; under appeal, Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P).
3.  Costs
Where a party is unsuccessful before the Court of First Instance, he must in principle 
bear, in addition to his own costs, those of the opposing party. In accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, recoverable costs are limited, first, to 
those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance and, 
second, to those necessarily incurred for that purpose.
The  amount  of  the  costs  to  be  recovered  is  frequently  a  ground  for  dispute.  The 
Commission thus regarded as excessive the amounts claimed by the representatives of 
the companies Airtours and Schneider Electric after the Court of First Instance had Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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annulled the decisions respectively prohibiting Airtours from acquiring First Choice (Case 
T-342/99  Airtours  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR II-2585)  and  Schneider  Electric  from 
acquiring  Legrand  (Case  T-310/01  Schneider  Electric  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR 
II-4071)  as  well  as  a  decision  ordering  a  separation  of  the  undertakings  (Case 
T-77/02 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4201).
In an order of 28 June 2004 in Case T-342/99 DEP Airtours v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR, the Court observed that the sum which Airtours sought to recover 
from the Commission amounted to more than GBP 1 700 000. The Commission, for its 
part, had assessed initially at GBP 130 000, and then at GBP 170 000, the costs incurred 
by Airtours.
For the purpose of fixing the amount recoverable, the Court held, in particular, that where 
a client decides to be represented by both a solicitor and counsel, it is possible for the 
fees due to each of them to be regarded as costs necessarily incurred for the purpose of 
the proceedings. The Court stated that in those circumstances, however, it must examine 
the extent to which the services supplied by all the advisers concerned were necessary 
for the conduct of the legal proceedings and satisfy itself that the fact that both categories 
of lawyers were instructed did not entail any unnecessary duplication of costs. That was 
partially the case in this instance.
It also held that the essentially economic nature of the findings made by the Commission 
in the context of merger control may justify the involvement of economic advisers or 
experts specialising in that field to supplement the legal advisers’ work, thus resulting in 
costs that are recoverable. The costs of that nature were, however, considered excessive 
by the Court.
Finally, where an applicant is subject to value added tax, as Airtours was, it is entitled to 
recover from the tax authorities value added tax paid on goods and services purchased 
by it. Since this tax does not represent an expense for it, it cannot claim reimbursement 
of the tax on costs which are recoverable.
In the light of those considerations, and of the importance of the case from the point of 
view of Community competition law, the numerous and complex economic and legal 
questions which were examined by the advisers, the financial interest that Airtours had 
in the case and the amount of work generated by the court proceedings for the legal and 
economic advisers, the Court set the total amount of costs that Airtours could recover at 
slightly less than GBP 490 000.
By order of 29 October 2004 in Case T-310/01 DEP Schneider Electric v Commission, not 
published in the ECR, the Court set the amount to be recovered by Schneider Electric, the 
Commission having refused to pay the sum of roughly EUR 830 000. This sum was claimed 
in respect, essentially, of the fees and disbursements of Schneider Electric’s advisers 
incurrred for the purpose of the procedure before the Court that resulted in annulment of the 
decision prohibiting the merger between Schneider Electric and Legrand.
While acknowledging the great complexity of the case, its financial importance to the 
applicant, its interest from the point of view of Community law and the complexity of the 
economic and legal questions raised by it, the Court held that the number of chargeable Proceedings  Court of First Instance
82
Court of First Instance  Proceedings
83
hours put forward by the lawyers in support of their claim was excessive. In the light of 
all those factors, the total amount of costs was reduced to almost EUR 420 000.
For reasons of the same nature, the amount of the costs relating to the proceedings for 
interim relief and to the proceedings that resulted in annulment of the decision ordering 
Schneider to sell as a whole the assets held in Legrand, which had been assessed at 
EUR 830 000, was set at almost EUR 427 000 (order of 29 October 2004 in Case 
T-77/02 DEP Schneider Electric v Commission, not published in the ECR).
B.  Admissibility of actions brought under Article 230 EC
Under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, ‘any natural or legal person may ... institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, 
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of 
direct and individual concern to the former’.
The fifth paragraph of Article 230 EC provides that an action for annulment is to be 
instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the 
plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the 
latter, as the case may be.
1.  Measures against which an action may be brought
It is settled case-law that only a measure which produces binding legal effects such as 
to affect the interests of an applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal 
position is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action for annulment under 
Article 230 EC.
By contrast, as recalled in the order in SGL Carbon v Commission, cited above, a 
measure which merely confirms a previous decision not contested within the time-limit 
for initiating proceedings is not a reviewable act. That is so in the case of a measure 
which contains no new factor as compared with the previous decision and was not 
preceded by a re-examination of the circumstances of the person to whom that decision 
was addressed. The Court points out, however, that the question whether a measure is 
confirmatory cannot be determined solely with reference to its content as compared with 
that of the previous decision which it confirms. The nature of the contested measure 
must also be appraised in the light of the nature of the request to which it constitutes a 
reply. In particular, if the measure constitutes the reply to a request in which substantial 
new facts are relied on, and whereby the administration is requested to reconsider its 
previous decision, that measure cannot be regarded as merely confirmatory in nature, 
since it constitutes a decision taken on the basis of those facts and thus contains a new 
factor as compared with the previous decision. The Court held that the Commission was 
fully entitled to maintain that the letter which it had sent to the applicant was not in the 
nature of a decision because, even if the financial information supplied by the applicant 
was new, that information was not capable of substantially altering the applicant’s legal Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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situation as at the date of the previous decision, which was not contested within the time-
limit for initiating proceedings.
Also, the Court has held that where, in the context of an action for annulment, the 
contested measure is negative, it must be appraised in the light of the nature of the 
request to which it constitutes a reply. In particular, the refusal by a Community institution 
to withdraw or amend a measure may constitute a measure whose legality may be 
reviewed under Article 230 EC only if the measure which the Community institution 
refuses to withdraw or amend could itself have been contested under that provision 
(order of 15 March 2004 in Case T-139/02 Institouto N. Avgerinopoulou and Others v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, and Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía v 
Commission, cited above). In this regard, the Court held in Comunidad Autónoma de 
Andalucía v Commission that a letter from the Director-General of the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) informing the applicant that it was not possible to investigate its 
complaint directed against the final report which was drawn up by OLAF following an 
external investigation and forwarded to the competent Spanish authorities in accordance 
with Article 9 of Regulation No 1073/1999 4 could not be regarded as a decision against 
which proceedings could be brought, since that report did not constitute a measure 
producing  binding  legal  effects  such  as  to  affect  the  applicant’s  interests,  but  a 
recommendation or an opinion lacking binding legal effects.
2.  Time-limit for bringing an action
While the Court was called on in a number of decisions to verify whether the time-limit for 
bringing an action was complied with (judgment of 28 January 2004 in Joined Cases 
T-142/01 and T-238/01 OPTUC v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, and order 
of 25 May 2004 in Case T-264/03 Schmoldt and Others v Commission, not yet published 
in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-342/04 P), it is the order of 9 November 2004 in Case 
T-252/03 FNICG v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, that is to be focused upon.
In an action brought by the Fédération nationale de l’industrie et des commerces en gros 
des viandes (French National Federation for the Meat Industry and Meat Wholesalers 
(FNICGV)) for annulment, on the basis of Article 229 EC, of the fine which the Commission 
had imposed on it for breach of the competition rules,  5 the Court observed that this 
article of the Treaty does not enshrine the ‘action under the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction’ 
as an autonomous remedy. Indeed, this provision, which states that ‘regulations adopted 
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and by the Council, pursuant to the 
provisions of [the EC] Treaty, may give the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction with 
regard to the penalties provided for in such regulations’, is not mentioned in Article 
225(1) EC, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, among the types of action falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
4  Regulation  (EC)  No  1073/1999  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  May  1999 
concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 1).
5  Commission Decision 2003/600/EC of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 – French beef) (OJ 2003 L 209, p. 12).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Since that unlimited jurisdiction can be exercised by the Community judicature only in the 
context of the review of acts of the Community institutions, more particularly in actions 
for annulment, an action in which the Community judicature is asked to exercise its 
unlimited jurisdiction must be brought within the time-limit laid down by the fifth paragraph 
of Article 230 EC, which was not the case in this instance. 6
3.  Legal interest in bringing proceedings
In the case between MCI, formerly called WorldCom, and the Commission, the Court 
found that MCI had an interest in obtaining the annulment of the Commission decision 
prohibiting it from merging with Sprint even though that decision was adopted after 
withdrawal of the notification.
The Court held in its judgment in MCI v Commission, cited above, that the applicant had an 
interest in obtaining the annulment of a decision by which the Commission refused to regard 
the parties’ statement as amounting to a formal withdrawal of the notified agreement, when 
the applicant had vainly sought to prevent adoption of the decision by formally stating that it 
was abandoning the notified merger transaction with which the decision deals. The Court 
added that, as long as the Commission decision continues to stand, the undertaking is 
prevented by law from merging with the other party to the notified transaction, at least in the 
configuration and under the conditions put forward in the notification, should it again have the 
intention to do so. The fact that the undertaking does not necessarily have that intention, or 
that it will perhaps not carry it out, is, in this respect, a purely subjective circumstance that 
cannot be taken into account when assessing its interest in bringing proceedings for the 
annulment of a measure which, unquestionably, produces binding legal effects such as to 
affect its interests by bringing about a distinct change in its legal position.
4.  Standing to bring proceedings
So far as concerns the circumstances in which an applicant is regarded as directly concerned 
by the measure whose annulment he seeks, the Court recalled that a Community measure 
is of direct concern to an individual if it directly produces effects on his legal position and its 
implementation leaves no discretion to the addressees of the measure, implementation 
being a purely automatic matter flowing solely from the Community legislation without the 
application of other intermediate rules. The order in Institouto N. Avgerinopoulou and Others 
v Commission, cited above, and the order of 8 July 2004 in Case T-341/02 Regione Siciliana 
v Commission, not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-417/04 P), dismiss for 
lack of direct interest (i) an action, brought by private parties not appearing among the final 
beneficiaries of the measures envisaged, for annulment of a Commission decision addressed 
to the Hellenic Republic approving a draft operational programme for the purposes of the 
regulation on structural funds 7 and (ii) an action for annulment of a Commission decision 
addressed  to  the  Italian  Republic  terminating  financial  assistance  from  the  European 
6  The other actions brought against the decision mentioned in the preceding footnote are still pending 
before the Court (Case T-217/03 Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail et viande v Commission 
and Case T-245/03 FNSEA and Others v Commission).
7  Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds (OJ 1999 L 161, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in relation to a motorway project between Messina and 
Palermo, which had been brought by the authority responsible for carrying out the project, 
namely the Region of Sicily. In both orders the Court found that the national authorities had 
a discretion in implementing the contested measures.
So far as concerns the circumstances in which an applicant is regarded as individually 
concerned by a measure which is not addressed to him, it should be noted that the new 
interpretation  of  the  criterion  for  determining  whether  applicants  are  individually 
concerned, which was adopted in Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-2365, now clearly belongs to the past. After the Court of Justice had decided to 
confirm its interpretation of the concept of individual concern in Case C-50/00 P Unión de 
Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677 (see also the judgment of the Court 
of  Justice  of  1 April  2004  in  Case  C-236/02  P  Commission  v  Jégo-Quéré,  not  yet 
published in the ECR, setting aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case 
T-177/01), the Court of First Instance examined the concept of individual concern in the 
cases  before  it  by  reference  to  the  formula  laid  down  in  Case  25/62  Plaumann  v 
Commission [1963] ECR 95. Thus, in order for natural and legal persons to be regarded 
as individually concerned by a measure not addressed to them, it must affect their 
position by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation 
which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in 
the same way as the addressee.
Where a legal person bringing an action for annulment is an association of undertakings, 
it may, when it has taken part in the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested 
measure, be granted standing in at least three kinds of circumstances: where a legal 
provision expressly grants it a series of procedural powers; where the association itself 
is distinguished individually because its own interests as an association are affected, in 
particular because its negotiating position has been affected by the measure whose 
annulment is being sought; and where it represents the interests of undertakings which 
would themselves be entitled to bring proceedings. In its order of 10 May 2004 in Case 
T-391/02 Bundesverband der Nahrungsmittel- und Speiseresteverwertung and Kloh v 
Parliament and Council, not yet published in the ECR, and in Schmoldt and Others v 
Commission, cited above, the Court, in particular, refused to accept that the applicant 
associations had occupied a clearly circumscribed position as negotiator which was 
intimately linked to the subject-matter of the contested measure.
a)  Decisions
In the field of State aid, actions mainly seek the annulment either of a decision taken 
without opening the formal investigation procedure referred to in Article 88(2) EC or of a 
decision taken at the end of that procedure. Since those decisions are addressed to the 
Member State concerned, it is for the undertaking, which is not the addressee, to show 
that that measure is of direct and individual concern to it.
Where the Commission, without opening the formal investigation procedure, finds in the 
course  of  a  preliminary  investigation  that  State  aid  is  compatible  with  the  common Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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market, the parties concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC, who are entitled to 
the guarantees of the formal investigation procedure when it is implemented, must be 
regarded as individually concerned by the decision making that finding.
In  the  judgment  of  16  March  2004  in  Case  T-157/01  Danske  Busvognmaend  v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, a trade association representing the interests 
of the majority of Danish bus companies was recognised as having the status of a ‘party 
concerned’,  on  the  ground  that  it  made  a  complaint  to  the  Commission,  that  its 
interventions influenced the course of the administrative procedure and that at least 
some of its members were in competition with the undertaking which benefited from the 
disputed aid.
In the judgment of 1 December 2004 in Case T-27/02 Kronofrance v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR, the Court held that the applicant, who had pleaded the failure to 
open the formal investigation procedure, was indeed a ‘party concerned’ in light of its 
status  as  a  competitor,  a  status  established  by  having  regard  to  the  identity  of  the 
products manufactured by it with those of the undertaking benefiting from the aid and to 
the fact that their sales areas overlapped.
In the judgment of 13 January 2004 in Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz and 
Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, hotel operators in a tourist resort in 
the Province of Styria (Austria) were entitled to challenge the legality of a Commission 
decision declaring the public financing of the construction of a luxury hotel in the same 
resort to be compatible with the common market. The Court observed that the applicants 
were direct competitors of the hotel receiving the aid in question and that they were 
recognised as having this status in the contested decision.
In  the  above  three  cases  it  was  held  that  the  applicant  undertakings  were,  in  their 
capacity  as  parties  concerned  within  the  meaning  of  Article  88(2)  EC,  individually 
concerned by the decisions declaring at the end of the preliminary investigation procedure 
that aid was compatible with the common market. It should nevertheless be noted, with 
regard to the extent of the review of the pleas, that in one instance the Court regarded 
the pleas for annulment in their entirety as seeking to establish that the Commission had 
unlawfully failed to open the formal investigation procedure (Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz 
and Others v Commission), whereas in another instance it annulled on the merits the 
decision approving the grant of aid (Danske Busvognmaend v Commission).
Where the contested decision has been adopted at the end of the formal investigation 
procedure provided for by Article 88(2) EC, it is not sufficient, in order for an undertaking 
to be distinguished individually in the same way as the addressee of the decision, that it 
has the status of a ‘party concerned’. According to the case-law, such a decision is of 
individual concern to the undertakings which were at the origin of the complaint which led 
to that procedure and whose views were heard and determined the conduct of the 
procedure, provided, however, that their position on the market is substantially affected 
by the aid which is the subject of that decision.
Applying those criteria identified for the first time by the Court of Justice in Case 169/84 
COFAZ and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 391, the Court of First Instance held that Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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the Austrian company Lenzing was individually concerned by a Commission decision 
concerning the State aid granted by the Kingdom of Spain to the company Sniace, since 
Lenzing, a competitor of the recipient company, first, was at the origin of the complaint 
that led to the opening of the procedure and participated actively in the procedure and, 
second, provided information such as would show that its position on the market was 
substantially affected by the contested decision, for instance information concerning the 
characteristics of the market in question, namely a very limited number of producers, 
fierce competition and significant production surpluses (judgment of 21 October 2004 in 
Case T-36/99 Lenzing v Commission, not yet published in the ECR; under appeal, Case 
C-525/04 P).
On the other hand, by order of 27 May 2004 in Case T-358/02 Deutsche Post and DHL v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-367/04 P), the Court 
found that Deutsche Post and DHL International, two companies operating on the Italian 
market in postal services open to competition, had not played an active role during the 
administrative procedure which preceded the adoption of the decision relating to State aid 
granted by the Italian Republic in favour of Poste Italiane. It therefore examined whether 
the measure authorised by that decision was nevertheless liable to affect significantly their 
position on the market in question and concluded, in the absence of sufficient proof of the 
magnitude of the prejudice to their position on the market, that that was not the case.
b)  Measures of general application
The Court did not fail to recall that although the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC makes 
no express provision regarding the admissibility of actions brought by private persons for 
annulment of measures of general application, the mere fact that the contested measure 
is of general application is not sufficient to render such an action inadmissible.
None the less, after analysing whether the private persons were individually concerned by 
the measures of general application whose legality they put in issue, the Court concluded 
that they were not and dismissed actions for the annulment of regulations (order of 6 July 
2004 in Case T-370/02 Alpenhain-Camembert-Werk and Others v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR), 8 directives (order of 6 September 2004 in Case T-213/02 SNF v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-482/04 P)),  9 and 
decisions of general application (Schmoldt and Others v Commission, cited above).
8  By this order the Court dismissed an action for annulment of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1829/
2002 of 14 October 2002 amending the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 with regard to the 
name ‘Feta’ (OJ 2002 L 277, p. 10), by which ‘Feta’ was added as a protected designation of origin.
9  By this order the Court dismissed an action for partial annulment of the Twenty-sixth Commission 
Directive (2002/34/EC) of 15 April 2002 adapting to technical progress Annexes II, III and VII to 
Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
cosmetic products (OJ 2002 L 102, p. 19) in so far as it restricts the use of polyacrylamides in the 
composition of cosmetic products.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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C.  Competition rules applicable to undertakings
The points raised in this area in 2004 are primarily concerned with questions relating to 
the procedure before the Commission and the determination of the amounts of fines. The 
decisions of the Court of First Instance in the ‘graphite electrodes’ 10 and ‘seamless steel 
tubes and pipes’ 11 cases are the main cases dealt with below.
In Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, cited above, the eight United States, German 
and Japanese undertakings which participated in the cartel – seeking, on a worldwide 
scale, to fix prices and to share national and regional markets according to the ‘home 
producer’ principle in the graphite electrodes sector (graphite electrodes are used mainly 
in the production of steel in electric arc furnaces) – were fined a total of approximately 
EUR 220 million by the Commission, 12 the individual fines varying between EUR 10.3 
million and 80.2 million.
In the ‘seamless steel tubes and pipes’ case, the Commission ordered eight producers 
(four European companies and four Japanese companies) of certain types of seamless 
steel tubes used in the oil and gas industry to pay fines amounting to EUR 99 million for 
infringing Article 81 EC. 13 The Commission found that each undertaking had undertaken 
not to sell standard borehole tubes and certain types of line pipe on the national market 
of any other undertaking participating in the agreement.
The actions brought in those cases (by seven undertakings in the ‘graphite electrodes’ and 
also by seven undertakings in the ‘seamless steel tubes and pipes’ cases) reveal, thus 
confirming a tendency already observed, that it is now rare for undertakings which are 
fined for infringing Article 81 EC to challenge the legal classification of the infringements 
and the evidence of their participation in the agreement. They now essentially dispute the 
determination  of  the  amount  of  the  fines,  claiming  that  there  has  been  an  incorrect 
application of the rules which the Commission has imposed upon itself in setting fines, in 
particular the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed under Article 15(2) of 
Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (‘the Guidelines’) 14 and the Notice 
10  Judgment of 29 April 2004 in Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and 
T-252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, 
Cases C-289/04 P, C-301/04 P, C-307/04 P and C-308/04 P).
11  Judgments of 8 July 2004 in Case T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission (under appeal, 
Case C-411/04 P); Case T-48/00 Corus UK v Commission; Case T-50/00 Dalmine v Commission 
(under appeal, Case C-407/04 P); and Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE 
Engineering and Others v Commission (under appeal, Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P); none yet 
published in the ECR.
12  Commission Decision 2002/271/EC of 18 July 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement – Case COMP/E-1/36.490 – Graphite electrodes (OJ 
2002 L 100, p. 1).
13  Commission Decision 2003/382/EC of 8 December 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty (Case IV/E-1/35.860-B seamless steel tubes) (OJ 2003, L 140, p. 1).
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on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 1996 C 207, p. 4; ‘the 
Leniency Notice’). 15 As explained below, the Court of First Instance recognises that the 
Commission has a margin of discretion, indeed a very wide margin of discretion, depending 
on the case, in applying the criteria for determining the amount of fines. However, the Court 
scrupulously ensures that the undertakings fined for having participated in the same cartel 
are treated in according with the principle of equal treatment.
It will also be recalled that the Court of First Instance may exercise its unlimited jurisdiction 
not only to reduce fines but also to increase them. The reduction by the Court of the overall 
amount of the fines imposed on the applicants by the Commission in the ‘graphite electrodes’ 
and ‘welded steel tubes and pipes’ cases (from EUR 207 200 200 to EUR 152 772 400) in 
the ‘graphite electrodes’ case and from EUR 90 900 000 to EUR 78 120 000 in the ‘seamless 
steel tubes and pipes’ case) is a result which merits some qualification (see below).
As no judgment has entailed an adjudication on the lawfulness of decisions adopted under 
Article 82 EC (as far as 2004 is concerned, Microsoft v Commission was dealt with by the judge 
responsible for granting interim relief; see below) and the only decision relating to Regulation 
No 4064/89  concluded  that  the  Commission  was  not  competent  to  deal  with  the  matter 
(judgment of 28 September in Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not yet published in the 
ECR), the developments relating to Article 81 EC and the sanctions imposed for infringement 
of that provision will constitute the essential part of this section on competition law.
1.  Points raised in the case-law on the scope of Article 81 CE
a)  Scope ratione materiae
In Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission (judgment of 30 September 
2004, not yet published in the ECR; under appeal, Case C-519/04 P), the Court of First 
Instance had occasion to apply the concept of economic activity to sport. In its judgment, 
the  Court  upheld  the  Commission’s  decision  rejecting  the  complaint  lodged  by  two 
professional  athletes  who  compete  in  long-distance  swimming  events.  Those  two 
athletes, who were suspended under the Olympic Movement’s Anti-Doping Code after 
testing positive for nandrolone, had claimed before the Commission that the International 
Olympic Committee’s anti-doping rules infringed the Community rules on competition 
and the free movement of services.
The Court recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, sport is 
subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the 
meaning of Article 2 EC. The provisions of the EC Treaty on free movement of workers 
and services apply to the rules adopted in the field of sport which concern the economic 
aspect which sporting activity can present. That applies, in particular, to the rules providing 
for the payment of fees for the transfer of professional players between clubs (transfer 
clauses) or limiting the number of professional players who are nationals of other Member 
States which those clubs may field in matches. On the other hand, Community law does 
not extend to what are purely sporting rules which for that reason have nothing to do with 
15  The 1996 Leniency Notice was replaced in 2002 by the Commission notice on immunity from fines 
and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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economic activity, like the rules on the composition of national teams or ‘the rules of the 
game’ fixing, for example, the length of matches or the number of players on the field.
After noting that the Court of Justice had not, in cases concerning Article 39 EC et seq. 
and Article 49 EC et seq., had to rule on whether sporting rules are subject to the Treaty 
provisions  on  competition,  the  Court  of  First  Instance  considered  that  the  principles 
identified in respect of free movement of workers and services are equally valid as regards 
the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to competition and that the opposite is also true. 
It follows that purely sporting legislation does not come under either the Community 
provisions on free movement of persons and services or the provisions on competition.
b)  Competition procedure
–  Access to the file
The rule that undertakings being investigated under Articles 81 EC and 82 EC must have 
access to the Commission’s file is now clearly recognised in Community law. That rule has 
its basis in the principle of equality of arms and is therefore essential to the exercise of the 
rights of the defence. None the less, there are limits to the rule, which seek to protect the 
Commission’s decision-taking process or the legitimate interests of third parties.
In Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, cited above, the Court of First Instance first 
observed that, in order to allow the undertakings concerned to defend themselves effectively 
against the objections raised against them in the statement of objections, the Commission 
is required to make available to them the entire investigation file, except for documents 
containing  business  secrets  of  other  undertakings,  other  confidential  information  and 
internal documents of the Commission. As regards those internal documents, the restriction 
of access to them is justified by the need to ensure the proper functioning of the Commission 
when it deals with infringements of the Treaty competition rules; internal documents can be 
made available only if the exceptional circumstances of the case so require, on the basis of 
serious evidence which it is for the party concerned to provide, both before the Community 
Court and in the administrative procedure conducted by the Commission.
–  The scope of the Statement of Objections
The function of the Statement of Objections is well established: it must enable those 
concerned to be fully aware of the conduct in respect of which the Commission criticises 
them and to exercise their rights of defence effectively. That requirement is satisfied 
where the final decision does not impute to the parties concerned infringements different 
from those referred to in the statement of objections and sets out only facts in respect of 
which the parties concerned have had the opportunity to provide an explanation.
In its judgment of 8 July 2004 in Case T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, 
not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-411/04 P), the Court of First Instance 
recalled that the rights of the defence are infringed as a result of a discrepancy between 
the statement of objections and the final decision only where an objection stated in the 
decision was not set out in the statement of objections in a manner sufficient to enable Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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the addressees to defend their interests. The obligation placed on the Commission in 
connection with a statement of objections is limited to setting out the objections and to 
specifying clearly the facts upon which it relies and its classification of those facts, so that 
the addressees of the statement of objections are able to defend their interests. In that 
regard, the Court held that the legal classification of the facts made in the statement of 
objections can, by definition, be only provisional, and a subsequent Commission decision 
cannot be annulled on the sole ground that the definitive conclusions drawn from those 
facts do not correspond precisely with that intermediate classification. The Commission 
is required to hear the addressees of a statement of objections and, where necessary, to 
take account of any observations made in response to the objections by amending its 
analysis, specifically in order to respect their rights of defence.
–  Consequences of an express acknowledgement of the facts 
during the administrative procedure
Where the undertaking involved in an infringement of the competition rules does not 
expressly  acknowledge  the  facts,  the  Commission  must  prove  the  facts  and  the 
undertaking is free to put forward, in the procedure before the Court, any plea in its 
defence which it deems appropriate. On the other hand, that is not the case where the 
undertaking  expressly,  clearly  and  specifically  acknowledges  the  facts:  where  the 
undertaking explicitly admits during the administrative procedure the substantive truth of 
the facts which the Commission alleges against it in the statement of objections, those 
facts  must  thereafter  be  regarded  as  established  and  the  undertaking  estopped  in 
principle from disputing them during the procedure before the Court (Tokai Carbon and 
Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 108). In the light of those criteria, the Court 
considered that an inference made by the Commission on the basis of a range of evidence 
such as the objective conduct of the undertaking concerned towards the Commission 
during the administrative procedure and its no-contest statements taken from a wide 
generality did not constitute such an acknowledgement (ibid., paragraph 109).
In reaching that decision, the Court made specific reference to the finding made in 2003 
in  the  ‘lysine’  cases  that  the  elements  of  fact  on  which  the  Commission  relied  in 
determining the amount of the fine could no longer be called in question before the Court 
if the applicant expressly acknowledged them during the administrative procedure (Case 
T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission 
[2003] ECR II-2597 (under appeal, Case C-397/03 P), commented on in the Annual 
Report 2003).
–  No recognition of an absolute right to silence
The question has regularly arisen whether the undertakings to which decisions taken 
under Article 11(5) of Regulation No 17 16 requesting that they communicate certain 
information are sent have an absolute right to silence. The Court of Justice (Case 374/87 
16  Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-62, p. 87).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283 and Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, 
C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij  and  Others  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR  I-8375)  and  the  Court  of  First 
Instance (Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II-729) 
have consistently held that to acknowledge the existence of such a right would be to go 
beyond what is necessary in order to preserve the rights of defence of undertakings and 
would constitute an unjustified hindrance to the Commission’s performance of its duty to 
ensure that the rules on competition within the common market are observed and that a 
right to silence can be recognised only to the extent that the undertaking concerned 
would be compelled to provide answers which might involve an admission on its part of 
the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove. It 
has  always  been  inferred  that,  in  order  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of Article  11  of 
Regulation No 17, the Commission is therefore entitled to compel the undertakings to 
provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to them and 
to disclose to the Commission, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in 
their  possession,  even  if  the  latter  may  be  used  to  establish  the  existence  of  anti-
competitive conduct. It follows from those decisions that this power of the Commission to 
request information does not fall foul of Article 6(1) and (2) of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
However, the applicants have not been deterred from invoking the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights 17 in an effort to ensure that the Community case-law 
develops in a way favourable to their case. The Court of First Instance has none the less 
refused  to  embark  on  that  road  and  emphasised  in  Tokai  Carbon  and  Others  v 
Commission that the Commission’s power to request information does not fall foul of 
either Article 6(1) and (2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms or the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
In any event, the Court of First Instance observes, the mere fact of being obliged to 
answer purely factual questions put by the Commission and to comply with its requests 
for the production of documents already in existence cannot constitute a breach of the 
principle of respect for the rights of defence or impair the right to fair legal process, which 
offer, in the specific field of competition law, protection equivalent to that guaranteed by 
Article  6  of  the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental 
Freedoms. There is nothing to prevent the addressee of a request for information from 
showing, whether later during the administrative procedure or in proceedings before the 
Community Courts, when exercising his rights of defence, that the facts set out in his 
replies or the documents produced by him have a different scope from that ascribed to 
them by the Commission.
17  Funke v France judgment of 25 February 1993, Series A No 256-A, § 44a; Saunders v United 
Kingdom judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports of judgments and decisions, 1996-VI, p. 2044; 
and J.B. v Switzerland judgment of 3 May 2001, not yet published in the Reports of judgments and 
decisions.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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–  Reasonable time
The  need  to  act  within  a  reasonable  time  in  conducting  administrative  proceedings 
relating to competition policy is a general principle of Community law whose observance 
is ensured by the Community judicature (Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and 
FNK v Commission [1997] ECR II-1739).
In its judgment of 13 January 2004 in Case T-67/01 JCB Service v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-167/04 P), the Court of First Instance had 
occasion to recall that infringement of that principle is capable of vitiating the decision 
adopted by the Commission at the close of the administrative procedure only if it is 
shown  that  it  also  entails  infringement  of  the  rights  of  defence  of  the  undertaking 
concerned. In that case, although the Commission flagrantly breached its obligation to 
comply with such a time-limit when examining an application for exemption under Article 
81(3) EC when it rejected an application for exemption 27 years after an agreement was 
notified to it in 1973, the Court of First Instance held that that breach had not affected the 
lawfulness of the rejection of the application for exemption.
As regards the period of more than four years taken to investigate the complaint lodged 
by a competitor of the party which notified the agreements in issue, the Court of First 
Instance did not find it excessive, given the complexity of the case, which involved 
several Member States and covered five heads of infringement, and the need to draw up 
a second statement of objections.
c)  Proof of the infringement of Article 81 EC
It is for the Commission to demonstrate the circumstances constituting an infringement 
of Article 81 EC (Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, 
paragraph 86). The Commission must, in particular, demonstrate the duration of the 
infringement in respect of which it is imposing a sanction. The challenges mounted by 
the applicants in the ‘seamless steel tubes and pipes’ cases helped to clarify a number 
of aspects relating to the level of proof required and also to the burden of proof before 
the Court of First Instance when the evidence adduced by the Commission is disputed 
by the undertakings concerned.
In those cases, the Commission had not adduced evidence of the entire duration of the 
infringement. In order to determine the duration of the infringement, the Commission 
took the view that, although the Europe-Japan club had first met in 1977, 1990 should be 
taken  as  the  starting  date  of  the  infringement  because,  between  1977  and  1990, 
agreements  on  the  voluntary  restraint  of  exports  had  been  concluded  between  the 
European Community and Japan.
The Court noted that none of the parties had challenged the Commission’s position, 
consisting in not setting the starting date of the infringement as 1977 because of the 
existence  of  the  voluntary  restraint  agreements.  When  the  applicants  disputed  the 
starting date of the infringement, however, the Court observed that the alleged cessation 
of the voluntary restraint agreements constituted the decisive criterion for the purpose of Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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determining whether 1990 should be taken as the starting date for the infringement. In 
that regard, the Court recalled that, in principle, it is for the applicant to adduce evidence 
of its claims. None the less, the Court found that, in the specific circumstances of the 
case, it was incumbent on the Commission to produce evidence of the date of cessation 
of the international voluntary restraint agreements. It was held that that evidence had not 
been produced, after the Court considered that ‘[t]he Commission’s inexplicable inability 
to produce evidence relating to a circumstance which concern[ed] it directly [made] it 
impossible for the Court to give a ruling in full knowledge of the facts concerning the date 
of cessation of those agreements’.
In  the  absence  of  evidence  adduced  by  the  Commission,  and  faced  with  evidence 
adduced by the Japanese undertakings that the international agreements had been 
extended until 31 December 1990, at least at the Japanese level, the Court considered 
that those agreements had remained in force until the end of 1990. The contested 
decision  was  annulled  in  part  on  that  point  and  the  amount  of  the  fines  reduced 
accordingly.
The Japanese undertakings also disputed the date on which the infringement in which 
they were found to have participated came to an end. The Court held that, on the basis 
of the evidence adduced by the Commission, the existence of the infringement had not 
been established, so far as the Japanese undertakings were concerned, after 1 July 
1994 and that, accordingly, the duration of the infringement must be reduced by six 
months in addition to the reduction of one year indicated above. Consequently, the Court 
annulled the contested decision in so far as it established the existence of the infringement 
before 1 January 1991 and, so far as the Japanese undertakings were concerned, 
beyond  30  June  1994,  and  the  fines  imposed  on  the  undertakings  were  reduced 
accordingly (Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and 
Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR; under appeal, Cases C-403/04 P 
and C-405/04 P).
d)  Fines
Under Article 15 of Regulation No 17, 18 where the Commission finds an infringement of 
Article 81 EC or Article 82 EC, it may, by decision, not only require the undertakings to 
bring the infringement to an end, but also impose fines on them. The amount of the fine, 
which may be up to 10% of the worldwide turnover in the business year preceding the 
adoption of the decision making a finding of infringement of each of the undertakings 
participating in the infringement, is determined in the light of the gravity and the duration 
of the infringement.
18  Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1) is identical 
to Article 15 of Regulation No 17.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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–  Guidelines
As regards, first, the Guidelines, the Court of First Instance recalled, as it had already 
held in the judgments in the ‘district heating’, 19 ‘Lysine’ 20 and ‘FETTSCA’ 21 cases, that 
the Guidelines are binding on the Commission. The Commission must therefore comply 
with the rules which it has imposed upon itself (Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, 
cited  above,  paragraphs  212  and  231),  unless  it  sets  out  expressly  its  reasons  for 
departing from them in any particular regard (Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, 
cited  above,  paragraph  352).  The  undertakings  may  therefore  invoke  the  incorrect 
application of the Guidelines before the Community Courts.
As regards, second, certain more particular provisions of the Guidelines, the Court has 
defined the conditions for the application of the criteria set for determining the amount of 
the fine in the light of the gravity of the infringement and also of its duration.
Gravity
In its decision in the ‘graphite electrodes’ case, the Commission had concluded that the 
infringement was ‘very serious’, regard being had to the nature of the infringement, its 
actual impact on the graphite electrodes market in the EEA and the size of the relevant 
geographic  market. The  Court  approved  the  approach  taken  by  the  Commission.  It 
considered, in particular, that since the cartel sought to share the markets at worldwide 
level, the Commission had not made a manifest error of assessment in choosing the 
worldwide turnover achieved from sales of the relevant product for the purposes of 
determining the starting amount, because, in the Court’s view, that turnover allowed the 
Commission to take account of ‘the effective economic capacity of offenders to cause 
significant damage to other operators, in particular consumers’, within the meaning of 
point 1.A, fourth paragraph, of the Guidelines. 22
19  Judgments of 20 March 2002 in Case T-9/99 HFB and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-1487 
(under appeal, Case C-202/02 P); Case T-15/99 Brugg Rohrsysteme v Commission [2002] ECR 
II-1613 (under appeal, Case C-207/02 P); Case T-16/99 Lögstör Rör v Commission [2002] ECR 
II-1633 (under appeal, Case C-208/02 P); Case T-17/99 KE KELIT v Commission [2002] ECR II-1647 
(under  appeal,  Case  C-205/02 P);  Case  T-21/99  Dansk  Rørindustri  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR 
II-1681 (under appeal, Case C-189/02 P); Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR 
II-1705 (under appeal, Case C-206/02 P); Case T-28/99 Sigma Tecnologie v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-1845, and Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v Commission [2002] ECR II-1881 (under 
appeal, Case C-213/02 P); these judgments are commented on in the Annual Report 2002.
20  In particular, the judgment of 9 July 2003 in Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and Archer 
Daniels  Midland  Ingredients  v  Commission  (under  appeal,  Case  C-397/03 P);  the  judgments 
delivered in the ‘Lysine’ cases were commented on in the Annual Report 2003.
21  Judgment  of  19  March  2003  in  Case T-213/00  CMA  CGM  and  Others  v  Commission  [2003] 
ECR II-913, concerning the FETTSCA agreement; this judgment was commented on in the Annual 
Report 2003.
22  Point 1 A of the Guidelines states that ‘[i]n assessing the gravity of the infringement, account must be 
taken of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the 
relevant geographic market’. It also follows from point 1 that it is possible to ‘apply weightings to the 
amounts determined within each of the three categories [of gravity] in order to take account of the 
specific weight and, therefore, the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on 
competition’.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The Commission had also divided the undertakings concerned into three categories, on 
the basis of the worldwide turnover of each undertaking in sales of the product concerned, 
in order to take account of the actual economic capacity of each undertaking to cause 
significant harm to competition and of the great disparity in size between the undertakings. 
On that point, the Court observed that the Commission was entitled to divide the members 
of a cartel into several categories for the purposes of setting the amount of fines. Although 
that categorisation ignored the differences in size between undertakings in the same 
category, it could not in principle be condemned. However, the thresholds determined for 
each of the categories thus identified must be coherent and objectively justified. In the 
present case, the Court held that the method of differentiation used in the decision, which 
was  based  on  turnover  and  market  shares,  had  not  been  correctly  applied  by  the 
Commission vis-à-vis Tokai Carbon and the Carbide/Graphite Group, which came in one 
of the three categories in question. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court 
therefore decided to dismantle the category in question and to make its own classification. 
It also fixed the starting amount of the fines for the undertakings coming within that 
classification and also for the undertakings in the third category.
Last, in regard to the two undertakings considered the most important, the Commission 
had applied multipliers for gravity to the starting amount. The Court confirmed that it is in 
principle possible for the Commission to apply a multiplier for gravity to the starting 
amounts in order to set the fine at a sufficiently deterrent level (Case T-31/99 ABB Asea 
Brown Boveri v Commission [2002] ECR II-1881, paragraphs 165 to 167; under appeal, 
Case C-213/02 P). However, the multiplier applied in the present case to SDK (2.5) was 
held not to comply with the principles of proportionality and equal treatment and the 
Court, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, reduced the multiplier applicable to that 
undertaking to 1.5.
Although, by applying a multiplier, the Commission therefore remains free to increase the 
level of fines, it also has the option of reducing the starting amount which would result 
from a strict application of the Guidelines. The Court confirmed that, in the seamless 
steel  tubes  and  pipes  decision,  the  Commission  was  entitled,  in  spite  of  what  was 
recognised as the ‘very serious’ nature of the infringement, to take a starting amount 
(EUR  10  million)  corresponding  to  50%  of  the  minimum  amount  mentioned  in  the 
Guidelines for infringements in that category (EUR 20 million), in order to take account 
of the fact that the actual impact of the infringement on the market had been limited.
On the other hand, the Court considered that the Commission had failed to take into 
consideration the second infringement by the European producers (the contracts relating 
to the United Kingdom market) when setting the amount of the fine. By that omission, the 
Commission therefore infringed the principle of equal treatment, since different situations 
were treated in the same way. In order to remedy that unequal treatment of the European 
producers and the Japanese producers, the Court reduced the fine imposed on each of 
the Japanese producers by 10%. As the Commission had not requested it to do so, the 
Court did not increase the fines imposed on the European producers.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Duration
In its judgment in Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, cited above, the Court of First 
Instance rejected all the complaints relating to the basic amounts applied in the decision 
in order to take account of duration.
SGL Carbon maintained that the Guidelines were unlawful in that they envisaged the 
duration of an infringement in the same way, irrespective of its nature. It maintained that 
a cartel is by definition long-lasting and that it cannot be treated in the same way for the 
purpose of duration as other infringements. The Court rejected that argument, observing 
that certain cartels, being of short duration, are less harmful than they would have been 
had they been in operation for a long period.
Aggravating circumstances
In Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission the Court of First Instance confirmed that the 
Commission could increase the basic amounts for: (i) continuing the infringement after 
the Commission had begun its investigations (ABB Asea Brown Boveri v Commission, 
paragraphs 211 to 213); (ii) acting as ringleader (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer 
Daniels Midlands Ingredients v Commission, paragraph 239); and (iii) attempting to 
impede the procedure by warning other undertakings that dawn raids were imminent 
(Case T-334/94 Sarrió v Commission [1998] ECR II-1439, paragraph 320).
Attenuating circumstances
None of the attenuating circumstances which the Commission was alleged to have failed 
to take into account was recognised by the Court of First Instance.
–  The Leniency Notice
Generally, cooperation which allows the Commission to establish the existence of an 
infringement with less difficulty and, where appropriate, to put an end to it may be 
rewarded by a reduction in the fine. The 1996 Leniency Notice defines the conditions in 
which the benefit of its provisions may be granted.
The  findings  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  on  the  application  of  that  notice  by  the 
Commission show that the fact of voluntarily sending the Commission, in answer to a 
request for information under Regulation No 17, documents and information constituting 
an admission of having participated in an infringement of the Community competition 
rules must be regarded as voluntary collaboration on the part of the undertaking of such 
a kind as to warrant a reduction in the fine. In concluding that that was not the case, the 
Commission, according to the Court of First Instance, failed to appreciate the importance 
of  the  cooperation  provided  by  certain  applicants  (Tokai  Carbon  and  Others  v 
Commission, cited above).
It should also be noted that the Court criticised the Commission for having failed to 
appreciate the importance of the cooperation of UCAR, which had provided information Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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such as the names of other undertakings which were members of the cartel, the names 
of  a  number  of  representatives  of  those  members  or  code  names  used  to  conceal 
contacts, not in documentary form but orally.
Last, while the notice provides, in point A.3, only for a reduction ‘in the fine which would 
have been imposed upon [the undertakings cooperating with the Commission]’, it does 
not require that each individual item of information must relate to an infringement of 
competition law in respect of which a separate sanction may be imposed. In order to be 
able to benefit from that notice, it is sufficient, therefore, that, by revealing its involvement 
in an infringement, the undertaking minded to cooperate exposes itself to sanctions, while 
whether the various items of information may be taken into consideration for the purposes 
of a possible reduction in the fine depends on how useful they are to the Commission in 
its task of establishing the existence of the infringement and putting an end to it.
In that last regard, since a disloyal Commission official is in a position to sabotage his 
institution’s  mission  by  supporting  the  members  of  an  illegal  cartel  and  may  thus 
considerably complicate the investigation carried out by the Commission, for example by 
destroying  or  manipulating  evidence,  by  informing  the  members  of  the  cartel  of  a 
forthcoming unannounced investigation and by revealing the entire investigation strategy 
drawn up by the Commission, information about the existence of such an official must, in 
principle, be regarded as being capable of making it easier for the Commission to carry 
out its task of establishing an infringement and putting an end to it. Such information is 
particularly useful when it is provided at the beginning of the investigation opened by the 
Commission into possible anti-competitive conduct.
In Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, cited above, the Court of First Instance 
stated that, in order to receive a reduction in the fine on the ground of not contesting the 
facts, in accordance with point D.2 of the Leniency Notice, an undertaking must expressly 
inform the Commission that it has no intention of substantially contesting the facts, after 
perusing the statement of objections. In the absence of such an express declaration, 
mere  passivity  on  the  part  of  an  undertaking  cannot  be  considered  to  facilitate  the 
Commission’s task, since the Commission is required to establish the existence of all the 
facts in the final decision without being able to rely on a declaration by the undertaking 
in doing so.
–  The principle ne bis in idem 
As it has already had occasion to state (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels 
Midland  Ingredients  v  Commission,  cited  above,  paragraph  85),  the  Court  of  First 
Instance recalled in Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission that the principle ne bis in 
idem, which is also enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention on the 
Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms,  is  a  general  principle  of 
Community  law  upheld  by  the  Community  judicature.  In  the  field  of  Community 
competition law, the principle precludes an undertaking from being sanctioned by the 
Commission  or  made  the  defendant  to  proceedings  brought  by  the  Commission  a 
second time in respect of anti-competitive conduct for which it has already been penalised 
or of which it has been exonerated by a previous decision of the Commission that is no 
longer amenable to challenge.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The question none the less arose as to whether the Commission infringes that principle 
when it imposes sanctions on undertakings in respect of unlawful conduct which has 
already been punished by the authorities of non-member States.
On that point, the Court of First Instance considered that the principle ne bis in idem does 
not preclude the possibility of concurrent sanctions, one a Community sanction, the other 
a national one, resulting from two sets of parallel proceedings which pursue distinct ends. 
A fortiori, that principle cannot apply where procedures are conducted and penalties 
imposed by the Commission on the one hand and the authorities of non-member States 
on the other, provided that those procedures do not pursue the same ends.
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance held that the Commission was not required, 
under a general requirement of natural justice, to take account of penalties imposed by 
the authorities or the courts of a non-member State which have already been borne by the 
same undertaking in respect of the same conduct. The conditions on which it may be 
concluded that there is an obligation to take account of the penalties imposed by an 
authority of a Member State which have already been borne by the same undertaking in 
respect of the same conduct are not satisfied where the penalties were imposed by the 
authorities  of  non-member  States.  In  those  circumstances,  given  that  the  applicants 
pointed  to  no  express  provision  of  a  convention  requiring  the  Commission,  when 
determining the amount of a fine, to take account of penalties already imposed on the 
same undertaking in respect of the same conduct by the authorities or courts of a non-
member State, such as the United States or Canada, they could not validly complain that, 
in the present case, the Commission had failed to satisfy any such alleged obligation.
The principles thus recalled by the Court of First Instance confirm those already identified 
in the ‘Lysine’ cases (see, in particular, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels 
Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraphs 85 to 104).
–  The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 17, the Court of First Instance has unlimited 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 229 EC in an action against a decision imposing 
a fine and may thus cancel, reduce or increase the fine imposed.
The Court has on a number of occasions exercised its unlimited jurisdiction to reduce 
fines after finding that certain elements of the infringement were not established to the 
requisite  legal  standard  (JCB  Service  v  Commission,  paragraph  193)  or  that  the 
Commission had failed to comply with the Guidelines or the Leniency Notice (Tokai 
Carbon and Others v Commission).
Particular attention should be drawn to the Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction to 
increase the amount of fines. In Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission the Court thus 
exercised for the first time its unlimited jurisdiction to increase the amount of the fine, at 
an intermediate stage of the calculation. As the undertaking Nippon had contested before 
the Court facts which it had previously admitted during the administrative procedure – 
although without expressly, clearly and specifically acknowledging them – the reduction 
in the fine initially granted by the Commission was reduced.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The Court further observed that, in the context of its unlimited jurisdiction, its assessment 
of the appropriateness of the fine could take into account information not mentioned in 
the Commission decision.
2.  Regulation No 4064/89
The  only  decision  delivered  in  the  field  of  concentrations  in  2004  was  a  judgment 
annulling  a  Commission  decision  prohibiting  the  concentration  between  the  United 
States telecommunications undertakings WorldCom (now MCI) and Sprint. 23
However, the judgment of 28 September 2004 in Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not 
yet published in the ECR, did not involve a determination of the substance of the case, 
as the ground of annulment concerned the Commission’s lack of power to adopt the 
decision.
After the parties had jointly notified the merger pursuant to Regulation No 4064/89 24 on 
10 January 2000, they formally stated on 27 June 2000 that they were withdrawing their 
notification and that they no longer intended to implement the proposed merger in the 
form set out in the notification. On 28 June 2000, the Commission none the less adopted 
its decision declaring the merger incompatible with the common market and the EEA 
Agreement.
The  Court  found  that  the  communication  which  WorldCom  and  Sprint  sent  to  the 
Commission on 27 June 2000 concerned not the abandonment, as a matter of principle, 
of any idea of, or proposal for, a merger, but only the abandonment of the proposed 
merger ‘in the form presented in the notification’, i.e. in the form envisaged by the notified 
merger agreement. Press releases issued on the same day in the United States by the 
two undertakings confirmed that at the time WorldCom and Sprint still entertained some 
hopes of merging their activities in one form or another. In reality, it was only by the press 
release of 13 July 2000 that the notifying parties announced that they were definitively 
abandoning their proposed merger. However, the Court of First Instance further stated 
that a merger agreement capable of forming the subject-matter of a Commission decision 
does not automatically exist (or continue to exist) between two undertakings simply 
because they are considering merging (or continue to consider merging). Commission 
competence cannot rest on the mere subjective intentions of the parties. Just as it does 
not have the power to prohibit a merger before a merger decision has been concluded, 
the Commission ceases to have that power as soon as that agreement is abandoned, 
even if the undertakings concerned continue negotiations with a view to concluding an 
agreement in a modified form. In that particular case, the Commission should have found 
that it no longer had the power to adopt the decision.
23  Commission Decision 2003/790/EC of 28 June 2000 declaring a concentration incompatible with the 
common market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.1741 – MCI WorldCom/Sprint) (OJ 2003 
L 300, p. 1).
24  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89  of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of  concentrations 
between undertakings (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1, corrigendum OJ 1990 L 257, p. 13, since repealed by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1)).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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D.  State aid
1.  The concept of State aid
a)  Constituent elements
The benefit and the specificity of the State measure are characteristic elements of the 
concept of State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. 25 The Commission was 
condemned on a number of occasions for not having correctly appraised the criteria in 
question (judgments of 16 March 2004 in Case T-157/01 Danske Busvognmaend v 
Commission, of 16 September 2004 in Case T-274/01 Valmont Nederland v Commission, 
of 21 October 2004 in Case T-36/99 Lenzing v Commission and of 1 December 2004 in 
Case T-27/02 Kronofrance v Commission, none yet published in the ECR).
–  Advantage
The concept of State aid covers not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, loans or 
the taking of shares in undertakings, but also interventions which, in various forms, 
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and 
which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in 
character and have the same effect.
Thus, in its judgment of 21 October 2004 in Lenzing v Commission, the Court of First 
Instance held that where public bodies with responsibility for collecting social security 
contributions tolerate late payment of such contributions, their conduct gives a recipient 
undertaking in serious financial difficulties, by mitigating, for that undertaking, the burden 
associated  with  the  normal  application  of  the  social  security  system,  a  significant 
commercial advantage which cannot be wholly removed by the interest and default 
surcharges which it is required to pay. By concluding in that case that those bodies had 
acted in the same way as a hypothetical private creditor in, so far as possible, the same 
situation vis-à-vis its debtor as those bodies, the Commission made a manifestly incorrect 
application of the private creditor test; and, accordingly, the Court annulled the contested 
decision.
It was also by reference to the private creditor test that the Court of First Instance 
determined whether the Commission had been entitled to conclude that the reduction of 
some of the debts of the German company Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau to the public-
law  body  responsible  for  the  restructuring  of  undertakings  of  the  former  German 
Democratic Republic (‘the BvS’) constituted State aid. The restricted review which the 
court carries out of the complex economic appraisals of that nature led to the conclusion 
that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the Commission had not committed a 
25  As established in Article 87(1) EC, a State aid incompatible with the common market is an advantage, 
granted  by  the  State  or  through  State  resources  in  any  form  whatsoever  in  favour  of  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, which affects trade between Member States and 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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manifest error of assessment in finding that the BvS had not behaved like a private 
creditor operating under normal market conditions. As none of the other pleas was 
upheld,  the  action  for  annulment  was  dismissed  (judgment  of  8  July  2004  in  Case 
T-198/01 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, not yet published in the ECR; 
under appeal, Case C-404/04 P).
In  its  judgment  in  Valmont  Nederland  v  Commission,  moreover,  the  Court  of  First 
Instance adopted for the first time the solution arrived at by the Court of Justice in its 
judgment of 24 July 2003 in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium 
Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, according to which State intervention in favour of an 
undertaking in return for discharging public service obligations does not constitute aid, 
provided that a number of conditions are satisfied. 26
In that case, the Commission had considered that the financing granted by a Netherlands 
municipality to an undertaking to construct a car park constituted State aid in part, on the 
ground that it corresponded to business costs which that undertaking should normally 
have borne and placed it at an advantage. The Commission none the less considered 
that the other part of the financing benefited other undertakings and did not benefit the 
applicant.
The Court of First Instance found, first, that the undertaking bore a burden in allowing 
others  to  use  its  car  park  in  various  ways  regularly  and  free  of  charge,  under  an 
agreement  concluded,  in  the  public  interest  as  much  as  in  that  of  the  third  parties 
concerned, with a territorial authority and, second, that a portion of the financing granted 
by  the  territorial  authority  for  the  construction  of  that  car  park  effectively  benefited 
Valmont.
In those circumstances, the Court held that the Commission could not automatically 
consider that the portion of the financing had necessarily benefited Valmont but should 
have first examined, in the light of the information available, whether or not that portion 
of the financing could be regarded as being in fact compensation for the burden borne by 
Valmont. To that end, the Commission was required to ascertain whether the conditions 
set  out  in  Altmark  Trans  and  Regierungspräsidium  Magdeburg,  cited  above,  were 
26  Namely: (i) the recipient undertaking must actually be responsible for carrying out public service 
obligations and those obligations must be clearly defined; (ii) the parameters on the basis of which 
the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent 
manner to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking 
over competing undertakings; (iii) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or 
part of the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; (iv) when the undertaking which is 
to  discharge  public  service  obligations,  in  a  specific  case,  is  not  chosen  pursuant  to  a  public 
procurement procedure, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an 
analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped to be able to 
satisfy  the  necessary  public  service  requirements,  would  have  incurred  in  discharging  those 
obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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satisfied. As it was not apparent from the decision that the Commission had done so, the 
decision was annulled. 27
Last,  by  its  judgment  in  Danske  Busvognmaend  v  Commission,  the  Court  of  First 
Instance  annulled  the  Commission  decision  declaring  the  aid  granted  by  Danish 
authorities to the bus company Combus to be compatible with the common market.
In  particular,  the  Court  held  that  that  company  had  not  been  entrusted  with  the 
performance of public service obligations within the meaning of Regulation No 1191/
69. 28 It considered that an undertaking, such as Combus, whose obligations to operate, 
to carry and to collect the tariffs were not imposed unilaterally, which was not obliged to 
operate  its  transport  services  in  an  unprofitable  manner,  contrary  to  its  commercial 
interests, but which, on the contrary, had voluntarily assumed those obligations once it 
had been successful in the tendering procedures, which did not provide for any State 
subsidies and in which it had been free to participate or not, depending on its economic 
interests, and whose transport services were paid for by the price it had proposed in its 
bids  in  the  tendering  procedures  and  which  had  been  included  in  the  contracts 
subsequently concluded, did not bear public service obligations within the meaning of 
Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1191/69; such an undertaking did not therefore receive 
compensation within the meaning of that article, as the Commission had found, but 
financial remuneration provided for in the transport contracts.
–  Specific or selective nature of the State measure
In Lenzing v Commission, the Court considered that the Commission had been entitled 
to conclude that the measure granted in favour of Sniace was selective.
The Court recalled, in that regard, that measures of purely general scope do not fall 
within Article 87(1) EC, but that, however, the case-law has already established that 
even assistance which at first sight is applicable to undertakings in general may present 
a certain selectivity and, accordingly, be regarded as a measure intended to favour 
certain  undertakings  or  certain  products.  That  is  the  case,  in  particular,  where  the 
administration called upon to apply the general rule has a discretion when applying the 
measure. In this case, the Court found that the Spanish public bodies responsible for 
collecting social security contributions had a certain discretion both when concluding 
restructuring and repayment agreements and when determining certain detailed terms in 
those agreements, such as the repayment timetable, the amount of the surcharges and 
the sufficiency of the guarantees offered in return for the settlement of the debts. It was 
27  As well as this ground for annulment of the decision of 18 July 2001, there had been an infringement 
of Article 87(1) EC – established in the same judgment – by the Commission, which had concluded 
on the basis of an expert report having no probative calue that the price of the land sold to the 
applicant was below market price and, accordingly, contained an element of State aid.
28  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of 26 June 1969 on action by Member States concerning the 
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway 
(OJ, English Special Edition 1969 (I), p. 276), as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1893/91 
of 20 June 1991 (OJ 1991 L 169, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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also within the discretion of those bodies whether or not to allow the company not to 
comply with those agreements and to tolerate non-payment of the debts for several 
years.
The condition that a State measure should relate to a specific undertaking or apply 
selectively is one of the defining features of State aid, not only in the context of the EC 
Treaty but also in that of the ECSC Treaty, as recalled in the judgment of 1 July 2004 in 
Case T-308/00 Salzgitter v Commission, not yet published in the ECR (under appeal, 
Case  C-408/04 P),  which,  on  that  point,  confirms  that  the  fact  that  the  advantage 
conferred by a tax measure provided for by law is made subject to a condition that the 
investments must be made in a geographically-limited area within a Member State, as 
was the position in this case, is in principle sufficient for the measure in question to be 
viewed as relating to a specific category of undertakings. The Court referred in support 
of its findings – a fact sufficiently rare to deserve mention – to a judgment of the EFTA 
Court 29 and emphasised that what mattered, for a measure to be found to be State aid, 
was that the recipient undertakings belonged to a specific category determined by the 
application, in law or in fact, of the criterion established by the measure in question.
b)  Guidelines
Although the Commission, for the purposes of applying Article 87(3) EC, enjoys a wide 
discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature 
which must be made within a Community context, it is none the less bound by the 
guidelines and notices that it issues in the area of supervision of State aid where they do 
not depart from the rules in the Treaty and are accepted by the Member States. The 
persons concerned are therefore entitled to rely on them and the Court will ascertain 
whether the Commission has complied with the rules which it has imposed on itself when 
adopting the contested decision.
The Court of First Instance has thus adjudicated on a number of applications in which it 
has been requested to declare that there have been errors of law in the application of the 
Community  guidelines  on  State  aid  for  environmental  protection  of  1994  and  2001 
(judgment of 18 November 2004 in Case T-176/01 Ferriere Nord v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR), of the multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment 
projects 30  (Kronofrance  v  Commission,  cited  above),  of  the  notice  laying  down 
Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty 31 
(Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, cited above), and also of Recommendation 
96/280/EC concerning the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises 32 and the 
notice  on  the  Community  guidelines  on  State  aid  for  small  and  medium-sized 
29  Judgment of the EFTA Court of 20 May 1999 in Case E-6/98 Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority 
Reports of EFTA Court, p. 74.
30  OJ 1998 C 107, p. 7.
31  OJ 1994 C 368, p. 12.
32  Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC of 3 April 1996 concerning the definition of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (OJ 1996 L 107, p. 4).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
106
Court of First Instance  Proceedings
107
enterprises 33 (judgment of 14 October 2004 in Case T-137/02 Pollmeier Malchow v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR).
In Ferriere Nord v Commission the Court of First Instance confirmed that the Commission 
was able to declare the project of aid for Ferriere Nord incompatible with the common 
market in so far as the investment did not satisfy the requirement of environmental 
performance sought by the 1994 and 2001 Guidelines.
Likewise,  in  Pollmeier  Malchow  v  Commission  the  Court  upheld  the  Commission’s 
finding that the recipient of the aid was a large enterprise and did not therefore satisfy the 
criteria of the definition of SMEs. The Court considered, in particular, that, in the light of 
the general scheme of the texts concerned, the Commission was entitled to ensure that 
the recipient of the aid in question was not in reality a group whose power exceeded that 
of an SME.
In Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission the Court of First Instance considered, 
in the light of the guidance provided by the Guidelines on aid for rescuing and restructuring 
firms in difficulty, whether the Commission made a manifest error of assessment by 
refusing to declare the price reduction in question compatible with the common market 
under Article 87(3)(c) EC without taking into account the monopoly situation that would 
be created should the applicant disappear. The Court held that that circumstance would 
suffice to justify the grant of State aid intended to save undertakings and to encourage 
their  restructuring  only  if  the  general  conditions  for  the  authorisation  of  rescue  or 
restructuring aid, as laid down in the Guidelines, were satisfied. In this case, the Court 
held that the Commission had not made a manifest error of assessment in concluding 
that the restructuring plan was not such as to allow Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau to 
restore its viability, and, consequently, rejected the plea.
In Kronofrance v Commission, on the other hand, the Court of First Instance annulled the 
Commission’s decision not to raise objections to aid granted by the German authorities 
to  Glunz  for  the  construction  of  an  integrated  wood  processing  centre.  The  Court 
considered  that  the  Commission  had  not  complied  with  the  rules  laid  down  in  the 
multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, since it had not 
ascertained, as provided for in that framework, whether the relevant product market was 
a ‘declining market’. Owing to that error of law on the part of the Commission, there had 
been  no  assessment  of  the  compatibility  of  the  notified  aid  on  the  basis  of  all  the 
applicable criteria.
c)  Recovery
The judgment of 14 January 2004 in Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost v Commission, not 
yet published in the ECR, provided the opportunity for the Court of First Instance to recall 
33  Commission notice on the Community guidelines on State aid for SMEs (OJ 1996 C 213, p. 4).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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that undertakings in receipt of aid cannot in principle have a legitimate expectation that 
the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down 
in Article 88 EC but that, none the less, the case-law does not preclude the possibility 
that,  in  order  to  challenge  its  repayment,  the  recipients  of  unlawful  aid  may,  in  the 
procedure for recovery of the aid, plead exceptional circumstances which may have 
legitimately given rise to a legitimate expectation that the law was lawful.
However, the Court held that those recipients can rely on such exceptional circumstances, 
on the basis of the relevant provisions of national law, only in the framework of the 
recovery procedure before the national courts, and that it is for those courts alone to 
assess the circumstances of the case, if necessary after obtaining a preliminary ruling on 
interpretation from the Court of Justice. In so holding, the Court of First Instance took a 
clear position on a question to which hesitant answers had thus far been given (see, in 
that regard, the Annual Report 1999).
Unlike the applicant in Fleuren Compost v Commission, Salzgitter maintained, in order 
to challenge repayment of the aid, not that the Commission had breached the principle 
of protection of legitimate expectations but that it had failed to observe the principle of 
legal certainty; and the Court considered that the breach of that principle of legal certainty 
justified in that case the annulment of the provisions of the Commission decision 34 
requiring the Federal Republic of Germany to recover the aid granted to the undertakings 
forming part of Salzgitter AG.
In Salzgitter v Commission the Court of First Instance held, first of all, that the possibility 
of relying on the principle of legal certainty did not depend on the conditions which must 
be satisfied where a party relies on a legitimate expectation that State aid was properly 
granted. It was for that reason that the steel undertaking which had obtained State aid 
which had not been notified to the Commission could rely, in order to challenge the 
Commission decision requiring repayment of the aid, on legal certainty, although the 
recipient of aid is precluded, other than in certain circumstances, from having a legitimate 
expectation that the aid was properly granted if it was granted in breach of the provisions 
on prior control of State aid.
The Court of First Instance then held that the steel undertaking which had received 
unlawful aid was entitled to rely on the principle of legal certainty in order to challenge the 
lawfulness of a Commission decision ordering repayment of the aid in a case where at 
the  time  when  it  received  the  aid  there  was,  owing  to  reasons  attributable  to  the 
Commission, a situation of uncertainty and lack of clarity as regards the legal rules 
applicable to the type of aids involved, combined with the prolonged lack of reaction on 
the part of the Commission, which was none the less aware that the aid was being paid 
and which thus led to the creation, in disregard of its duty of care, of an equivocal 
situation which the Commission was under a duty to clarify before it could take any action 
to order the repayment of the aid which had been paid.
34  Commission Decision 2000/797/ECSC of 28 June 2000 on State aid granted by the Federal Republic 
of Germany to Salzgitter AG, Preussag Stahl AG and the group’s steel-industry subsidiaries, now 
known as Salzgitter AG – Stahl und Technologie (SAG) (OJ 2000 L 323, p. 5).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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2.  Procedural matters
The question of the scope of the rights recognised to the interested parties in the formal 
procedure involving examination of State aid has been clarified. The case-law of the 
Court of First Instance draws a clear distinction between the Member States providing 
the aid and the parties concerned. Whereas the Member States enjoy the full rights of 
defence, the parties concerned are only entitled to present observations.
First, in one of the pleas examined in the case which it brought against the Commission, 
Ferriere Nord – an undertaking in the steel, mechanical and metallurgical industrial 
sector – claimed that the Commission had breached its rights of defence in initiating the 
formal  examination  procedure  in  accordance  with  the  1994  Community  guidelines 
framework on State aid for environmental protection, 35 although the decision had been 
adopted on the basis of the 2001 guidelines, 36 without either the Italian Republic or itself 
having  been  invited  to  submit  comments  on  the  new  guidelines.  In  its  judgment  in 
Ferriere Nord v Commission, the Court of First Instance stated, first of all, that that plea 
must be examined not from the point of view of the rights of the defence, which only the 
States enjoy in State aid matters, but in consideration of the right which, pursuant to 
Article 88(2) EC, the ‘parties concerned’ have to submit comments during the review 
stage referred to in that provision. The Court then observed that the Commission would 
not have been able, without disregarding the procedural rights of the parties concerned, 
to have based its decision on new principles introduced by the 2001 Guidelines without 
inviting the parties concerned to submit their comments in that regard. However, the 
Court found that the principles laid down by the two sets of guidelines were, in the light 
of the grounds on which the Commission relied to declare the aid in question incompatible, 
substantially identical; it concluded that there had been no requirement to consult the 
parties concerned again.
Second,  the  question  arose  whether  the  undertaking  in  receipt  of  the  aid  must  be 
recognised as having guarantees over and above the right to submit comments after 
initiation of the procedure recognised to all the parties concerned within the meaning of 
Article 88(2) EC. The answer given by the Court of First Instance in Fleuren Compost v 
Commission and Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission is unambiguous: ‘the 
recipient of the aid does not play a special role pursuant to any provision governing the 
procedure for the review of State aid’, and the Court recalled that the procedure for the 
review of State aid is not a procedure initiated ‘against’ the recipient of aid by virtue of 
which it could rely on rights as extensive as the rights of the defence as such.
As the parties concerned other than the Member State in question cannot rely on the 
right to participate in an adversarial procedure before the Commission, the Court of First 
Instance  rejected  the  applicants’  complaints,  in  particular  Technische  Glaswerke 
Ilmenau’s complaint that it ought to have been granted access to the non-confidential 
part of the file in the administrative procedure and to have received the comments or 
35  OJ 1994 C 72, p. 3.
36  Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJ 2001 C 37, p. 3).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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replies  to  the  Commission’s  questions  submitted  by  one  of  its  competitors  on  the 
market.
In one of the pleas which it formulated in the action for annulment of the Commission 
decision  declaring  incompatible  with  the  common  market  the  aid  which  the  Italian 
Republic proposed to grant to Ferriere Nord, that undertaking criticised the Commission 
for not having asked it or the Italian Republic to provide documentation relating to the 
environmental purpose of the investment, then for having stated in its decision that no 
evidence on that point had been provided. In that regard, the Court of First Instance 
(Ferriere  Nord  v  Commission)  held  that  the  principle  of  protection  of  legitimate 
expectations meant that in carrying out the procedure involving review of State aid, the 
Commission  must  take  account  of  the  legitimate  expectations  which  the  parties 
concerned might entertain as a result of what had been said in the decision opening the 
formal examination procedure and, subsequently, that it did not base its final decision on 
the absence of elements which, in the light of those indications, the parties concerned 
had been unable to consider that they must provide to it. In that case, the plea was 
rejected on the ground that the indications in the decision to open the procedure were 
sufficiently clear and precise. 37
E.  Trade protection measures
Although mention must be made of the judgment of 28 October 2004 in Case T-35/01 
Shanghai Teraoka Electronic v Council, not yet published in the ECR, dismissing the 
action for annulment of a regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports 
of  certain  electronic  weighing  scales, 38  in  particular  because  it  is  the  only  decision 
delivered in the anti-dumping sphere, it is to the judgment of 14 December 2004 in Case 
T-317/02  Fédération  des  industries  condimentaires  de  France  (FICF)  and  Others  v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, that the reader’s attention is drawn.
In adjudicating for the first time on the lawfulness of a Commission decision rejecting a 
complaint lodged in accordance with the Council regulation on trade barriers 39, the 
Court  of  First  Instance  specified  the  conditions  in  which  those  obstacles  to  trade 
justify Community intervention.
37  See also, to that effect, Pollmeier Malchow v Commission, cited above, paragraph 76.
38  Council Regulation (EC) No 2605/2000 of 27 November 2000 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties 
on imports of certain electronic weighing scales (REWS) originating in the People’s Republic of 
China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (OJ 2000 L 301, p. 42).
39  Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in 
the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights 
under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspicies of the World Trade 
Organisation (OJ 1994 L 349, p. 71).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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In this case, the complaint lodged in June 2001 by the FICF, which represents all the 
principal French producers of prepared mustard, sought to denounce the effects of the 
measures which the United States of America had been authorised to take by the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 40 which consisted, inter alia, 
in imposing an additional customs duty of 100% on certain products from the Member 
States of the European Community, including ‘prepared mustard’.
In its complaint, the FICF denounced the selective nature of the United States retaliatory 
measures applied only vis-à-vis certain Member States and not vis-à-vis the European 
Community as a whole. The complaint also stated that the trade barrier created by the 
United States had unfavourable commercial effects on the exports of prepared mustard 
of the undertakings that were members of the FICF and that it was in the Community 
interest,  under  the  rules  on  international  trade,  to  initiate  proceedings  against  the 
measures adopted by the United States.
In accordance with the trade barriers regulation, the Commission initiated an examination 
procedure  which  was  subsequently  extended  to  three  other  trade  organisations  of 
producers of foie gras, Roquefort and shallots. That procedure was closed in 2002, the 
Commission concluding that no specific action was necessary in the interests of the 
Community, as the selective withdrawal of concessions by the United States did not 
cause adverse trade effects within the meaning of that regulation.
Upon application by the FICF and the other organisations concerned for annulment of 
the Commission’s decision not to take action against the retaliatory measures taken by 
the United States, the Court of First Instance upheld that decision.
The Court observed, first of all, that under the Trade Barriers Regulation, the Community 
may take action pursuant to international rules against an obstacle to trade created by a 
third country on the basis of three cumulative conditions: there must be an obstacle to 
trade which produces adverse trade effects and action must be necessary in the interests 
of the Community.
The Court of First Instance then considered that the Commission had correctly taken into 
account all the essential and indissociable elements of the concept of an obstacle to 
trade. As regards adverse trade effects, the Court found that the increase in exports of 
prepared mustard between 1996-1998 and 2000 from the United Kingdom to the United 
States, in terms of both value and volume, was extremely small in size and proportion by 
comparison to exports from other Member States of the Community. Therefore, even on 
the  assumption  that  exporters  from  Member  States  other  than  the  United  Kingdom 
themselves would have benefited from that increase if the retaliatory measures adopted 
by the United States had been extended to prepared mustard from the United Kingdom 
40  Between 1981 and 1996, the Council of the European Union adopted a number of directives against 
the use of certain substances having a hormonal action in animal feedstuffs, in order to protect 
human health. In January 1998, the Appellate Body of the WTO, following a complaint lodged by the 
United States, declared that legislation contrary to the WTO rules. In July 1999, as the Community 
legislation had not been adjusted to comply with those rules, the Appellate Body authorised the 
United States to adopt retaliatory measures and in particular to impose additional customs duties of 
100% on a number of products from the European Community.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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– which the applicants had failed to show –, those exporters would not have been able 
to enjoy greater opportunities for export.
Last, the Court observed that an assessment of the interests of the Community required a 
balancing of the interests of the various parties involved against those of the general 
interest  of  the  Community. Although  the  examination  procedure  had  not  precluded  a 
general Community interest in taking action in future, the Commission had closed the 
procedure because there was no specific Community interest in challenging an obstacle to 
trade which did not produce adverse trade effects within the meaning of the Trade Barriers 
Regulation. The Court held that a complainant may not urge the Community to take action 
on principle to protect the general interest without, at the least, having itself suffered 
adverse trade effects within the meaning of the Trade Barriers Regulation. Contrary to the 
French producers’ contention, therefore, the Commission had not confused the interests of 
the Community with those of the FICF. Furthermore, although the contested decision did 
not refer to the interested parties other than the FICF, the Court found that the Commission 
had considered their interests in the context of its examination.
F.  Community trade mark
Given the place which it now occupies in the Court’s work, the registration of Community 
trade marks is a prime source of litigation before the Court: 110 actions were brought in 
2004 (compared with 100 in 2003) and 76 cases were disposed of (47 by judgment and 
29 by order), which is 29 more than last year.
Under Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade 
mark, 41 registration as a Community trade mark is to be refused if, inter alia, the mark is 
devoid of distinctive character (Article 7(1)(b)) or descriptive (Article 7(1)(c)) (absolute 
grounds for refusal) or in the event of well-founded opposition on the basis of an earlier 
mark protected in a Member State or as a Community trade mark (Article 8) (relative 
grounds for refusal). 42
1.  Absolute grounds for refusal of registration
In its 14 judgments ruling on the lawfulness of decisions of the Boards of Appeal relating 
to absolute grounds for refusal of registration, the Court annulled only one of those 
41  OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1.
42  A Community trade mark may also be declared invalid by OHIM where an application for such a 
declaration has been made under Article 51(1) of Regulation No 40/94. No ruling was given by the 
Court in 2004 on the lawfulness of any decision of the Cancellation Division of OHIM.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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decisions (judgment of 24 November 2004 in Case T-393/02 Henkel v OHIM (shape of a 
white and transparent bottle)) and dismissed all the other actions. 43
First, the marks covered by Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 are those which are 
incapable of performing the essential function of the trade mark, which is to identify the 
trade origin of goods or a service. In other words, to be distinctive within the meaning of 
that provision, a mark must be capable of identifying the goods or service in respect of 
which registration is applied as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to 
distinguish those goods or that service from those of other undertakings.
The Court upheld, inter alia, the decisions of the Boards of Appeal refusing to register the 
following as Community trade marks on account of a lack of distinctiveness: representations 
of stand-up pouches for packaging drinks in respect of fruit juices; the word mark ‘LOOKS 
LIKE GRASS... FEELS LIKE GRASS... PLAYS LIKE GRASS’ for synthetic surfacing and 
installation services for that product; a transparent bottle, filled with a yellow liquid, with a 
long neck in which a slice of lemon with a green skin has been plugged for drinks and 
certain services; the word mark ‘Mehr für Ihr Geld’ for cleaning and cosmetic materials 
and foods for everyday consumption; the representation of a twisted wrapper for sweets; 
and a three-dimensional shape representing a light-brown sweet for confectionery.
By contrast, the Court annulled the decision of the Board of Appeal which held that a 
three-dimensional mark consisting of the shape of a white and transparent bottle for 
cleaning products was devoid of distinctive character. In Henkel v OHIM (shape of a 
white and transparent bottle), cited above, the Court found that the three-dimensional 
mark applied for was unusual and capable of enabling the goods in question to be 
distinguished from those having a different commercial origin.
Second, it may be observed that, in the cases concerning the descriptiveness of the 
marks applied for within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, the Court 
upheld all of the findings made by the Boards of Appeal on that point. It thus found lawful 
the decisions declaring the following to be incapable of fulfilling the trade mark’s function 
of an indication of origin: the word mark TELEPHARMACY SOLUTIONS for equipment 
which may be used to distribute pharmaceutical products from a distance; the word mark 
LIMO for certain categories of laser products; the word mark APPLIED MOLECULAR 
EVOLUTION for services relating to the molecular engineering of compounds; and the 
word mark NURSERYROOM for goods for young children.
43  Judgments of 28 January 2004 in Joined Cases T-146/02 to T-153/02 Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM 
(stand-up pouch) (under appeal, Case C-173/04 P); of 31 March 2004 in Case T-216/02 Fieldturf v 
OHIM (LOOKS LIKE GRASS... FEELS LIKE GRASS... PLAYS LIKE GRASS); of 21 April 2004 in Case 
T-127/02 Concept v OHIM (ECA); of 29 April 2004 in Case T-399/02 Eurocermex v OHIM (shape of a 
beer bottle) (under appeal, Case C-286/04 P); of 30 June 2004 in Case T-281/02 Norma Lebensmittelf
ilialbetrieb v OHIM (Mehr für Ihr Geld); of 8 July 2004 in Case T-289/02 Telepharmacy Solutions v OHIM 
– (TELEPHARMACY SOLUTIONS); of 8 July 2004 in Case T-270/02 MLP Finanzdienstleistungen v 
OHIM (bestpartner); of 20 July 2004 in Case T-311/02 Lissotschenko and Hentze v OHIM (LIMO); of 14 
September 2004 in Case T-183/03 Applied Molecular Evolution v OHIM (APPLIED MOLECULAR 
EVOLUTION); of 10 November 2004 in Case T-402/02 Storck v OHIM (shape of a sweet wrapper); of 
10 November 2004 in Case T-396/02 Storck v OHIM (shape of a sweet); of 23 November 2004 in Case 
T-360/03 Frischpack v OHIM (shape of a cheese box); of 30 November 2004 in Case T-173/03 Geddes 
v OHIM (NURSERYROOM), none yet published in the ECR.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Moreover, for the first time, the Court applied Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure in 
order to dismiss by order an action brought against a decision of a Board of Appeal, in 
which it was held that QUICK-GRIP was descriptive of clamps (DIY equipment), on the 
ground that it was manifestly lacking any foundation in law (order of 27 May 2004 in Case 
T-61/03 Irwin Industrial Tool v OHIM (QUICK GRIP), not yet published in the ECR).
Third, in Concept v OHIM (ECA), cited above, the Court reviewed whether the Board of 
Appeal had properly applied the absolute ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(h) 
of Regulation No 40/94. 44 In that case, the Court confirmed that registration of a figurative 
mark composed of a circle of stars of the same shape and size with five points one of 
which points upwards, surrounding, on a square background, the word element ‘ECA’, 
without specification of any of the colours, in respect of which registration was sought for, 
inter alia, record data carriers and the arranging and conducting of seminars, had to be 
refused. It found that such a mark is an imitation from a heraldic point of view of the 
European emblem within the meaning of Article 6 ter (1)(b) of the Paris Convention. It 
held, in addition, that the Board of Appeal had been right to find that registration of the 
mark sought was likely to give the public the impression that there is a connection 
between  the  mark  sought  and  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  European  Union  or  the 
European Community.
Fourth, since Article 7(3) of Regulation No 40/94 expressly provides that Article 7(1)(b) to 
(d) does not apply if the mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services 
for which registration is requested ‘in consequence of the use which has been made of it’, 
applicants do not neglect to rely on that provision before OHIM in support of their argument 
that the mark should be registered. The Court set out the circumstances in which such 
distinctiveness  may  be  regarded  as  established,  in  terms  of  both  the  procedural 
requirements and the necessary proof, in its judgments Eurocermex v OHIM (shape of a 
beer bottle) and Case T-396/02 Storck v OHIM (shape of a sweet) and Case T-402/02 
Storck v OHIM (shape a sweet wrapper), cited above. In the last of those judgments, the 
Court stated that the Boards of Appeal do not infringe the first clause of Article 74(1) of 
Regulation No 40/94 where they refrain from examining, of their own motion, all the facts 
on the basis of which it may be concluded that a mark has become distinctive as a result 
of use within the meaning of Article 7(3). Although, in contrast to what is stated at the end 
of Article 74(1) with regard to the relative grounds for refusal, there is no rule in the first 
clause of that provision requiring that the examination by OHIM (that is, by the examiner 
or the Board of Appeal, as the case may be) be limited to the facts pleaded by the parties, 
the Court found that, if the applicant for a mark does not plead distinctiveness acquired 
through use, OHIM is, in practical terms, unable to take account of the fact that the mark 
claimed may have become distinctive. Accordingly, under the principle that ‘no one is 
obliged to do the impossible’, OHIM is not bound to examine facts showing that the mark 
claimed  has  become  distinctive  through  use  within  the  meaning  of  Article  7(3)  of 
Regulation No 40/94 unless the applicant has pleaded them.
44  That provision states that ‘trade marks which have not been authorised by the competent authorities 
and are to be refused pursuant to Article 6 ter of the Paris Convention are not to be registered’.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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2.  Relative grounds for refusal of registration
In addition to the cases which were disposed of by order, including that ordering that 
there was no need to adjudicate where the opposition to the mark had been withdrawn 
(order  of  9  February  2004  in  Case  T-120/03  Synopharm  v  OHIM  –  Pentafarma 
(DERMAZYN), not yet published in the ECR), the Court gave 19 rulings by way of 
judgment. Fourteen of the judgments delivered upheld the decisions of the Boards of 
Appeal, 45 whilst the others annulled the contested decisions either for reasons of form 
and  procedure  46  or  because  the  Board  of  Appeal  had  infringed  Article  8(1)(b)  of 
Regulation No 40/94. 47
That provision states that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the 
mark applied for is not to be registered if, because of its identity with or similarity to the 
earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the 
two marks, there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in 
which the earlier trade mark is protected.
Having regard to the fact that the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, by 
reference to the perception by the relevant public and taking into account all the factors 
relevant to each case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the marks 
and the similarity of the goods or services, the Court confirmed, for example, that there was 
a likelihood of confusion between the word mark CONFORFLEX for bedroom furniture and 
the figurative marks FLEX previously registered in Spain for categories of goods including 
45  Judgments of 18 February 2004 in Case T-10/03 Koubi v OHIM – Flabesa (CONFORFLEX); of 
3 March 2004 in Case T-355/02 Mülhens v OHIM – Zirh International (ZIRH) (under appeal, Case 
C-206/04 P); of 31 March 2004 in Case T-20/02 Interquell v OHIM – SCA Nutrition (HAPPY DOG); of 
17 March 2004 in Joined Cases T-183/02 and T-184/02 El Corte Inglés v OHIM – González Cabello 
and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (MUNDICOR); of 28 April 2004 in Joined Cases T-124/02 and 
T-156/02 Sunrider v OHIM – Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann and Friesland Brands (VITATASTE and 
METABALANCE 44); of 22 June 2004 in Case T-66/03 ‘Drie Mollen sinds 1818’ v OHIM – Nabeiro 
Silveria  (Galáxia);  of  22  June  2004  in  Case  T-185/02  Ruiz-Picasso  and  Others  v  OHIM  – 
DaimlerChrysler (PICARO) (under appeal, Case C-361/04 P); of 30 June 2004 in Case T-186/02 BMI 
Bertollo v OHIM – Diesel (DIESELIT); of 6 July 2004 in Case T-117/02 Grupo El Prado Cervera v 
OHIM – Heirs of Mr Debuschewitz (CHUFAFIT); of 8 July 2004 in Case T-203/02 Sunrider v OHIM 
– Espadafor Caba (VITAFRUIT) (under appeal, Case C-416/04 P); of 13 July 2004 in Case T-115/02 
AVEX v OHIM – Ahlers (Image ‘a’); of 13 July 2004 in Case T-115/03 Samar v OHIM – Grotto (GAS 
STATION); of 16 September 2004 in Case T-342/02 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion v OHIM – Moser 
Grupo Media (Moser Grupo Media); of 6 October 2004 in Joined Cases T-117/03, T-118/03, T-119/03 
and T-171/03 New Look v OHIM – Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection), 
none yet published in the ECR.
46  Judgments of 30 June 2004 in Case T-107/02 GE Betz v OHIM – Atofina Chemicals (BIOMATE); of 
8 July 2004 in Case T-334/01 MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON); of 6 October 
2004 in Case T-356/02 Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann v OHIM – Krafft (VITAKRAFT) (under appeal, 
Case C-512/04 P); and of 10 November 2004 in Case T-164/02 Kaul v OHIM – Bayer (ARCOL), none 
yet published in the ECR.
47  Judgment of 30 June 2004 in Case T-317/01 M+M v OHIM – Mediametrie (M+M EUROdATA), not yet 
published in the ECR.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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bedroom furniture and, conversely, that there was no such likelihood between the word 
mark PICARO for vehicles and the earlier Community trade mark PICASSO for the same 
goods or between the word mark CHUFAFIT for processed and fresh nuts and two earlier 
national trade marks, namely the word mark CHUFI and a figurative mark containing the 
word CHUFI, for goods including those covered by the application for registration.
Moreover,  several  judgments  help  to  clarify  the  rules  governing  the  procedure  for 
examining an opposition laid down in Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94. More 
specifically, Article 43(2) provides that, if the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an 
earlier Community trade mark who has given notice of opposition is to furnish proof that, 
during the period of five years preceding the date of publication of the Community trade 
mark application, the earlier Community trade mark has been put to genuine use in the 
Community in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered 
and which he cites as justification for his opposition, or that there are proper reasons for 
non-use, provided that the earlier Community trade mark has at that date been registered 
for not less than five years. Article 43(3) provides for the application of paragraph 2 to 
earlier national trade marks by substituting use in the Member State in which the earlier 
national trade mark is protected for use in the Community.
It is apparent from the case-law that proof of genuine use may be requested only if five years 
have elapsed between the date of registration of the earlier mark and the date of publication 
of the application for registration of a Community trade mark (BMI Bertollo v OHIM – Diesel 
(DIESELIT), cited above) and that proof of genuine use need be adduced only in so far as 
the applicant has ‘expressly and timeously requested such proof before OHIM’ (El Corte 
Inglés v OHIM – González Cabello and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (MUNDICOR), cited 
above). In several decisions (MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON), Sunrider 
v OHIM – Espadafor Caba (VITAFRUIT) and Vitakraft-Werke Wührmann v OHIM – Krafft 
(VITAKRAFT)), the Court also clarified the definition of genuine use and the standard of proof 
which must be met by the opponent and reviewed the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the 
genuine nature of the use. With respect to such an assessment, the Court held, in Vitakraft-
Werke Wührmann v OHIM – Krafft (VITAKRAFT), that the Board of Appeal was wrong to find 
that proof of genuine use had been adduced because its reasoning was based on mere 
presumptions and therefore annulled the contested decision.
3.  Formal and procedural issues
Although the Court dealt with a relatively large number of formal and procedural issues, 
the limited nature of this account means that only some of them can be addressed. Four 
points have thus been chosen.
The first point concerns the admissibility or inadmissibility of certain forms of order. First 
of all, the question arose as to whether OHIM may seek a form of order other than 
dismissal of the action, given that OHIM is designated as the defendant before the Court 
in the Rules of Procedure. 48 According to the judgment in GE Betz v OHIM – Atofina 
Chemicals (BIOMATE), cited above, the answer is that it may. The Court accepted that 
OHIM could endorse the applicant’s claim for annulment of the decision of the Board of 
48  Article 133(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Appeal or simply leave the decision to the discretion of the Court. Referring to the 
principle  of  continuity  in  terms  of  their  functions  between  the  Board  of Appeal,  the 
examiner  and/or  the  competent  division  and  of  the  functional  independence  of  the 
Boards of Appeal and their members in carrying out their tasks, the Court took the view 
that it must be recognised that, while the Office does not have the requisite capacity to 
bring an action against a decision of a Board of Appeal, conversely it cannot be required 
to defend systematically every contested decision of a Board of Appeal or to claim 
automatically that every action challenging such a decision should be dismissed. 49
Moreover, the question also arose as to the admissibility of a claim for annulment of, in 
addition to the contested decision, the decision of the Opposition Division. It follows from 
the judgment in MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON), cited above, that 
such an application is admissible because it seeks to have the Court take the decision 
which, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal should lawfully have taken when 
hearing the appeal before OHIM. Since the Board of Appeal may annul the decision 
taken by the section of OHIM, such annulment is likewise one of the measures which 
may be taken by the Court in the exercise of its power to amend decisions, which is 
provided for in Article 63(3) of Regulation No 40/94.
The second point is that Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94, which provides that decisions 
of OHIM are to be based only on reasons on which the parties have had an opportunity 
to present their comments, is not regarded as having been infringed where the information 
not communicated served only to confirm the accuracy of a finding based on reasoning 
independent of that information (Fieldturf v OHIM (LOOKS LIKE GRASS... FEELS LIKE 
GRASS... PLAYS LIKE GRASS), cited above).
The third point relates to the application of Article 74 of Regulation No 40/94 by the Board 
of Appeal in proceedings concerning relative grounds for refusal of registration. The 
scope of that provision, which provides that, in such proceedings, the ‘examination [is 
restricted] to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief 
sought’, was clarified in the judgment in Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM – DaimlerChrysler 
(PICARO), cited above. 50
In that judgment, the Court observed that, as it had already held in Case T-308/01 Henkel 
v OHIM – LHS (UK) (KLEENCARE) [2003] ECR II-3253, under Article 74 of Regulation 
No 40/94, the Board of Appeal, when hearing an appeal against a decision terminating 
opposition proceedings, may base its decision only on the relative grounds for refusal which 
the party concerned has relied on and the related facts and evidence it has presented. 
However, it stated, for the first time, that the restriction of the factual basis of the examination 
by the Board of Appeal does not preclude it from taking into consideration, in addition to the 
facts expressly put forward by the parties to the opposition proceedings, facts which are well 
49  With respect to this issue, see also the judgment of 12 October 2004 in Case C-106/03 P Vedial v 
OHIM, not yet published in the ECR.
50  With respect to the inadmissibility before the Court of a document which was not produced during a 
procedure before OHIM relating to the relative grounds for refusal of registration and of which OHIM 
was therefore not required to take account of its own motion, see Samar v OHIM – Grotto (GAS 
STATION), cited above.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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known, that is, which are likely to be known by anyone or which may be learned from generally 
accessible sources. In that respect, it explained that the object of Article 74(1) in fine is to 
relieve OHIM of the task of investigating the facts itself in the context of proceedings between 
parties. That object is not compromised if OHIM takes well-known facts into account.
Finally,  as  a  fourth  point,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Court  offered  some  important 
clarifications with regard to the language requirements of the opposition procedure in GE 
Betz v OHIM – Atofina Chemicals (BIOMATE).
4.  Operational continuity of the departments of OHIM
It is appropriate to apply the case-law established in the ex parte cases 51 according to 
which there is continuity in terms of function between the examiner and the Board of 
Appeal to the relationship between the Opposition Division of OHIM ruling at first instance 
and the Boards of Appeal. Relying expressly on the approach adopted in Henkel v OHIM 
– LHS (UK) (KLEENCARE), cited above (commented on in the Annual Report 2003), the 
Court held in its judgment of 10 November 2004 in Kaul v OHIM – Bayer (ARCOL) that 
the Board of Appeal had erred in refusing to take account of the evidence intended to 
demonstrate that the earlier mark was highly distinctive, on the ground that that evidence 
had  not  been  produced  before  the  Opposition  Division.  In  light  of  the  principle  of 
operational continuity of the departments of OHIM, the Board of Appeal is bound to base 
its decision on all the factual and legal evidence that the party concerned has submitted 
either during the proceedings before the division ruling at first instance or, subject to 
compliance with the prescribed time-limits, 52 during the appeal proceedings. In the case 
at issue, the factual evidence had been produced in good time before the Board of 
Appeal so that it ought to have taken account of it. The failure to do so was penalised by 
annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal. 53
G.  Access to documents
Regulation No 1049/2001, 54 adopted pursuant to Article 255 EC, defines the principles, 
conditions and limits governing the right of access by the public to European Parliament, 
51  Case T-163/98 Procter & Gamble v OHIM (BABY-DRY) [1999] ECR II-2383, which was not set aside 
on that point in Case C-383/99 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM (BABY-DRY) [2001] ECR I-6251, and 
Case T-63/01 Procter & Gamble v OHIM (soap bar shape) [2002] ECR II-5255.
52  That is to say, subject to compliance with Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94, which provides: ‘The 
Office  may  disregard  facts  or  evidence  which  are  not  submitted  in  due  time  by  the  parties 
concerned’.
53  Although the position taken on the issue was less clear, the operational continuity of the departments 
of OHIM was referred to in other inter partes cases, namely in the judgments of 30 June 2004 in GE 
Betz v OHIM – Atofina Chemicals (BIOMATE) and of 8 July 2004 in MFE Marienfelde v OHIM – 
Vétoquinol (HIPOVITON).
54  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 
L 145, p. 43).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Council and Commission documents in such a way as to enable citizens to participate 
more closely in the decision-making process, guarantee that the administration enjoys 
greater  legitimacy  and  is  more  effective  and  more  accountable  to  the  citizen  in  a 
democratic  system  and  strengthen  the  principles  of  democracy  and  respect  for 
fundamental rights.
The refusal of access to documents by the Commission and the Council which gave rise 
to the judgments of 30 November 2004 in Case T-168/02 IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-
Fonds v Commission and of 23 November 2004 in Case T-84/03 Turco v Council, neither 
yet published in the ECR, gave the Court of First Instance an opportunity to define the 
scope of certain provisions of that regulation more clearly.
The regulation provides, first, that an institution which is asked to disclose a document 
originating from a third party is to consult the third party with a view to assessing whether 
one of the exceptions provided for by the regulation is applicable, unless it is clear that 
the document is or is not to be disclosed (Article 4(4)) and, second, that a Member State 
may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that Member 
State without its prior agreement (Article 4(5)).
As the Federal Republic of Germany had refused to agree to the disclosure to the 
applicant of certain documents originating from the German authorities, the Commission 
refused to disclose them to that applicant. On an application for annulment of the decision 
refusing access, the Court of First Instance upheld that decision in its judgment in IFAW 
Internationaler  Tierschutz-Fonds  v  Commission,  cited  above.  Pointing  out  that  the 
Member States are in a different position from that of other third parties, the Court of First 
Instance observed that a Member State has the power to request an institution not to 
disclose a document originating from it and the institution is obliged not to disclose it 
without its ‘prior agreement’. That obligation imposed on the institution to obtain the 
Member  State’s  prior  agreement,  which  is  clearly  laid  down  in  Article  4(5)  of  the 
Regulation, would risk becoming a dead letter if the Commission were able to decide to 
disclose that document despite an explicit request not to do so from the Member State 
concerned.  Thus,  contrary  to  what  the  applicant  argued,  with  the  support  of  three 
Member States, where a request is made by a Member State under that provision, the 
institution is obliged not to disclose the document in question.
In Turco v Council, the issue was the Council’s refusal to disclose to the applicant an 
opinion of the Council’s legal service on a proposal for a Council Directive laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States. The 
Council had relied on Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, which provides that the 
institutions are to refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the 
protection of, inter alia, court proceedings and legal advice unless there is an overriding 
public interest in disclosure.
The Court of First Instance held in favour of the Council, which was supported in those 
proceedings by the United Kingdom and the Commission. It held that, contrary to the 
argument of the applicant, the words ‘legal advice’ must be understood as meaning that 
the  protection  of  the  public  interest  may  preclude  the  disclosure  of  the  contents  of 
documents drawn up by the Council’s legal service in the context of court proceedings Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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but also for any other purpose. It pointed out, citing the judgment in Case T-92/98 
Interporc v Commission [1999] ECR II-3521 (see the Annual Report 1999), that legal 
advice  drawn  up  in  the  context  of  court  proceedings  was  already  covered  by  the 
exception relating to the protection of such proceedings.
As exceptions to the right of access to the institutions’ documents under Regulation 
No 1049/2001 must be interpreted and applied strictly, the Court of First Instance held 
that the fact that the document in question is a legal opinion cannot, of itself, justify 
application of the exception relied upon. However, since, first, the Council made no error 
of  assessment  in  considering  that  the  disclosure  of  such  advice  could  give  rise  to 
lingering doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative act in question and there was, 
therefore, an interest in the protection of that opinion and, second, the applicant has not 
cited any matter of public interest liable to justify the disclosure of such a document, the 
Court of First Instance dismissed the action in its entirety.
H.  Community staff cases
The hundred or so decisions giving rulings in disputes between officials and staff of the 
institutions of the Community, on the one hand, and those institutions, on the other, tackle 
many different legal situations, and since this section is necessarily a summary, it can give an 
account of only some of them. In brief, those actions sought to contest the legality of:
–  decisions not to promote (judgments of 21 January 2004 in Case T-97/02 Mavridis v 
Commission, of 2 March 2004 in Case T-197/02 Caravelis v Parliament, of 17 March 
2004 in Case T-175/02 Lebedef v Commission and Case T-4/03 Lebedef v Commission, 
of 10 June 2004 in Case T-330/03 Liakoura v Council and of 28 September 2004 in 
Case T-216/03 Tenreiro v Commission, none yet published in the ECR);
–  decisions taken in the course of appointment procedures (judgments of 21 January 
2004 in Case T-328/01 Robinson v Parliament, of 2 March 2004 in Case T-234/02 
Michael v Commission, of 23 March 2004 in Case T-310/02 Theodorakis v Conseil 
and of 31 March 2004 in Case T-10/02 Girardot v Commission, none yet published in 
the ECR). In this connection it must also be noted that the judgment of 9 November 
2004 in Case T-116/03 Montalto v Council, not yet published in the ECR, annuls the 
decision of the Council of 23 May 2002 appointing an additional Chairman of a Board 
of Appeal, also President of the Appeals Department of the OHIM;
–  decisions no longer to engage conference interpreters over the age of 65 (judgments 
of 10 June 2004 in Joined Cases T-153/01 and T-323/01 Alvarez Moreno v Commission 
(under appeal, Case C-373/04 P), in Case T-275/01 Alvarez Moreno v Parliament and 
in Case T-276/01 Garroni v Parliament, none yet published in the ECR);
–  decisions taken by competition selection boards not to admit candidates to tests 
(judgments  of  20  January  2004  in  Case  T-195/02  Briganti  v  Commission,  of 
19 February 2004 in Case T-19/03 Konstantopoulou v Court of Justice, of 25 March 
2004 in Case T-145/02 Petrich v Commission, of 21 October 2004 in Case T-49/03 
Schumann  v  Commission,  of  26  October  2004  in  Case  T-207/02  Falcone  v 
Commission and of 28 October 2004 in Joined Cases T-219/02 and T-337/02 Lutz 
Herrera v Commission, none yet published in the ECR), awarding a number of marks Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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such that the applicant was excluded (judgment of 9 November 2004 in Joined Cases 
T-285/02 and T-395/02 Vega Rodríguez v Commission, not yet published in the ECR), 
or refusing to include the applicant on a reserve list (judgments of 28 April 2004 in 
Case T-277/02 Pascall v Council and of 10 November 2004 in Case T-165/03 Vonier 
v Commission, neither yet published in the ECR);
–  decisions taken in the course of disciplinary procedures (judgment of 16 December 
2004 in Joined Cases T-120/01 and T-300/01 De Nicola v EIB, not yet published in the 
ECR), or imposing disciplinary sanctions (judgments of 16 March 2004 in Case T-11/
03 Afari v European Central Bank, of 1 April 2004 in Case T-198/02 N v Commission, 
and of 10 June 2004 in Case T-307/01 Eveillard v Commission and in Case T-307/01 
François v Commission, none yet published in the ECR).
Other judgments rule on claims for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of 
delay in drawing up staff reports (judgments of 6 July 2004 in Case T-281/01 Huygens v 
Commission  and  of  30  September  2004  in  Case  T-16/03  Ferrer  de  Moncada  v 
Commission, neither yet published in the ECR), or as a result of an occupational disease 
of  an  official  (judgments  of  3  March  2004  in  Case  T-48/01  Vainker  and  Vainker  v 
Parliament and of 14 October 2004 in Case T-256/02 I v Court of Justice and in Case 
T-389/02 Sandini v Court of Justice, none yet published in the ECR). Also of interest are 
the judgments of 5 October 2004 in Case T-45/01 Sanders and Others v Commission 
and in Case T-144/02 Eagle v Commission, neither yet published in the ECR, which 
order the defendant institution to pay damages for the loss sustained by the applicants 
as  a  result  of  the  fact  that  they  were  not  recruited  as  temporary  servants  of  the 
Communities  during  the  time  they  worked  at  the  Joint  European  Tours  (JET)  Joint 
Undertaking.
II.  Actions for damages 55
For the Community to incur non-contractual liability for an unlawful act, three conditions 
must  be  fulfilled:  the  conduct  alleged  against  the  Community  institutions  must  be 
unlawful, there must be actual damage and there must be a causal link between that 
conduct and that damage.
The concurrence of those three conditions allowing the non-contractual liability of the 
Community to be incurred was regarded as established by the Court in its interlocutory 
judgment of 23 November 2004 in Case T-166/98 Cantina sociale di Dolianova and 
Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR. As one or more of those conditions 
were not met in the other actions for damages, the Court of First Instance dismissed all 
the other actions brought under Article 288 EC.
As regards the condition that the conduct alleged against the Community institutions 
should be unlawful, it was recalled in the judgment of 10 February 2004 in Joined Cases 
T-64/01 and T-65/01 Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie and Internationale Fruchtimport 
Gesellschaft Weichert & Co. v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, and in Cantina 
sociale di Dolianova and Others v Commission, cited above, that the case-law requires 
that a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals 
55  Excluding Community staff cases.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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must be established (judgment in Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission 
[2000] ECR I-5291). As regards the requirement that the breach must be sufficiently 
serious, the decisive test for finding that there has been such a breach is whether the 
Member State or the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits on its discretion. Where the Member State or the institution in question has only 
considerably reduced discretion, or even no discretion at all, the mere infringement of 
Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious 
breach.
The expression ‘rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals’ has been analysed on 
several occasions by the Court of First Instance. For instance, it has been held that the 
aim of the rules applicable to the system of the division of powers between the various 
Community institutions is to ensure that the balance between the institutions provided for 
in  the Treaty  is  maintained  and  not  to  confer  rights  on  individuals. Accordingly,  any 
unlawful delegation of the Council’s powers to the Commission is not such as to engage 
the Community’s liability (judgment in Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie and Internationale 
Fruchtimport Gesellschaft Weichert & Co. v Commission, cited above). It has also been 
held,  by  reference  to  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  that  infringement  of  the 
obligation to state reasons is not such as to give rise to the liability of the Community 
(judgment in Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie and Internationale Fruchtimport Gesellschaft 
Weichert & Co. v Commission and judgment of 25 May 2004 in Case T-154/01 Distilleria 
F. Palma v Commission, not yet published in the ECR).
On  the  other  hand,  in  its  judgment  in  Cantina  sociale  di  Dolianova  and  Others  v 
Commission, the Court of First Instance held that the prohibition on unjust enrichment 
and the principle of non-discrimination were intended to confer rights on individuals. The 
breach by the Commission of those principles was held to be sufficiently serious, a 
conclusion which the Court of First Instance did not reach with regard to any of the other 
actions for damages in which it ruled in 2004.
Further, in Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie and Internationale Fruchtimport Gesellschaft 
Weichert & Co. v Commission, the Court of First Instance outlined the conditions which 
would give rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community in the event of the 
principle of such liability as a result of a lawful act being recognised in Community law 
(see, on that subject, the 2001, 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports). Citing its previous 
decisions, it thus considered that those three conditions would have to be met, namely 
the reality of the damage allegedly suffered, the causal link between it and the act on the 
part of the Community institutions, and the unusual and special nature of that damage, it 
being specified that damage is ‘special’ when it affects a particular class of economic 
operators in a disproportionate manner by comparison with other operators, and ‘unusual’ 
when it exceeds the limits of the economic risks inherent in operating in the sector 
concerned, the legislative measure that gave rise to the damage pleaded not being 
justified by a general economic interest. In that case, the Court of First Instance held that 
damage of that sort was manifestly not established.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Finally, the order of 7 June 2004 in Case T-338/02 Segi and Others v Council, not yet 
published in the ECR (under appeal, Case C-355/04 P) 56 is interesting and important. By 
their action, the applicants seek compensation for damage suffered as a result of their 
being included in the list annexed to Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 
December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, 57 updated 
by Common Positions 2002/340 and 2002/462.  58 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 
was adopted on the basis of Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union under Title V: 
‘Provisions on a common foreign and security policy’ (CFSP), and Article 34 of the Treaty 
on European Union under Title VI: ‘Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters’ (together called justice and home affairs (JHA)).
Holding that the provision 59 of the Common Position which affects the applicants entails 
no measure coming under the CFSP and that, therefore, Article 34 of the Treaty on 
European Union is the only relevant legal basis as regards the measures which, it is 
claimed, give rise to the alleged damage, the Court of First Instance declared that it was 
clear that it had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the action for damages since the 
only remedies provided for under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union are a reference 
for a preliminary ruling, an action for annulment and a ruling in disputes between Member 
States and, therefore, there is no provision for an action for damages under Title VI. The 
Court of First Instance points out that the fact that the applicants ‘probably have no 
effective judicial remedy’ cannot of itself found a claim to Community jurisdiction proper 
in a legal system based on the principle of specific jurisdiction.
As regards the applicants’ claim for damages, in so far as it seeks a finding that the 
Council, acting in the area of JHA, has encroached on the jurisdiction of the Community, 
the Court of First Instance declared that it had jurisdiction but held that the claim manifestly 
lacked any foundation in law, since the relevant legal basis for the adoption of the provision 
giving rise to damage was actually Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union.
III.  Applications for interim relief
The number of applications for interim relief submitted in 2004 was lower than for the 
previous year, since 26 were registered, compared with 39 in 2003. Contrary to what had 
been observed in 2002, the fall in the number of applications for interim relief was not 
offset by a large number of applications for expedited procedures in the main proceedings, 
since, as indicated previously, only 13 applications for expedited procedure were lodged.
56  See also the order of the same date in Case T-333/02 Gestoras Pro-Amnistía and Others v Council, 
not yet published in the ECR; under appeal, Case C-354/04 P.
57  OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93.
58  Common Positions 2002/340/CFSP and 2002/462/CFSP adopted by the Council pursuant to Articles 
15 and 34 of the Treaty on European Union of 2 May and 17 June 2002 respectively (OJ 2002 L 116, 
p. 75, and OJ 2002 L 160, p. 32).
59  Namely, Article 4, according to which the Member States are, through police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters within the framework of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, to afford each 
other the widest possible assistance in preventing and combating terrorist acts.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The President of the Court of First Instance, in his capacity as judge responsible for 
granting interim relief, completed 34 interim relief cases. Apart from cases in which 
provisional measures were ordered for a limited period (orders of 21 January 2004 in 
Case T-217/03 R FNCBV v Commission and Case T-245/03 R FNSEA and Others v 
Commission and of 12 May 2004 in Case T-198/01 R III Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau 
v Commission, none yet published in the ECR) and the cases in which suspension of 
operation pending final judgment was granted, the applications with which the President 
dealt in 2004 were dismissed, in particular the application by the Autonomous Region of 
the Azores for suspension of the new fisheries rules applicable to Azorean waters (order 
of 8 July 2004 in Case T-37/04 R Região autónoma dos Açores v Council, not yet 
published in the ECR) and the application by Microsoft.
In the latter case, the President of the Court of First Instance, by order of 22 December 
2004 in Case T-201/04 R Microsoft v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the 
President of the Court of First Instance found that the evidence adduced by Microsoft 
was not sufficient to show that the immediate enforcement of the remedies imposed by 
the Commission might cause Microsoft serious and irreparable damage.
That case originated in the Commission’s decision of 24 March 2004  60 finding that 
Microsoft had infringed Article 82 EC by abusing its dominant position by engaging in 
two  distinct  types  of  conduct.  The  Commission  also  fined  Microsoft  more  than 
EUR 497 million.
The first type of conduct concerned Microsoft’s refusal to provide its competitors with 
certain ‘interoperability information’ and to authorise its use in the development and 
distribution  of  products  competing  with  its  own  products  on  the  work  group  server 
operating system market during the period October 1998 to the date of adoption of the 
decision.  By  way  of  remedy,  the  Commission  ordered  Microsoft  to  disclose  the 
‘specifications’ for its client-to-server and server-to-server communications protocols to 
any undertaking wishing to develop and distribute work group server operating systems. 
The specifications describe certain characteristics of a program and must therefore be 
distinguished from the program’s ‘source code’, which designates the software code 
actually run by the computer.
The second type of conduct sanctioned by the Commission was the tying of Windows 
Media Player with the Windows operating system. The Commission considered that that 
practice  affected  competition  on  the  media  reader  market.  By  way  of  remedy,  the 
Commission ordered Microsoft to offer for sale a version of Windows without Windows 
Media Player. Microsoft none the less retains the possibility to market Windows with 
Windows Media Player.
On 7 June 2004, Microsoft brought an action before the Court of First Instance for 
annulment of the Commission’s decision (Case T-201/04). On 25 June 2004, Microsoft 
sought suspension of operation of the remedies imposed by that decision. Following the 
lodging of that application, the Commission stated that it did not intend to enforce the 
remedies until a decision had been reached on the application for suspension.
60  Commission Decision C(2004) 900 final of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 
of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-37.792 Microsoft).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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In his order of 22 December 2004, the President of the Court of First Instance, after 
examining the circumstances of the case, held that Microsoft had not shown that it might 
suffer serious and irreparable damage if the contested decision should be enforced.
As regards the refusal to provide the interoperability information, the President considered 
that the main action raised a number of questions of principle relating to the conditions 
in which the Commission is justified in concluding that a refusal to disclose information 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 82 EC. Emphasising that 
it is solely for the court dealing with the substance of the application to answer those 
questions, the President of the Court of First Instance concluded that the application for 
annulment lodged by Microsoft was not at first sight unfounded and that the prima facie 
requirement (which entails an assessment of whether the main action is prima facie well 
founded) was therefore satisfied.
However, the President of the Court of First Instance held that the condition relating to 
urgency was not satisfied, since Microsoft had not adduced evidence that disclosure of 
the information thus far kept secret would cause serious and irreparable harm. Following 
a factual examination of the actual consequences of disclosure as alleged by Microsoft, 
the President found, in particular, that disclosure of information thus far kept secret does 
not necessarily entail serious harm and that, regard being had to the circumstances of 
the  case,  such  damage  had  not  been  demonstrated  in  the  present  case.  Nor  had 
Microsoft demonstrated, first, that the use of the disclosed information by its competitors 
would have the effect of placing the information in the public domain; second, that the 
fact that the competing products would remain in distribution channels after annulment 
of the decision would constitute serious and irreparable damage; third, that Microsoft’s 
competitors would be able to ‘clone’ its products; fourth, that Microsoft would have to 
make a fundamental change to its business policy; and, fifth, that the decision would 
cause an irreversible development on the market.
As regards the tying of Windows and Windows Media Player, the President considered, 
first of all, that certain of Microsoft’s arguments raised complex issues, such as that of 
the anti-competitive effect of the tying resulting from ‘indirect network effects’, which it 
was for the Court of First Instance to resolve in the main action. The President concluded 
that the prima facie requirement was satisfied and then considered whether the requested 
suspension must be ordered as a matter of urgency. On the basis of a factual analysis of 
the alleged damage, the President held that Microsoft had not demonstrated in concrete 
terms that it might suffer serious and irreparable damage owing to interference with its 
commercial freedom or harm to its reputation.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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(CCBE) 1985-86; Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law, University College 
Dublin; Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; President of the 
Royal Zoological Society of Ireland 1987-90; Bencher of the Honorable 
Society  of  Kings  Inns,  Dublin;  Honorary  Bencher  of  Lincoln’s  Inn, 
London; Judge at the Court of First Instance since 10 January 1996.Members  Court of First Instance
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Marc Jaeger
Born  1954;  lawyer;  attaché  de  justice,  delegated  to  the  Public 
Attorney’s Office; Judge, Vice-President of the Luxembourg District 
Court; teacher at the Centre universitaire de Luxembourg (Luxembourg 
University Centre); member of the judiciary on secondment, Legal 
Secretary at the Court of Justice from 1986; Judge at the Court of First 
Instance since 11 July 1996.
Jörg Pirrung
Born 1940; academic assistant at the University of Marburg; Doctor of 
Laws  (University  of  Marburg);  adviser,  subsequently  head  of  the 
section for private international law and, finally, head of a subdivision 
for civil law in the German Federal Ministry of Justice; member of the 
Governing Council of Unidroit (1993-98); chairman of the commission 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to draw up the 
Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  children  (1996);  honorary 
professor  at  the  University  of  Trier  (private  international  law, 
international procedural law, European law); member of the Scientific 
Advisory Board of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and 
Private International Law in Hamburg since 2002; Judge at the Court 
of First Instance since 11 June 1997.
Paolo Mengozzi
Born 1938; Professor of International Law and holder of the Jean 
Monnet  Chair  of  European  Community  law  at  the  University  of 
Bologna; Doctor honoris causa of the Carlos III University, Madrid; 
visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins University (Bologna Center), 
the  Universities  of  St.  Johns  (New  York),  Georgetown,  Paris-II, 
Georgia  (Athens)  and  the  Institut  universitaire  international 
(Luxembourg);  co-ordinator  of  the  European  Business  Law  Pallas 
Program of the University of Nijmegen; member of the consultative 
committee of the Commission of the European Communities on public 
procurement; Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry during 
the Italian tenure of the Presidency of the Council; member of the 
working  group  of  the  European  Community  on  the  World  Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and director of the 1997 session of The Hague 
Academy of International Law research centre devoted to the WTO; 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 4 March 1998.Members  Court of First Instance
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Arjen W.H. Meij
Born 1944; Justice at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (1996); 
Judge  and  Vice-President  at  the  College  van  Beroep  voor  het 
Bedrijfsleven  (Administrative  Court  for Trade  and  Industry)  (1986); 
Judge  Substitute  at  the  Court  of  Appeal  for  Social  Security,  and 
Substitute  Member  of  the  Administrative  Court  for  Customs  Tariff 
Matters;  Legal  Secretary  at  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities (1980); Lecturer in European Law in the Law Faculty of 
the University of Groningen and Research Assistant at the University 
of Michigan Law School; Staff Member of the International Secretariat 
of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce (1970); Judge at the Court 
of First Instance since 17 September 1998.
Mihalis Vilaras
Born 1950; lawyer (1974-80); national expert with the Legal Service of 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  then  Principal 
Administrator  in  Directorate  General  V  (Employment,  Industrial 
Relations, Social Affairs); Junior Officer, Junior Member and, since 
1999, Member of the Greek Council of State; Associate Member of the 
Superior Special Court of Greece; Member of the Central Legislative 
Drafting Committee of Greece (1996-98); Director of the Legal Service 
in the General Secretariat of the Greek Government; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since 17 September 1998.
Nicholas James Forwood
Born  1948;  Cambridge  University  BA  1969,  MA  1973  (Mechanical 
Sciences  and  Law);  called  to  the  English  Bar  in  1970,  thereafter 
practising in London (1971-99) and also in Brussels (1979-99); called to 
the Irish Bar in 1981; appointed Queen’s Counsel 1987; Bencher of the 
Middle Temple 1998; representative of the Bar of England and Wales at 
the  Council  of  the  Bars  and  Law  Societies  of  the  EU  (CCBE)  and 
Chairman of the CCBE’s Permanent Delegation to the European Court 
of Justice (1995-99); Governing Board member of the World Trade Law 
Association  and  European  Maritime  Law  Organisation  (1993-2002); 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 15 December 1999.Members  Court of First Instance
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Hubert Legal
Born 1954; Maître des Requêtes at the French Conseil d’État from 
1991 onwards; graduate of the École normale supérieure de Saint-
Cloud and of the École nationale d’administration; Associate Professor 
of English (1979-85); rapporteur and subsequently Commissaire du 
Gouvernement  in  proceedings  before  the  judicial  sections  of  the 
Conseil d’État (1988-93): legal adviser in the Permanent Representation 
of the French Republic to the United Nations in New York (1993-97); 
Legal Secretary in the Chambers of Judge Puissochet at the Court of 
Justice (1997-2001); Judge at the Court of First Instance since 19 
September 2001.
Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro
Born 1956; studied in Lisbon, Brussels and Strasbourg; Member of 
the  Bar  in  Portugal  and  Brussels;  independent  researcher  at  the 
Institut  d’études  européennes  de  l’université  libre  de  Bruxelles 
(Institute  of  European  Studies,  Free  University  of  Brussels);  Legal 
Secretary to the Portuguese Judge at the Court of Justice, Mr Moitinho 
de Almeida (1986-2000), then to the President of the Court of First 
Instance, Mr Vesterdorf (2000-03); Judge at the Court of First Instance 
since 1 April 2003.
Franklin Dehousse
Born 1959; Law degree (University of Liege, 1981); research fellow 
(Fonds  national  de  la  recherche  scientifique);  legal  advisor  to  the 
Chamber of Representatives; Doctor in Laws (University of Strasbourg, 
1990);  Professor  (Universities  of  Liege  and  Strasbourg;  College  of 
Europe; Institut royal supérieur de Défense; Université de Montesquieu, 
Bordeaux; Collège Michel Servet of the Universities of Paris; Faculties 
of  Notre-Dame  de  la  Paix,  Namur);  Special  Representative  of  the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Director of European Studies of the Royal 
Institute of International Relations; assesseur at the Council of State; 
consultant  to  the  European  Commission;  member  of  the  Internet 
Observatory; chief editor of Studia Diplomatica; Judge at the Court of 
First Instance since 7 October 2003.Members  Court of First Instance
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Ena Cremona
Born 1936; Bachelors Degree (BA) in languages, Royal University of 
Malta (1955); Doctor of Laws (LLD) of the Royal University of Malta 
(1958); practising at the Malta Bar from 1959; Legal Adviser to the 
National Council of Women (1964-79); Member of the Public Service 
Commission (1987-89); Board Member at Lombard Bank (Malta) Ltd, 
representing the Government shareholding (1987-93); Member of the 
Electoral Commission since 1993; examiner for doctoral theses at the 
Royal  University  of  Malta;  Member  of  the  European  Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2003-04); Judge at the Court 
of First Instance since 12 May 2004.
Ottó Czúcz
Born  1946;  Doctor  of  Laws  of  the  University  of  Szeged  (1971); 
administrator at the Ministry of Labour (1971-74); lecturer (1974-89), 
Dean of the Faculty of Law (1989-90), Vice-Rector (1992-97) of the 
University  of  Szeged;  Lawyer;  Member  of  the  Presidium  of  the 
National  Retirement  Insurance  Scheme;  Vice-President  of  the 
European  Institute  of  Social  Security  (1998-2002);  Member  of  the 
scientific  council  of  the  International  Social  Security  Association 
(1998-2004); Judge at the Constitutional Court (1998-2004); Judge at 
the Court of First Instance since 12 May 2004.
Irena Wiszniewska-Bialecka
Born 1947; Magister Juris, University of Warsaw (1965-69); researcher 
at  the  Institute  of  Legal  Sciences,  assistant,  associate  professor, 
professor at the Academy of Sciences (1969-2004); researcher at the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright 
and Competition Law, Munich (1985-86); Lawyer (1992-2000); Judge 
at the Supreme Administrative Court (2001-04); Judge at the Court of 
First Instance since 12 May 2004.Members  Court of First Instance
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Irena Pelikánová
Born 1949; Doctor of Laws, assistant in economic law (before 1989), 
Dr Sc, Professor of business law (since 1993) at the Faculty of Law, 
Charles University, Prague; Member of the Executive of the Securities 
Commission (1999-2002); Lawyer; Member of the Legislative Council 
of the Government of the Czech Republic (1998-2004); Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since 12 May 2004.
Daniel Šváby
Born 1951; Doctor of Laws (University of Bratislava); Judge at District 
Court, Bratislava; Judge, Appeal Court, responsible for civil law cases, 
and Vice-President, Appeal Court, Bratislava; member of the civil and 
family law section at the Ministry of Justice Law Institute; acting Judge 
responsible for commercial law cases at the Supreme Court; Member 
of the European Commission of Human Rights (Strasbourg); Judge at 
the Constitutional Court (2000-04); Judge at the Court of First Instance 
since 12 May 2004.
Vilenas Vadapalas
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws of the University of Moscow; Doctor habil. 
in law, University of Warsaw; Professor at the University of Vilnius: 
international law (since 1981), human rights law (since 1991) and 
Community law (since 2000); Director-General of the Government’s 
European  Law  Department;  Professor  of  European  law  at  the 
University of Vilnius, holder of the Jean Monnet Chair; President of the 
Lithuanian  European  Union  Studies  Association;  Chairman  of  the 
Parliamentary  working  group  on  constitutional  reform  relating  to 
Lithuanian  accession;  Member  of  the  International  Commission  of 
Jurists  (April  2003);  former  expert  to  the  Council  of  Europe  on 
questions relating to the compatibility of national legislation with the 
European  Human  Rights  Convention;  Judge  at  the  Court  of  First 
Instance since 12 May 2004.Members  Court of First Instance
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Küllike Jürimäe
Born 1962; degree in law, University of Tartu (1981-86); Assistant to 
the Public Prosecutor, Tallinn (1986-91); diploma, Estonian School of 
Diplomacy (1991-92); Legal Adviser (1991-93) and General Counsel 
at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992-93); Judge, Tallinn 
Court of Appeal (1993-2004); European Masters in human rights and 
democratisation,  Universities  of  Padua  and  Nottingham  (2002-03); 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 12 May 2004.
Ingrida Labucka
Born 1963; Diploma in law, University of Latvia (1986); investigator at 
the Interior Ministry for the Kirov Region and the City of Riga (1986-
89); Judge, Riga District Court (1990-94); Lawyer (1994-98 and July 
1999 to May 2000); Minister for Justice (November 1998 to July 1999 
and May 2000 to October 2002); Member of the International Court of 
Arbitration in the Hague (2001-04); Member of Parliament (2002-04); 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 12 May 2004.
Savvas S. Papasavvas
Born 1969; studies at the University of Athens (graduated in 1991); 
DEA  in  public  law,  University  of  Paris  II  (1992)  and  PhD  in  law, 
University  of Aix-Marseille  III  (1995);  admitted  to  the  Cyprus  Bar, 
Member of the Nicosia Bar since 1993; Lecturer, University of Cyprus 
(1997-02),  Lecturer  in  Constitutional  Law  since  September  2002; 
Researcher, European Public Law Centre (2001-02); Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since 12 May 2004.Members  Court of First Instance
136
Court of First Instance  Members
137
Verica Trstenjak
Born  1962;  Doctor  of  Laws  of  the  University  of  Ljubljana  (1995); 
professor (since 1996) of theory of law and State (jurisprudence) and of 
private law; researcher; postgraduate study at the Universities of Zurich 
and Vienna (Institute of Comparative Law), the Max Planck Institute for 
private international law in Hamburg, the Free University of Amsterdam; 
visiting professor at the Universities of Vienna and Freiburg (Germany) 
and at the Bucerius School of Law in Hamburg; head of the legal service 
(1994-96) and State Secretary in the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(1996-2000); Secretary-General of the Government (2000); Member of 
the Study Group on a European Civil Code since 2003; Prize of the 
Association of Slovene Lawyers ‘Lawyer of the Year 2003’; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since 7 July 2004.
Hans Jung
Born  1944;  Assistant,  and  subsequently  Assistant  Lecturer  at  the 
Faculty of Law (Berlin); Rechtsanwalt (Frankfurt am Main); Lawyer-
linguist at the Court of Justice; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice in 
the Chambers of the President, Mr Kutscher, and subsequently in the 
Chambers  of  the  German  judge;  Deputy  Registrar  at  the  Court  of 
Justice; Registrar of the Court of First Instance since 10 October 1989.138
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2.  Changes in the composition of the Court of First Instance in 2004
As a consequence of the enlargement of the European Union, ten new Judges entered 
into office. On 12 May, Ms Ena Cremona, a Maltese national, Mr Ottó Czúcz, a Hungarian 
national, Ms Irena Wiszniewska-Bialecka, a Polish national, Ms Irena Pelikánová, a 
Czech national, Mr Daniel Šváby, a Slovak national, Mr Vilenas Vadapalas, a Lithuanian 
national,  Ms  Küllike  Jürimäe,  an  Estonian  national,  Ms  Ingrida  Labucka,  a  Latvian 
national, and Mr Savvas S. Papasavvas, a Cypriot national, entered into office. On 7July, 
Ms Verica Trstenjak, a Slovene national, entered into office.140
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3.  Order of precedence
from 1 January to 11 May 2004
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
P. Lindh, President of Chamber
J. Azizi, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, President of Chamber
H. Legal, President of Chamber








M.E. Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro, Judge
F. Dehousse, Judge
H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 12 May to 6 July 2004
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
P. Lindh, President of Chamber
J. Azizi, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, President of Chamber
H. Legal, President of Chamber



















H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 7 July to 9 September 2004
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
P. Lindh, President of Chamber
J. Azizi, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, President of Chamber
H. Legal, President of Chamber




















H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 10 September to 31 December 2004
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
M. Jaeger, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, President of Chamber
M. Vilaras, President of Chamber
H. Legal, President of Chamber
J.D. Cooke, President of Chamber



















H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of precedence  Court of First Instance
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4.  Former Members of the Court of First Instance
José Luis da Cruz Vilaça (1989-1995), President from 1989 to 1995
Donal Patrick Michael Barrington (1989-1996)
Antonio Saggio (1989-1998), President from 1995 to 1998
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (1989-1992)
Heinrich Kirschner (1989-1997)
Christos Yeraris (1989-1992)
Romain Alphonse Schintgen (1989-1996)
Cornelis Paulus Briët (1989-1998)
Jacques Biancarelli (1989-1995)
Koen Lenaerts (1989-2003)
Christopher William Bellamy (1992-1999)
Andreas Kalogeropoulos (1992-1998)
André Potocki (1995-2001)
Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos (1995-2003)
Presidents
José Luis da Cruz Vilaça (1989-1995)
Antonio Saggio (1995-1998)146 147146 147
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A  —    Official visits and functions at the Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance in 2004
12 January  Delegation of senior judges from the Russian Federation
19 January  HE Roland Lohkamp, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
19 January  Mr Ivan Bizjak, Minister for Justice of Slovenia
2 February  HE  Georges  Santer,  Ambassador,  Secretary-General  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Foreign  Trade,  Cooperation  and 
Defence in Luxembourg
2 and 3 February  Mr W.E. Haak, President of the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands) and Mr W.J.M. Davids, Vice-
President of the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden
3 February  Delegation from the European Committee of the Sejm, and the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the 
Senate, of the Republic of Poland
6 February  HE Claus Grube, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the 
European Union in Brussels
16 February  HE Pavel Telic ˇka, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Czech 
Republic to the European Union
19 February  HE Gordon Wetherell,  Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
of the United Kingdom to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
4 March  HE Miroslav Adamiš, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 
Head of Mission of the Republic of Slovakia to the European Union 
in Brussels
15 March  Mr Jerzy Makarczyk, Republic of Poland
15 March  Mr Joachim Becker, President of the Association of European 
Administrative Judges, accompanied by Mr Francesco Mariuzzo, 
Mr Pierre Vincent and Mr Erwin Ziermann, Vice-Presidents
17 March  HE  Mustafa  Oguz  Demiralp,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Delegate of Turkey to the European 
Union in Brussels
18 March  HE Walter Hagg, Ambassador of Austria to the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg
18 March  Professor Jir ˇí Malenovský, Czech Republic
19 March  Ms Irena Pelikánová, Czech Republic
22 and 23 March  Ms Küllike Jürimäe, Republic of EstoniaOfficial visits  Meetings and visits
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22 March  Delegation  from  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  (Federal 
Constitutional Court, Germany)
24 March  HE Agneta  Söderman, Ambassador  of  Sweden  to  the  Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg
25 March  Mr Ottó Czúcz, Republic of Hungary
25 March  Mr Daniel Šváby, Republic of Slovakia
26 March  Mr Savvas S. Papasavvas, Republic of Cyprus
29 March  Mr Vilenas Vadapalas, Republic of Lithuania
29 and 30 March  Delegation  of  Netherlands  judges,  being  ‘coordinators  for 
questions of Community law’
29 and 30 March  Information  days  for  the  prospective  Judges  of  the  Court  of 
Justice
31 March  Ms Irena Wiszniewska-Bialecka, Republic of Poland
1 April  HE  Rui  Alfredo  de  Vasconcelos  Félix-Alves,  Ambassador  of 
Portugal to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
5 April  HE Ricardo Zalacain, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
23 April  Delegation of Members of the Australian Parliament
26 April  Forum of western Europe environmental judges
26 April  HE Rocco Antonió Cangelosi, Permanent Representative of Italy 
to the European Union
26 April  Ms Ena Cremona, Republic of Malta
27 April  Ms Ingrida Labucka, Republic of Latvia
25 May  Ms Verica Trstenjak, Republic of Slovenia
8 June  Ms Brigitte Zypries, Minister for Justice of the Federal Republic of 
Germany
15 June  Mr Mircea Geóana, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, Mr 
Alexandru Farcas, Minister for European Integration of Romania, 
HE Lazar Comanescu, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Romania 
to the European Union, and HE Tudorel Postolache, Ambassador 
of Romania to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
17 June  Delegation of lawyers specialising in social and labour law from 
the Republic of Lithuania
8 July  HE  Julio  Núnez  Montesinos, Ambassador  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Spain to the Grand Duchy of LuxembourgOfficial visits  Meetings and visits
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15 July  HE Vasilis Kaskarelis, Permanent Representative of Greece to 
the European Union
2 September  HE  Peter  Charles  Grey,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary of Australia to the European Union
13 and 14 September  Delegation from the Constitutional Court of Austria
16 September  HE Tudorel Postolache, Ambassador of Romania to the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg
21 September  Mr Mats Melin, Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman, Sweden
23 September  Mr Cristoph Leitl, President of the Federal Economic Chamber of 
Austria and President of the Association of European Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres), accompanied by HE 
Ambassador Walter Hagg
23 September  Mr Wilfrido Fernandez de Brix, member of the Permanent Review 
Tribunal, arbitral tribunal of Mercosur
28 September  Mr Zoltán Lomnici, President of the Supreme Court of Hungary
28 September  Mr Milan M. Cvikl, Minister for European Affairs of Slovenia
5 October  Mr William N. Wamalwa, consultant (COMESA)
7 October  Mr Pavel Svoboda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech 
Republic
13 October  Delegation from the European Committee of Social Rights
14 October  Delegation from the Chinese Trademark Review and Adjudication 
Board, Beijing
18 October  Mr Evagelos Basliakos, Minister for Agriculture of Greece
18 October  HE G.J. Storm, Ambassador of the Netherlands to the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg
18 and 22 October  Delegation from the Court of Justice of the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
25 October  M. József Petrétei, Minister for Justice of Hungary
25 October  Opening of the exhibition ‘Anne Frank – a story for today’ in the 
presence of Mr P.H. Donner, Minister for Justice of the Netherlands
27 October  HE Tudorel Postolache, Ambassador of Romania to the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg
9 November  Delegation  from  the  Senate  of  the  Parliament  of  the  Czech 
Republic
11 November  Delegation from the Supreme Court of LithuaniaOfficial visits  Meetings and visits
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15 and 19 November  Delegation from the Court of Justice of the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
22 November  Mr Peter Hustinx, European Data Protection Supervisor
2 December  HE Ambassador Nicholas Emiliou, Permanent Representative of 
the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union
2 December  HE Mitsuaki Kojima, Ambassador of Japan to the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg
17 December  HE Rajendra Madhukar Abhyankar, Ambassador of India, Head 
of Mission to the European CommunitiesOfficial visits  Meetings and visits
152




















































































































































41 41 15 36 168 28 329
1
2
Other than those accompanying student groups
For the Member States which acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004, visits throughout 















































B  —    Study visits to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
in 2004
  Distribution by type of group 1Study visits  Meetings and visits
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C  —  Formal sittings in 2004
7 January  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Mr David 
A.O. Edward, Judge at the Court of Justice, and the entry into office of 
Sir Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann as Judge at the Court of 
Justice
30 April  Formal sitting for the giving of a solemn undertaking by Mr Stavros 
Dimas, new member of the Commission of the European Communities
11 May  Formal  sitting  on  the  occasion  of  the  entry  into  office  of  the  new 
members  of  the  Court  of  Justice  following  the  enlargement  of  the 
European Union
12 May  Formal  sitting  on  the  occasion  of  the  entry  into  office  of  the  new 
members of the Court of First Instance following the enlargement of the 
European Union
7 June  Formal  sitting  for  the  giving  of  a  solemn  undertaking  by  the  new 
members of the European Court of Auditors following the enlargement 
of the European Union
28 June  Formal sitting for the giving of a solemn undertaking by Mr Jacques 
Barrot, new member of the Commission of the European Communities, 
and the new members of the Commission following the enlargement of 
the European Union
7 July  Formal sitting on the occasion of the entry into office of Ms Verica 
Trstenjak as a member of the Court of First Instance
13 October  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Ms Fidelma 
Macken, Judge at the Court of Justice, and the entry into office of Mr 
Aindrias Ó Caoimh as Judge at the Court of Justice
10 December  Formal  sitting  for  the  giving  of  a  solemn  undertaking  by  Mr  Kikis 
Kazamias, new member of the European Court of Auditors158
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D  —  Visits and participation in official functions in 2004
Court of Justice
15 January  Participation of the President at the New Year audience at the 
Grand-Ducal Palace in Luxembourg
22 January  Participation  of  the  President  at  a  formal  sitting  of  the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
23 January  Participation  of  the  President  at  a  reception  given  by  the 
President of the Hellenic Republic in honour of the members 
of the Greek judiciary, in Athens
26 January  Receipt by the President of an honorary distinction given by 
the President of the Hellenic Republic during a ceremony in 
Athens
27 January  Participation of the President at the ceremony for awarding an 
honorary  doctorate  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  Luxembourg 
during  the  conference  ‘The  draft  international  treaty  for  a 
European  constitution’  organised  by  the  Department  for 
International Studies of the Democritus University of Thrace, 
in Komotini
2 and 3 April  Participation of the President in the official visit to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg by a delegation from the 
Court of Justice
17 May  Participation of the President at the formal sitting marking the 
75th anniversary of the Greek Council of State, in Athens
from 2 to 5 June  Participation of the President at the congress organised by the 
International Federation for European Law (FIDE) in Dublin
14 June  Participation of the President at the ‘Abschlussfeier’ of the 
School of German Law in Cracow
17 June  Participation of the President at the congress of the European 
Lawyers’ Union in Schengen
from 19 to 21 June  Participation of the President at the congress organised by 
the foundation ‘Budapest Forum for Europe’ in Budapest
from 17 to 19 July  Participation  of  the  President  at  the  ‘Constitutional  Courts 
Summit 2004’ organised by the Dräger Foundation and the 
Dedman School of Law of the Southern Methodist University, 
in Oxford
from 22 to 25 July  Participation  of  the  President  at  the  first  congress  of  the 
Societas Juris Publici Europaei, under the patronage of the 
Greek Parliament, on ‘The New European Union’, in KolimpariParticipation in official functions  Meetings and visits
160
Meetings and visits  Participation in official functions
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20 September  Participation of the President at a seminar organised by the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Finland,  in 
Helsinki
30 September  Participation of the President at the international conference 
organised  by  the  Constitutional  Court  of  the  Republic  of 
Slovenia on ‘The Position of Constitutional Rights following 
Integration into the European Union’, in Bled
21 October  Participation  of  the  President  in  the  events  organised  in 
Luxembourg by EFTA marking the 10th anniversary of the 
EFTA Court
28 and 29 October  Participation of the President at the ceremony for signature of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in Rome
1 November  Participation of the President at a meeting with the Presidents 
and Registrars of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
German Constitutional Court and the Austrian Constitutional 
Court, in Basle
3 November  Participation of the President in a ceremony in the course of 
which he was awarded an honorary doctorate, in Komotini
from 11 to 14 November  Participation of the President in an official visit to Romania on 
the invitation of the Prime Minister, Mr Adrian Nastase
15 November  Participation of the President at the ‘Colloquium on the Judicial 
Architecture of the European Union’ organised by the CCBE 
in Brussels
2 and 3 December  Participation  of  the  President  at  the  colloquium  on  ‘Das 
Vorabentscheidungsverfahren  und  die  nationalen  Gerichte’ 
(‘The preliminary reference procedure and national courts’) 
organised by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, 
in Brno
Court of First Instance
13 February  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
meetings at the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Denmark
15 April  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
meetings at the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in DenmarkParticipation in official functions  Meetings and visits
160
Meetings and visits  Participation in official functions
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23 April  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the international conference concerning Council Regulation 
No  1/2003  and  the  decentralised  application  of  European 
competition law, organised by the Dutch-speaking Order of 
Attorneys at the Brussels Bar
29 April  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the conference ‘State Aid Forum’ organised by the European 
State Aid Law Institute, in Brussels
7 May  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
a conference on competition law organised by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
from 2 to 5 June  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the congress organised by the International Federation for 
European Law (FIDE) in Dublin
14 and 15 June  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the  19th  Colloquium  of  the Association  of  the  Councils  of 
State  and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the 
European Union, in The Hague
1 and 2 July  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in a 
panel on the role and function of the future court for trade-mark 
law at the ‘4th FORUM Conference on Cross Border Litigation’ 
organised by FORUM, Institut für Management, in Cologne
10 September  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the commemorative ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary 
of the liberation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
7 and 8 October  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
a panel on rights, privileges and ethics in competition cases at 
the  annual  conference  of  the  Fordham  Corporate  Law 
Institute, in New York
20 and 21 October  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
the events organised in Luxembourg by EFTA marking the 
10th anniversary of the EFTA Court
28 and 29 October  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the  ceremony  for  signature  of  the  Treaty  establishing  a 
Constitution for Europe, in Rome
15 November  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the ‘Colloquium on the Judicial Architecture of the European 
Union’ organised by the CCBE in Brussels
19 November  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
a seminar organised by the University of CopenhagenParticipation in official functions  Meetings and visits
162 163
23 November  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
a conference on the new European competition law organised 
by Copenhagen Business School, in Copenhagen
6 December  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance at 
the ‘3rd Annual Merger Conference’ organised by the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law in London
29 December  Participation of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
meetings at the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign 
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A  —  Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice
General activity of the Court
1.  Cases completed, new cases, cases pending (2000-2004)
Cases completed
2.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
3.  Judgments, orders, opinions (2004) 
4.  Bench hearing actions (2004)
5.  Subject-matter of the action (2004)
6.  Proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2004)
7.  Judgments concerning failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations: 
outcome (2004)
8.  Duration of proceedings (2000-2004)
New cases
9.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
10.  Direct actions – Type of action (2004)
11.  Subject-matter of the action (2004)
12.  Actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations (2000-2004)
Cases pending as at 31 December
13.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
14.  Bench hearing actions (2004)
General trend in the work of the Court (1952-2004)
15.  New cases and judgments
16.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State per year)
17.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court 
or tribunal)
18.  New actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations166
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General activity of the Court
1. Cases completed, new cases, cases pending (2000-2004) 
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Cases completed 526 434 513 494 665
New cases 503 504 477 561 531
Cases pending 873 943 907 974 840
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being
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Cases completed
2. Nature of proceedings (2000-2004) 
12
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a preliminary ruling 268 182 241 233 262
Direct actions 180 179 215 193 299
A p p e a l s 7 35 94 75 78 9
Appeals concerning interim 
measures and interventions
5 1 1675
Opinions/Rulings 1 1 1
Special forms of procedure 2 3 4 9
Total 526 434 513 494 665
1
2
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken 
of the joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).
The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: taxation of costs (Article 74 of the
Rules of Procedure); legal aid (Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure); application to set a judgment
aside (Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure); third party proceedings (Article 97 of the Rules of
Procedure); interpretation of a judgment (Article 102 of the Rules of Procedure); revision of a
judgment (Article 98 of the Rules of Procedure); rectification of a judgment (Article 66 of the Rules
of Procedure); attachment procedure (Protocol on Privileges and Immunities); cases concerning
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References for a preliminary 
ruling 160 30 25 215
Direct actions 182 1 1 115 299
Appeals 33 34 1 6 74
Appeals concerning interim 
measures and interventions 55
Opinions/Rulings 11
Special forms of procedure 7 2 9





The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases, after joinder on the grounds of
similarity (a set of joined cases = one case).
Orders terminating proceedings by judicial determination (inadmissibility, manifest inadmissibility
and so forth).
Orders made following an application on the basis of Article 185 or 186 of the EC Treaty (now
Articles 242 EC and 243 EC), Article 187 of the EC Treaty (now Article 244 EC) or the
corresponding provisions of the EAEC and ECSC Treaties, or following an appeal against an order
concerning interim measures or intervention.
Orders terminating the case by removal from the register, declaration that there is no need to give a
decision or referral to the Court of First Instance.
2,49%
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Full Court 21 21
Grand Chamber/Small Plenary 32 1 33
Chambers (5 judges) 257 18 275
Chambers (3 judges) 113 61 174
President 6 6
Total 423 86 509
1
2 Orders terminating proceedings by judicial determination (other than those removing a case
from the register, declaring that there is no need to give a decision or referring a case to the
Court of First Instance).
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being
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Accession of new States 2 2
Agriculture 52 8 60
Approximation of laws 31 2 33
Area of freedom, security and justice   2 2
Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories
 11
Brussels Convention 7 7
Commun Customs Tariff 3 1 4
Company law 14 2 16
Competition 22 7 29
Customs union 12 12
Economic and monetary policy  2   2
Energy 1 1
Environment and consumers 60 7 67
European citizenship 1 1
External relations 6 3 9
Fisheries policy 5 1 6
Free movement of capital 4 4
Free movement of goods 17 17
Freedom of establishment 11 3 14
Freedom of movement for persons 15 2 17
Freedom to provide services 13 10 23
Industrial policy 11 11
Intellectual property 15 5 20
Law governing the institutions 9 4 13
Principles of Community law 3 1 4
Social policy 41 3 44
Social security for migrant workers 6 6
State aid 17 4 21
Taxation 26 2 28
Transport 11 11
EC Treaty 415 70 485
CS Treaty 11
EA Treaty 22
Privileges and immunities 1 1
Procedure 8 8
Staff Regulations 5 7 12
Others 51 6 2 1
OVERALL TOTAL 423 86 509
1
2 Orders terminating proceedings by judicial determination (other than those removing a case from the
register, declaring that there is no need to give a decision or referring a case to the Court of First
Instance).
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the


































































































































































Accession of new States 1 1 2
Approximation of laws 1 1
Competition 1 1
Environment and consumers 2 2
Transport 1 1
Total EC Treaty 25 5 2
EA Treaty
Others
OVERALL TOTAL 2 5 5 2
1 The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases, after joinder on the grounds of similarity
(a set of joined cases = one case).
Outcome
6. Proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2004) 
1Court of Justice  Tables and statistics
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Germany 14 1 15
Estonia
Greece 8 1 9
Spain 10 1 11
France 23 2 25
Ireland 6 6








Austria 15 1 16
Poland
Portugal 6 1 7
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland 4 1 5
Sweden 5 1 6
United Kingdom 9 9
Total 144 11 155
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the
joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).
7. Completed cases – Judgments concerning failure of a Member State to fulfil 


































































































































































































Infringement declared Action dismissed
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8. Completed cases – Duration of proceedings (2000-2004) 
1
(Decisions by way of judgments and orders) 
2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a 
preliminary ruling
21,6 22,7 24,1 25,5 23,5
Direct actions 23,9 23,1 24,3 24,7 20,2
Appeals 19 16,3 19,1 28,7 21,3
1
2
The following types of cases are excluded from the calculation of the duration of proceedings:
cases involving an interlocutory judgment or a measure of inquiry; opinions and rulings on
agreements; special forms of procedure (namely taxation of costs, legal aid, application to set a
judgment aside, third party proceedings, interpretation of a judgment, revision of a judgment,
rectification of a judgment, attachment procedure, cases concerning immunity); cases terminated
by an order removing the case from the register, declaring that there is no need to give a decision
or referring or transferring the case to the Court of First Instance; proceedings for interim measures
and appeals concerning interim measures and interventions.
The duration of proceedings is expressed in months and tenths of months.
Other than orders terminating a case by removal from the register, declaration that there is no need








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a preliminary ruling Direct actions AppealsCourt of Justice  Tables and statistics
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New cases
9. Nature of proceedings (2000-2004) 
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a preliminary ruling 224 237 216 210 249
Direct actions 197 187 204 277 219
Appeals 66 72 46 63 52
Appeals concerning interim measures and 
interventions
1 37456
Opinion/Rulings 2 1 1
Special forms of procedure 1 1 7 5 4
Total 503 504 477 561 531
Applications for interim measures 4 6 1 7 3
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a preliminary ruling
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim measures and interventions
Opinion/Rulings
Special forms of procedure
Applications for interim measuresTables and statistics  Court of Justice
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Actions for annulment 25
Actions for failure to act
Actions for damages
Actions for failure to fulfil obligations 193
Actions on arbitration clauses
Others 1
Total 219
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being
taken of the joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).
10. New cases – Direct actions – Type of action (2004) 
Others
0,46%
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11. New cases 

















































































































Accession of new States 2 1 1 4
Agriculture 22 27 1 50
Approximation of laws 26 12 2 1 41
Area of freedom, security and justice 7 5 12
Brussels Convention 3 3
Commercial policy 1 1
Common foreign and security policy   2 2
Commun Customs Tariff 6 1 7
Community own resources 2 2 4
Company law 12 13 25
Competiton 5 9 18 1 33
Customs union 6 6
Economic and monetary policy  1 1
Energy 2 2
Environment and consumers 40 6 2 48
European citizenship 4 4
External relations 1 6 1 8 1
Fisheries policy 7 1 8
Free movement of capital 1 8 9
Free movement of goods 2 10 12
Freedom of establishment 5 11 16
Freedom of movement for persons 11 12 23
Freedom to provide services 12 15 1 28
Industrial policy 11 1 12
Intellectual property   1 7 8
Law governing the institutions 7 6 1 14
Principles of Community law 2 2
Privileges and immunities 1 1 2
Regional policy 2 1 3
Social policy 17 18 35
Social security for migrant workers 5 5
State aid 2 19 3 24
Taxation 3 37 40
Transport 17 4 21
EC Treaty 218 245 44 6 513 1
EU Treaty 22
CS Treaty  11
EA Treaty 12 3
Privileges and immunities 1
Procedure 2 2 3
Staff Regulations 5 5
Others 77 4
OVERALL TOTAL 219 249 52 6 526 5
1
2
Taking no account of applications for interim measures.
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of
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Cases pending as at 31 December
13. Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
References for a preliminary 
ruling
432 487 462 439 426
Direct actions 326 334 323 407 327
Appeals 111 120 117 121 85
Special forms of procedure 2 1 5 6 1
Opinions/ Rulings 2 1 1 1
Total 873 943 907 974 840
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of
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Not assigned 236 256 55 547
Full Court 11 2
Grand Chamber 10 34 12 56
Chambers (5 judges) 49 113 14 1 177
Chambers (3 judges) 31 23 3 57
President 1 1
Total 327 426 85 2 840
1 The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being














21,07%Tables and statistics  Court of Justice
182
General trend in the work of the Court (1952-2004)








































































































































1954 10 10 2
1955 9 9 2 4
1956 11 11 2 6
1957 19 19 2 4
1958 43 43 10
1959 47 47 5 13
1960 23 23 2 18
1961 25 1 26 1 11
1962 30 5 35 2 20
1963 99 6 105 7 17
1964 49 6 55 4 31
1965 55 7 62 4 52
1966 30 1 31 2 24
1967 14 23 37 24
1968 24 9 33 1 27
1969 60 17 77 2 30
1970 47 32 79 64
1971 59 37 96 1 60
1972 42 40 82 2 61
1973 131 61 192 6 80
1974 63 39 102 8 63
1975 62 69 131 5 78
1976 52 75 127 6 88
1977 74 84 158 6 100
1978 147 123 270 7 97
1979 1218 106 1324 6 138
1980 180 99 279 14 132
1981 214 108 322 17 128
1982 217 129 346 16 185
1983 199 98 297 11 151
1984 183 129 312 17 165
1985 294 139 433 23 211
1986 238 91 329 23 174
1987 251 144 395 21 208
1988 193 179 372 17 238
1989 244 139 383 19 188
1990 
4 221 141 15 1 378 12 193
1991 142 186 13 1 342 9 204


















General trend in the work of the Court (1952-2004)








































































































































1954 10 10 2
1955 9 9 2 4
1956 11 11 2 6
1957 19 19 2 4
1958 43 43 10
1959 47 47 5 13
1960 23 23 2 18
1961 25 1 26 1 11
1962 30 5 35 2 20
1963 99 6 105 7 17
1964 49 6 55 4 31
1965 55 7 62 4 52
1966 30 1 31 2 24
1967 14 23 37 24
1968 24 9 33 1 27
1969 60 17 77 2 30
1970 47 32 79 64
1971 59 37 96 1 60
1972 42 40 82 2 61
1973 131 61 192 6 80
1974 63 39 102 8 63
1975 62 69 131 5 78
1976 52 75 127 6 88
1977 74 84 158 6 100
1978 147 123 270 7 97
1979 1218 106 1324 6 138
1980 180 99 279 14 132
1981 214 108 322 17 128
1982 217 129 346 16 185
1983 199 98 297 11 151
1984 183 129 312 17 165
1985 294 139 433 23 211
1986 238 91 329 23 174
1987 251 144 395 21 208
1988 193 179 372 17 238
1989 244 139 383 19 188
1990 
4 221 141 15 1 378 12 193
1991 142 186 13 1 342 9 204

















2Court of Justice  Tables and statistics
183
1993 265 204 17 486 13 203
1994 128 203 12 1 344 4 188
1995 109 251 46 2 408 3 172
1996 132 256 25 3 416 4 193
1997 169 239 30 5 443 1 242
1998 147 264 66 4 481 2 254
1999 214 255 68 4 541 4 235
2000 199 224 66 13 502 4 273
2001 187 237 72 7 503 6 244
2002 204 216 46 4 470 1 269
2003 278 210 63 5 556 7 308
2004 220 249 52 6 527 3 375




4 Since 1990 staff cases have been brought before the Court of First Instance.
Gross figures; special forms of procedure are not included.
Net figures.
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Total
Cour de cassation 61
Cour d'arbitrage2
Conseil d'État 35
Other courts or tribunals 397 495
Nejvyššího soudu 
Nejvyšší správní soud 
Ústavní soud 
Other courts or tribunals
Højesteret 19






Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen 1
Other courts or tribunals 955 1414
Riigikohus 
Other courts or tribunals
Άρειος Πάγος 4
Συµβούλιο της Επικρατείας 21
Other courts or tribunals 67 92
Tribunal Supremo 12
Audiencia Nacional 1
Juzgado Central de lo Penal 7
Other courts or tribunals 133 153
Cour de cassation 70
Conseil d'État 28
Other courts or tribunals 578 676
Supreme Court 14
High Court 15
Other courts or tribunals 16 45
Corte suprema di Cassazione 82
Consiglio di Stato 48
Other courts or tribunals 714 844
Ανώτατο ∆ικαστήριο
Other courts or tribunals
Augstākā tiesa 
Satversmes tiesa 
Other courts or tribunals
Konstitucinis Teismas 
Lietuvos Auksciausiasis
Vyriausiasis administracinis Teismas 
Other courts or tribunals
Cour supérieure de justice 10
Conseil d'État 13
Cour administrative 5
Other courts or tribunals 29 57
Legfelsöbb Bíroság 
Other courts or tribunals 22
Constitutional Court
Court of Appeal
Other courts or tribunals
Raad van State 45
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 131
Centrale Raad van Beroep 42
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven 118
Tariefcommissie 34
















New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court or 
tribunal)
17. General trend in the work of the Court (1952-2004) –  
Malta







Other courts or tribunals 136 261
Sad Najwyzszy
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny
Other courts or tribunals
31
Other courts or tribunals 24 55
Vrhovno sodišče
Vstavno sodišče
Other courts or tribunals
Ústavný Súd 
Najvyšší súd 
Other courts or tribunals
Korkein hallinto-oikeus 12
Korkein oikeus 7




Other courts or tribunals 27 50
House of Lords 31
Court of Appeal 31
Other courts or tribunals 334 396
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B —   Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of First Instance
General activity of the Court of First Instance
1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (1996-2004)
New cases
2.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
3.  Type of action (2000-2004)
4.  Subject-matter of the action (2000-2004)
Completed cases
5.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
6.  Subject-matter of the action (2004)
7.  Bench hearing action (2004)
8.  Duration of proceedings in months (2000-2004)
Cases pending as at 31 December of each year
9.  Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
10.  Subject-matter of the action (2000-2004)
Miscellaneous
11.  Decisions in proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2004)
12.  Appeals against decisions of the Court of First Instance
13.  Results of appeals
14.  General trend (1989-2004) – New cases, completed cases, cases 
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General activity of the Court of First Instance 
1. New cases, completed cases, cases pending (1996 – 2004)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
New cases 229 644 238 384 398 345 411 466 536
Completed cases 186 186 348 659 344 340 331 339 361
Cases pending 659 1117 1007 732 786 792 872 999 1174
845 1303
845 1303
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
New cases 217 246 231 313 336 345 411 442 536
Completed cases 178 178 268 267 318 275 320 327 319
Cases pending 424 492 456 501 519 589 680 795 1012
1
In the above table, the figures include certain groups of identical or related cases (cases concerning
milk quotas, customs agents, State aid in the Netherlands for service-stations and State aid in the
region of Venice, the restructuring of the fisheries sector, and staff cases). If those sets of cases are
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New cases




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other actions 242 180 198 214 240
Intellectual property 34 37 83 100 110
Staff cases 111 110 112 124 146
Special forms of procedure 11 18 18 28 40
Total 398 345 411 466 536
1
2
2000: The figures include three cases concerning State aid in the Netherlands for service-
stations and 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice.
2003: The figures include 24 cases concerning the restructuring of the fisheries sector.
The entry 'other actions' in this table and on the following pages refers to all actions brought by
natural or legal persons other than actions brought by officials of the European Communities
and intellectual property cases.
The following are considered to be 'special forms of procedure' (in this and the following tables):
application to set a judgment aside (Article 41 of the EC Statute; Article 122 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court of First Instance); third party proceedings (Article 42 of the EC Statute;
Article 123 of the Rules of Procedure); revision of a judgment (Article 44 of the EC Statute;
Article 125 of the Rules of Procedure); interpretation of a judgment (Article 43 of the EC Statute;
Article 129 of the Rules of Procedure); taxation of costs (Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure);
legal aid (Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure); rectification of a judgment (Article 84 of the
Rules of Procedure).
2004: The number relating to other actions includes 48 actions brought by Member States, in
consequence of the new areas of jurisdiction allocated to the Court of First Instance since 1
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Distribution in 2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Actions for annulment 220 134 171 174 199
Actions for failure to act 61 71 21 31 5
Actions for damages 17 21 13 24 19
Arbitration clauses 8237
Intellectual property 34 37 83 100 110
Staff cases 110 110 112 124 146
Special forms of procedure 11 18 18 28 40
Total 398 345 411 466 536
2000: The figures include three cases concerning State aid in the Netherlands for service-
stations and 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Accession of new States 1 1
Agriculture 23 17 9 11 25
Approximation of laws 2 1 4 1
Arbitration clause 2 1
Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories
66 1
Commercial policy 8 4 5 6 12
Common Customs Tariff 2 1 1
Common foreign and security policy 6 3 2 4
Company law 4 6 3 3 6
Competition 36 39 61 43 36
Culture 2 1
Customs union 2 5 5 11
Energy 2 2
Environment and consumers 14 2 8 13 30
European citizenship 2
External relations 8 14 8 10 3
Fisheries policy 1 3 6 25 3
Free movement of goods 17 1 1
Freedom of establishment 1 1
Freedom of movement for persons 8 3 2 7 1
Intellectual property 34 37 83 101 110
Justice and home affairs   1 1
Law governing the institutions 29 12 18 26 33
Regional policy 1 6 7 10
Research, information, education and statistics 1 3 1 3 6
Social policy 7 1 3 2 5
Staff Regulations 1
State aid 80 42 51 25 46
Taxation 1 5
Transport 2 1 1 3
Total EC Treaty 280 213 278 303 349
Competition 1 10
Iron and steel 2 1
State aid 1 2 1
Total CS Treaty 1 4 2 11
Nuclear energy 1 1
Total EA Treaty 1 1
Staff Regulations 106 110 112 124 146
OVERALL TOTAL 387 327 393 438 496
1 Special forms of procedure are not taken into acount in this table.
4. New cases – Subject-matter of the action (2000-2004)  
1Court of First Instance  Tables and statistics
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Completed cases
5. Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
00
00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other actions 219 162 189 169 159
Intellectual property 7 30 29 47 76
Staff cases 101 133 96 104 101
Special forms of procedure 17 15 17 19 25
Total 344 340 331 339 361
The number relating to other actions includes 1 action brought by a Member State, in consequence
of the new areas of jurisdiction allocated to the Court of First Instance since 1 June 2004 by virtue
of the amendment of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
2004: the figures include four cases concerning milk quotas and 38 cases concerning State aid in
the Netherlands for service-stations.
2000: the figures include eight cases concerning milk quotas, 13 cases concerning customs agents
and five cases concerning the regrading of officials.
2001: the figures include 14 cases concerning milk quotas and 51 cases concerning the regrading
of officials.
2002: the figures include seven cases concerning milk quotas and three cases concerning the
regrading of officials.
2003: the figures include four cases concerning milk quotas and eight cases concerning State aid
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6. Completed cases – Subject-matter of the action (2004) 
1
Judgments Orders Total
Agriculture 4 11 15
Approximation of laws 3 3
Arbitration clause 2 2
Commercial policy 1 1
Common foreign and security policy 2 2
Company law 2 2
Competition 22 4 26
Customs union 3 3
Environment and consumers 1 3 4
External relations 4 3 7
Fisheries policy 3 3 6
Free movement of goods 1 1
Freedom of movement for persons 2 2
Intellectual property 47 29 76
Law governing the institutions 3 13 16
Regional policy 1 3 4
Social policy 4 4
S t a t e  a i d 1 14 35 4
Taxation 1 1
Transport 1 1
Total EC Treaty 103 127 230
Iron and steel 3 3
S t a t e  a i d 112
Total CS Treaty 4 1 5
Staff Regulations 65 36 101
OVERALL TOTAL 172 164 336
1 Special forms of procedure are not taken into acount in this table.Court of First Instance  Tables and statistics
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7. Completed cases – Bench hearing action (2004)
Judgments and Orders
Chambers (3 judges) 276
Chambers (5 judges) 64
Single judge 14
President of the Court 7
Total 361
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other actions 27,5 20,7 21 21,5 22,6
Intellectual property 9,1 16,4 19,5 15,8 17,3








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other actions Intellectual property Staff casesCourt of First Instance  Tables and statistics
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Cases pending as at 31 December of each year
9. Nature of proceedings (2000-2004)
00
00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other actions 561 579 588 633 714
Intellectual property 44 51 105 158 192
Staff cases 179 156 172 192 237
Special forms of procedure 2 6 7 16 31
Total 786 792 872 999 1174
2004: the figures include 52 cases concerning milk quotas, 27 cases concerning State aid in the
Netherlands for service-stations, 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice, and 24 cases
concerning the restructuring of the fisheries sector.
The number relating to other actions includes 47 actions brought by Member States, in consequence of
the new areas of jurisdiction allocated to the Court of First Instance since 1 June 2004 by virtue of the
amendment of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
2000: the figures include 80 cases concerning milk quotas, 74 cases concerning State aid in the
Netherlands for service-stations, 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice and 54 cases
concerning the regrading of officials.
2001: the figures include 67 cases concerning milk quotas, 73 cases concerning State aid in the
Netherlands for service-stations, 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice and three
cases concerning the regrading of officials.
2002: the figures include 60 cases concerning milk quotas, 73 cases concerning State aid in the
Netherlands for service-stations and 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice.
2003: the figures include 56 cases concerning milk quotas, 65 cases concerning State aid in the
Netherlands for service-stations, 59 cases concerning State aid in the region of Venice, and 24 cases
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10. Cases pending as at 31 December of each year –  
Subject-matter of the action (2000-2004) 
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Accession of new States 1
Agriculture 144 114 95 85 95
Approximation of laws 2 1 4 1
Arbitration clause 2 3 2
Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories
11 15 9 6 6
C o m m e r c i a l   p o l i c y 1 61 51 41 42 5
Common Customs Tariff 3 2 3 1
Common foreign and security policy 3 3 9 11 13
Company law 4 6 5 6 10
Competition 79 96 114 119 129
Culture 2 3 1
Customs union 33 20 7 10 18
E n e r g y 2244
Environment and consumers 15 17 13 17 44
European citizenship 1
External relations 9 21 23 22 18
Fisheries policy 8 7 8 31 28
Free movement of goods 2 3 1 1 1
Freedom of establishment 5 2   1
Freedom of movement for persons 1 3 2 1
Intellectual property 44 51 105 159 193
Justice and home affairs   1 1
Law governing the institutions 27 20 27 32 49
Regional policy 1 6 13 19
Research, information, education and statistics 1 4 3 2 8
Social policy 4 3 4 5 6
Staff Regulations 2 2 1
State aid 176 207 227 226 218
Taxation 1 1
T r a n s p o r t 13213
Total EC Treaty 590 623 688 773 892
C o m p e t i t i o n 6 11 11 1
Iron and steel 1 2 2 3
State aid 7 6 3 3 1
Total CS Treaty 14 8 6 17 12
Law governing the institutions 1 1 1
Nuclear energy     1
Total EA Treaty 1   1 2
Staff Regulations 179 155 171 192 237
OVERALL TOTAL 784 786 865 983 1143






































































































State aid 44 1 1
Company law 5 3 3  
Competition 1 7 2 2
Environment and consumers 5 6 6
Fisheries policy 1 1 1
Law governing the institutions 2 2 1  
Taxation    1  
18 24 14 3
Staff Regulations 8 10 7
OVERALL TOTAL 26 34 21 3
1
11. Decisions in proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2004) 
Applications for interim measures brought to a conclusion by removal from the register or in respect of
which it was decided that there was no need to adjudicate are not counted in this table.
Outcome
1




Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought


















1 Total number of decisions open to challenge – judgments, and orders relating to admissibility,
concerning interim measures, declaring that there is no need to give a decision or refusing leave to
was brought.









































































Number of decisions against which appeals were brought
Total number of decisions open to challenge (1)
intervene – in respect of which the period for bringing an appeal expired or against which an appealCourt of First Instance  Tables and statistics
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Accession of new States 2 2
Agriculture 8 8
Approximation of laws 1     1
Area of freedom, security and justice 1 1
Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories
1 1
Company law     1 1
Competition 5 8 1 14
Environment and consumers 3 3
External relations 2     2
Fisheries policy 2 2
Freedom to provide services 3 3
Intellectual property 19 1 2 22
Law governing the institutions 6 4 1 11
Procedure 2 2
Social policy 2 2
Staff Regulations 9 1 1   11
State aid 7 1 8
Total 73 14 1 6 94Tables and statistics  Court of First Instance
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New cases, completed cases, cases pending
New cases Completed cases
Cases pending as 
at 31 December
1989 169 1 168
1990 59 82 145
1991 95 67 173
1992 123 125 171
1993 596 106 661
1994 409 442 628
1995 253 265 616
1996 229 186 659
1997 644 186 1117
1998 238 348 1008
1999 384 659 732
2000 398 344 786
2001 345 340 792
2002 411 331 872
2003 466 339 999
2004 536 361 1174
Total 5355 4182
New cases Completed cases Cases pending
1993 201 106 266
1994 236 128 374
1995 221 210 385
1996 217 178 424
1997 246 178 492
1998 231 268 455
1999 313 267 501
2000 336 318 519
2001 345 275 589
2002 411 320 680
2003 442 327 795
2004 536 319 1012
Total 3735 2894
1989: 153 pending cases referred back by the Court of Justice.
1993: 451 pending cases referred back by the Court of Justice.
1994:   14 pending cases referred back by the Court of Justice.
2004:   22 pending cases referred back by the Court of Justice.
If the groups of identical or related cases are excluded (see '1. New cases, completed 
cases, cases pending (1996-2004)'), the following figures are obtained:
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